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In January 2010, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights decided to collaborate on the preparation of this 
Handbook on European case-law concerning non-discrimination. We are pleased to 
be able to present the concrete results of this joint effort.
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union became legally binding. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty pro-
vides for EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. In this context, 
increased knowledge of common principles developed by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and the European Court of Human Rights is not only desirable but 
in fact essential for the proper national implementation of a key aspect of European 
human rights law: the standards on non-discrimination.
2010 marked the 60th anniversary of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which sets out a general prohibition on discrimination in its Article 14, and the 
10th anniversary of the adoption of the two fundamental texts in the fight 
against discrimination at EU level – the Racial Equality and Employment Equality 
Directives. With the impressive body of case-law developed by the European Court 
of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union in the field of 
non-discrimination, it seemed useful to present, in an accessible way, a handbook 
with a CD-Rom intended for legal practitioners in the EU and Council of Europe 
Member States and beyond, such as judges, prosecutors and lawyers, as well as 
law-enforcement officers. Being at the forefront of human rights protection, they, 
in particular, need to be aware of the non-discrimination principles in order to 
be able to apply them effectively in practice. For it is at the national level that 
non-discrimination provisions come to life, and there on the front line that the 
challenges become visible.
Erik Fribergh
Registrar of the  
European Court of Human Rights
Morten Kjaerum
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This introductory chapter will explain the origins of non-discrimination law in 
Europe, as well as current and future changes in both the substantive law and the 
procedures for protection.
It is important from the outset to note that both judges and prosecutors are 
required to apply the protections provided for under the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and those under 
the European Union (EU) non-discrimination directives irrespective of whether a 
party to the proceedings invokes them. The national courts and administrators of 
justice are not limited to the legal arguments advanced by the parties, but must 
determine the applicable law based on the factual matrix forwarded by the parties 
involved; essentially, this means that the parties to a case effectively choose how 
to present a non-discrimination claim through the arguments and evidence that 
they advance. This is consequent to the governing legal principles evident in each 
respective system, for example, the direct effect of EU law in the 27 Member States 
that make up the EU and the direct applicability afforded to the ECHR, which means 
that it must be complied with in all EU and Council of Europe (CoE) Member States. 
However, there is one significant constraint on this requirement, and this is in the 
form of any applicable limitation period. Before considering applying the non-
discrimination protections, practitioners will have to familiarise themselves with 
any relevant limitation period applying to the jurisdiction being considered and 
determine whether the court in question can deal with the issue. 
The practical consequences of this are that practitioners, where appropriate, are 
able to invoke the relevant non-discrimination instruments and pertinent case-law 
before national courts and authorities.
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This makes it imperative that practitioners understand the systems that are currently 
in place in the area of non-discrimination, their application, and how they apply in 
given situations. 
1.1.  Context and background to European  
non-discrimination law 
The term ‘European non-discrimination law’ suggests that a single Europe-wide 
system of rules relating to non-discrimination exists; however, it is in fact made 
up of a variety of contexts. This Handbook draws mainly from the ECHR and EU law. 
These two systems have separate origins both in terms of when they were created 
and why.
1.1.1.  The Council of Europe and the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
The CoE is an inter-governmental organisation (IGO) that originally came together 
after the Second World War with the aim of promoting, among other things, the 
rule of law, democracy, human rights and social development (see Preamble and 
Article 1 of the Statute of the Council of Europe). The CoE Member States adopted 
the ECHR to help achieve these aims, which was the first of the modern human 
rights treaties drawing from the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The ECHR sets out a legally binding obligation on its members to guarantee 
a list of human rights to everyone (not just citizens) within their jurisdiction. The 
implementation of the ECHR is reviewed by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) (originally assisted by a Commission), which hears cases brought against 
Member States. The Council of Europe currently has 47 members and any State 
wishing to join must also accede to the ECHR. 
The ECHR has been altered and added to since its inception in 1950 through what 
are known as ‘Protocols’. The most significant procedural change to the ECHR was 
Protocol 11 (1994), which turned the ECtHR into a permanent and full-time body, 
and abolished the Commission. This Protocol was designed to help the ECHR 
mechanisms cope with the growth in cases that would come from States in the 
east of Europe joining the Council of Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
break-up of the former Soviet Union. 
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The prohibition on discrimination is guaranteed by Article 14 of the ECHR,1 which 
guarantees equal treatment in the enjoyment of the other rights set down in the 
Convention. Protocol 12 (2000) to the ECHR, not yet ratified by all EU Member 
States,2 expands the scope of the prohibition of discrimination by guaranteeing 
equal treatment in the enjoyment of any right (including rights under national law). 
According to the Explanatory Report to the Protocol, it was created out of a desire to 
strengthen protection against discrimination which was considered to form a core 
element of guaranteeing human rights. The Protocol emerged out of debates over 
how to strengthen sex and racial equality in particular. 
Although not a primary focus of this Handbook, it is worth noting by the reader 
that the principle of non-discrimination is a governing principle in a number of CoE 
documents. Importantly, the 1996 version of the European Social Charter includes 
both a right to equal opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment 
and occupation, protecting against discrimination on the grounds of sex.3 Additional 
protection against discrimination can be witnessed in the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities,4 in the CoE Convention on Action Against 
Trafficking in Human Beings,5 and in the CoE Convention on the Access to Official 
Documents. There is also protection against the promotion of discrimination in the 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime. The issue of non-discrimination 
has clearly been influential in the shaping of the legislative documents produced by 
the CoE and is seen as a fundamental freedom that needs to be protected. 
1.1.2.  The European Union and  
the non-discrimination directives 
The European Union (EU) was originally an inter-governmental organisation, but is 
now a separate legal personality. The EU is currently made up of 27 Member States. 
It has evolved from three separate IGOs established in the 1950s that dealt with 
energy security and free trade (collectively known as the ‘European Communities’). 
The core purpose of the European Communities was the stimulation of economic 
1  A training guide in the form of a PowerPoint presentation offering guidance on the application of 
Article 14 of the ECHR can be found on the Council of Europe Human Rights Education for Legal 
Professionals website: www.coehelp.org/course/view.php?id=18&topic=1.
2  For the actual number of EU Member States that ratified Protocol 12, see: www.conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=177&CM=7&DF=16/07/2010&CL=ENG.
3 See Article 20 and Article E in Part V of the European Social Charter.
4 See Articles 4, 6(2) and 9 in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
5 See Article 2(1) in the CoE Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings.
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development through the free movement of goods, capital, people and services. 
In order to allow for a level playing field between the Member States, the original 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957) contained a provision 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in the context of employment. This 
would prevent Member States gaining a competitive advantage over each other 
by offering lower rates of pay or less favourable conditions of work to women. 
Although this body of law evolved considerably to include areas such as pensions, 
pregnancy and statutory social security regimes, until 2000 non-discrimination law 
in the EU applied only to the context of employment and social security, and only 
covered the ground of sex. 
During the 1990s, significant lobbying was carried out by public interest groups 
calling for the prohibition on discrimination to be extended in EU law to cover other 
areas such as race and ethnicity, as well as sexual orientation, religious belief, age 
and disability. Fears of resurgent extremist nationalism among some EU Member 
States stimulated sufficient political will among leaders to allow for the European 
Community Treaty to be amended, giving the Community the competence to 
legislate in these areas. 
In 2000, two directives were adopted: the Employment Equality Directive prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, religious belief, age and disability 
in the area of employment; the Racial Equality Directive prohibited discrimination on 
the basis of race or ethnicity in the context of employment, but also in accessing the 
welfare system and social security, and goods and services. This was a significant 
expansion of the scope of non-discrimination law under the EU, which recognised 
that in order to allow individuals to reach their full potential in the employment 
market, it was also essential to guarantee them equal access to areas such as health, 
education and housing. In 2004, the Gender Goods and Services Directive expanded 
the scope of sex discrimination to the area of goods and services. However, 
protection on the grounds of sex does not quite match the scope of protection under 
the Racial Equality Directive since the Gender Social Security Directive guarantees 
equal treatment in relation to social security only and not to the broader welfare 
system, such as social protection and access to healthcare and education.
Although sexual orientation, religious belief, disability and age are only protected 
grounds in the context of employment, a proposal to extend protection for 
these grounds to the area of accessing goods and services (known as ‘Horizontal 
Directive’) is currently being debated in the EU institutions. 
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1.2.  Current and future developments in 
European protection mechanisms
1.2.1. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
The original treaties of the European Communities did not contain any reference to 
human rights or their protection. It was not thought that the creation of an area of 
free trade in Europe could have any impact relevant to human rights. However, as 
cases began to appear before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) alleging human 
rights breaches caused by Community law, the ECJ developed a body of judge-made 
law known as the ‘general principles’ of Community Law.6 According to the ECJ, 
these general principles would reflect the content of human rights protection found 
in national constitutions and human rights treaties, in particular the ECHR. The ECJ 
stated that it would ensure the compliance of Community Law with these principles. 
In recognising that its policies could have an impact on human rights and in an 
effort to make citizens feel ‘closer’ to the EU, the EU and its Member States 
proclaimed the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000. The Charter contains a list 
of human rights, inspired by the rights contained in the constitutions of the Member 
States, the ECHR and universal human rights treaties such as the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. The Charter, as adopted in 2000, was merely a ‘declaration’, 
which means that it was not legally binding, although the European Commission 
(the primary body for proposing new EU legislation) stated that its proposals would 
be in compliance. 
When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009, it altered the status of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights to make it a legally binding document. As a result, 
the institutions of the EU are bound to comply with it. The EU Member States are 
also bound to comply with the Charter, but only when implementing EU law. A 
protocol to the Charter was agreed in relation to the Czech Republic, Poland and the 
UK which restates this limitation in express terms. Article 21 of the Charter contains 
a prohibition on discrimination on various grounds, which will be returned to later 
in this Handbook. This means that individuals can complain about EU legislation or 
national legislation that implements EU law if they feel the Charter has not been 
6  The European Court of Justice is now referred to as the ‘General Court’ after amendments introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty. However, this Handbook continues to refer to the ECJ in order to avoid confusion since 
most existing literature that practitioners may wish to consult was published before the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009.
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respected. National courts can seek guidance on the correct interpretation of EU law 
from the ECJ through the preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. 
1.2.2. UN human rights treaties
Human rights protection mechanisms are, of course, not limited to Europe. As 
well as other regional mechanisms in the Americas, Africa and the Middle East, 
there is a significant body of international human rights law that has been created 
through the United Nations (UN). All EU Member States are party to the following 
UN human rights treaties, all of which contain a prohibition on discrimination: 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),7 the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),8 the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),9 the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),10 the Convention Against 
Torture,11  and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).12 The most recently 
created human rights treaty at UN level is the 2006 Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD).13 Traditionally, human rights treaties have been 
open to membership only for States. However, as States cooperate more through 
inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), to which they delegate significant powers 
and responsibilities, there is a pressing need to make sure that IGOs also commit 
themselves to give effect to the human rights obligations of their Member States. 
The UNCRPD is the first UN level human rights treaty that is open to membership 
by regional integration organisations, and which the EU ratified in December 2010.
The UNCRPD contains an extensive list of rights for persons with disabilities, aimed 
at securing equality in the enjoyment of their rights, as well as imposing a range of 
obligations on the State to undertake positive measures. Like the Charter, this binds 
7 999 UNTS 171.
8 993 UNTS 3.
9 660 UNTS 195.
10 1249 UNTS 13.
11 1465 UNTS 85.
12  1577 UNTS 3. In addition, some Member States are also party to the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (UN Doc. A/61/611, 13 December 2006) and the International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (UN Doc. A/61/488, 20 December 2006); 
however, none are yet party to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (UN Doc. A/RES/45/158, 1 July 2003).
13 UN Doc. A/61/611, 13 December 2006.
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the EU institutions, and will bind the Member States when they are applying EU law. 
In addition individual Member States are currently in the process of acceding to the 
UNCRPD in their own right, which will also impose obligations upon them directly. 
The UNCRPD is likely to become a reference point for interpreting both EU and ECtHR 
law relating to discrimination on the basis of disability.
1.2.3.  European Union accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights
Currently EU law and the ECHR are closely connected. All Member States of the EU 
have joined the ECHR. As noted above, the ECJ looks to the ECHR for inspiration 
when determining the scope of human rights protection under EU law. The Charter 
of Fundamental Rights also reflects (though is not limited to) the range of rights in 
the ECHR. Accordingly, EU law, even though the EU is not yet actually a signatory 
to the ECHR, is largely consistent with the ECHR. However, if an individual wishes 
to make a complaint about the EU and its failure to guarantee human rights, 
they are not entitled to take the EU, as such, before the ECtHR. Instead they must 
either: make a complaint before the national courts, which can then refer the case 
to the ECJ through the preliminary reference procedure; or complain about the EU 
indirectly before the ECtHR while bringing an action against a Member State.
The Lisbon Treaty contains a provision mandating the EU to join the ECHR as a party 
in its own right and Protocol 14 to the ECHR amends it to allow this to happen. It is 
not yet clear what effect this will take in practice, and in particular what the future 
relationship between the ECJ and the ECtHR will be, as the negotiations for EU acces-
sion may take several years. However, it will at the very least allow individuals to 
bring the EU directly before the ECtHR for failure to observe the ECHR. 
Key points
• Protection against discrimination in Europe can be found within both EU law and the 
ECHR. While to a great degree these two systems are complementary and mutually 
reinforcing, some differences do exist which practitioners may need to be aware of. 
• The ECHR protects all individuals within the jurisdiction of its 47 States parties, 
whereas the EU non-discrimination directives only offer protection to citizens of the 
27 EU Member States.
• Under Article 14 of the ECHR, discrimination is prohibited only in relation to 
the exercise of another right guaranteed by the treaty. Under Protocol 12, the 
prohibition of discrimination becomes free standing. 
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• Under EU non-discrimination law, the prohibition on discrimination is free standing, 
but limited to particular contexts, such as employment. 
• The EU institutions are legally bound to observe the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, including its provisions on non-discrimination. EU Member 
States must also observe the Charter when they are implementing EU law. 
• The European Union will join the UNCRPD and the ECHR. This will place the EU 
under the supervision of external monitoring bodies, and individuals will be able to 
complain of violations of the ECHR by the EU directly before the ECtHR. 
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2.1. Introduction
The aim of non-discrimination law is to allow all individuals an equal and fair 
prospect to access opportunities available in a society. We make choices on a daily 
basis over issues such as with whom we socialise, where we shop and where we 
work. We prefer certain things and certain people over others. While expressing 
our subjective preferences is commonplace and normal, at times we may exercise 
functions that place us in a position of authority or allow us to take decisions that 
may have a direct impact on others’ lives. We may be civil servants, shopkeepers, 
employers, landlords or doctors who decide over how public powers are used, or 
how private goods and services are offered. In these non-personal contexts, non-
discrimination law intervenes in the choices we make in two ways: 
Firstly, it stipulates that those individuals who are in similar situations should 
receive similar treatment and not be treated less favourably simply because of 
a particular ‘protected’ characteristic that they possess. This is known as ‘direct’ 
discrimination. Direct discrimination, if framed under the ECHR, is subject to a 
general objective justification defence; however, under EU law defences against 
direct discrimination are somewhat limited. 
Secondly, non-discrimination law stipulates that those individuals who are in 
different situations should receive different treatment to the extent that this is 
needed to allow them to enjoy particular opportunities on the same basis as others. 
Thus, those same ‘protected grounds’ should be taken into account when carrying 
out particular practices or creating particular rules. This is known as ‘indirect’ 
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on objective justification irrespective of whether the 
claim is based on the ECHR or EU law. 
This chapter discusses in greater depth the meaning 
of direct and indirect discrimination, some of their 
specific manifestations, such as harassment or 
instruction to discriminate, and how they operate in 
practice through case-law. It will then examine how 
defences to discrimination operate.
2.2. Direct discrimination 
Direct discrimination is defined similarly under 
both the ECHR and EU law. Article 2(2) of the Racial 
Equality Directive states that direct discrimination 
is ‘taken to occur where one person is treated less 
favourably than another is, has been or would 
be treated in a comparable situation on grounds 
of racial or ethnic origin’.15 The ECtHR uses the 
formulation that there must be a ‘difference in the 
treatment of persons in analogous, or relevantly 
similar, situations’, which is ‘based on an identifiable 
characteristic’.16
2.2.1. Unfavourable treatment
At the heart of direct discrimination is the difference of treatment that an individual 
is subject to. Consequently, the first feature of direct discrimination is evidence 
of unfavourable treatment. This can be relatively easy to identify compared with 
indirect discrimination where statistical data is often needed (see below). Here are 
examples taken from cases that are referred to in this Handbook: refusal of entry 
to a restaurant or shop; receiving a smaller pension or lower pay; being subject to 
verbal abuse or violence; being refused entry at a checkpoint; having a higher or 
14 See, for example, ECtHR, Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.) (No. 58641/00), 6 January 2005.
15  Similarly: Employment Equality Directive, Article 2(2)(a); Gender Equality Directive (Recast), 
Article 2(1)(a); Gender Goods and Services Directive, Article 2(a).
16  ECtHR, Carson and Others v. UK [GC] (No. 42184/05), 16 March 2010; para. 61. Similarly, 
ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC] (No. 57325/00), 13 November 2007, para. 175; 
ECtHR, Burden v. UK [GC] (No. 13378/05), 29 April 2008, para. 60.
Direct discrimination will have 
occurred when
•  an individual is treated 
unfavourably
•  by comparison to how others, 
who are in a similar situation, 
have been or would be treated
•  and the reason for this is a 
particular characteristic they 
hold, which falls under a 
‘protected ground’. 
Non-discrimination law prohibits 
scenarios where persons or groups 
of people in an identical situation 
are treated differently, and where 
persons or groups of people in 
different situations are treated 
identically.14
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lower retirement age; being barred from a particular profession; not being able to 
claim inheritance rights; being excluded from the mainstream education system; 
being deported; not being permitted to wear religious symbols; or being refused 
social security payments or having them revoked.
2.2.2. A comparator
Unfavourable treatment will be relevant to making a determination of discrimina-
tion where it is unfavourable by comparison to someone in a similar situation. A 
complaint about ‘low’ pay is not a claim of discrimination unless it can be shown 
that the pay is lower than that of someone employed to perform a similar task 
by the same employer. Therefore a ‘comparator’ is needed: that is, a person in 
materially similar circumstances, with the main difference between the two persons 
being the ‘protected ground’. The cases discussed in this Handbook illustrate that 
proving a comparator is often not controversial, and sometimes neither the parties 
to the dispute, nor the court, will discuss the comparator explicitly. Below are some 
examples of cases where proving the comparator was expressly raised as an issue 
by the deciding body.
Example: in the Moustaquim case, a Moroccan national had been convicted of 
several criminal offences and, as a result, was to be deported.17 The Moroccan 
national claimed that this decision to deport him amounted to discriminatory 
treatment. He alleged discrimination on the grounds of nationality, saying that 
Belgian nationals did not face deportation following conviction for criminal 
offences. The ECtHR held that the applicant was not in a similar situation to 
Belgian nationals, since a State is not permitted to expel its own nationals 
under the ECHR. Therefore, his deportation did not amount to discriminatory 
treatment. Although the ECtHR accepted that he was in a comparable situation 
to non-Belgian nationals who were from other EU Member States (who could 
not be deported because of EU law relating to freedom of movement), it was 
found that the difference in treatment was justified. 
Example: in the Allonby case, the complainant, who worked for a college as 
a lecturer, did not have her contract renewed by the college.18 She then went 
to work for a company that supplied lecturers to educational establishments. 
This company sent the complainant to work at her old college, performing the 
17 ECtHR, Moustaquim v. Belgium (No. 12313/86), 18 February 1991.
18 ECJ, Allonby v. Accrington and Rossendale College, Case C-256/01 [2004] ECR I-873, 13 January 2004.
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same duties as before, but paid her less than her college had done. She alleged 
discrimination on the basis of sex, saying that male lecturers working for the 
college were paid more. The ECJ held that male lecturers employed by the 
college were not in a comparable situation. This was because the college was 
not responsible for determining the level of pay for both the male lecturer who 
it employed directly and the complainant who was employed by an external 
company. They were therefore not in a sufficiently similar situation. 
Example: in the Luczak case, a French farmer living and farming in Poland 
complained because he was refused entry into a Polish specialised social 
security regime established specifically to support Polish farmers, since this 
was not open to non-nationals.19 The ECtHR agreed that the applicant was in 
a comparable situation to Polish farmers, who benefited from this regime, 
because he was a permanent resident, paid taxes just like nationals and 
thereby contributed to funding the social security scheme and had previously 
been part of the general social security regime.
Example: in the Richards case, the complainant had undergone male-to-female 
gender reassignment surgery. She wished to claim her pension on her 60th 
birthday, which was the age that women were entitled to pensions in the UK. The 
government refused to grant the pension, maintaining that the complainant had 
not received unfavourable treatment by comparison to those in a similar situation. 
The government argued that the correct comparator here was ‘men’, since the 
complainant had lived his life as a man. The ECJ found that because national law 
allows an individual to change their gender, then the correct comparator was 
‘women’. Accordingly, the complainant was being treated less favourably than 
other women by having a higher retirement age imposed on her.20
Example: in the case of Burden v. UK, two sisters had cohabited for a period of 
31 years.21 They owned a property jointly and each had left their share in the 
property to the other in their will. The applicants complained that because the 
value of the property exceeded a certain threshold, upon the death of one, 
the other would have to pay inheritance tax. They complained that this was a 
discriminatory interference in their right to property because married couples and 
19  ECtHR, Luczak v. Poland (No. 77782/01), 27 November 2007; see also, ECtHR, Gaygusuz v. Austria 
(No. 17371/90), 16 September 1996.
20  ECJ, Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Case C-423/04 [2006] ECR I-3585, 
27 April 2006.
21 ECtHR, Burden v. UK [GC] (No. 13378/05), 29 April 2008.
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couples that had entered into civil partnerships were exempt from inheritance 
tax. The ECtHR, however, found that the applicants as siblings could not compare 
themselves to cohabiting couples who were married or civil partners. Marriage 
and civil partnerships amount to special relationships entered into freely 
and deliberately in order to create contractual rights and responsibilities. In 
contrast, the applicants’ relationship was based on consanguinity and so was 
fundamentally different. 
Example: in the case of Carson and Others v. UK, the applicants complained 
that the UK government did not apply the same increment to the pension 
payments of those living in retirement abroad as those living in retirement in 
the UK.22 According to UK law, increments were only applied to UK residents 
with the exception of UK nationals who had retired to States with which the 
UK had a reciprocal social security arrangement. The applicants, who did not 
live in a State that had concluded such an agreement, argued that they had 
been discriminated against on the basis of their place of residence. The ECtHR 
disagreed with the applicants who argued that they were in a similar position 
to those living in retirement in the UK or to those UK nationals who had retired 
in countries with which the UK had a reciprocal agreement. The ECtHR found 
that, although these different groups had all contributed to government 
revenue through the payment of national insurance, this did not constitute a 
pension fund but rather general public revenue to finance various aspects of 
public spending. Furthermore, the duty of the government to apply increments 
was based on consideration of the rise in cost of the standard of living in the 
UK. The applicants were therefore not in a comparable situation to these other 
groups and there had accordingly been no discriminatory treatment.
The apparent exception for finding a suitable ‘comparator’, at least in the context of 
EU law within the scope of employment, is where the discrimination suffered is due 
to the individual being pregnant. In a long line of ECJ jurisprudence, starting with the 
seminal case of Dekker, it is now well established that where the detriment suffered 
by an individual is due to their being pregnant then this will be classed as direct 
discrimination based on their sex, there being no need for a comparator.23
22 ECtHR, Carson and Others v. UK [GC] (No. 42184/05), 16 March 2010.
23  ECJ, Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, Case C-177/88 
[1990] ECR I-3941, 8 November 1990. Similarly, ECJ, Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd, Case C-32/93 
[1994] ECR I-3567, 14 July 1994.
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2.2.3. The protected ground
Chapter 4 will discuss the range of ‘protected grounds’ that exist in European non-
discrimination law, namely, sex, sexual orientation, disability, age, race, ethnic 
origin, national origin and religion or belief. This chapter will focus on the need for 
a causal link between the less favourable treatment and the protected ground. In 
order to satisfy this requirement one merely has to ask the simple question: would 
the person have been treated less favourably had they been of a different sex, of a 
different race, of a different age, or in any converse position under any one of the 
other protected grounds? If the answer is yes then the less favourable treatment is 
clearly being caused by the ground in question.  
The rule or practice that is being applied does not necessarily need to refer 
explicitly to the ‘protected ground’, as long as it refers to another factor that is 
indissociable from the protected ground. Essentially, when considering whether 
direct discrimination has taken place one is assessing whether the less favourable 
treatment is due to a ‘protected ground’ that cannot be separated from the 
particular factor being complained of.
Example: in the case of James v. Eastleigh Borough Council, Mr James had to 
pay an admission fee for entry into a swimming pool within Eastleigh, while 
his wife, Mrs James, did not.24 Both were aged 61 years. The benefit of free 
admission was only available to Mrs James because she was retired, whereas 
Mr James was not yet retired, since in the UK men retire at the age of 65 years 
while women retire at the age of 60 years. Although the rule of free admission 
to the swimming pool was based on the status of being retired, eligibility for 
retirement was dependent on sex. The UK House of Lords concluded that if Mr 
James had been of the opposite sex, then he would have been treated in line 
with the treatment received by his wife. Furthermore, it was determined that 
the intention and motivation behind the treatment was irrelevant, the focus 
being merely on the treatment. 
Example: in the Maruko case, a homosexual couple had entered into a ‘life 
partnership’.25 The complainant’s partner had died and the complainant wished 
to claim the ‘survivor’s pension’ from the company that ran his deceased partner’s 
24 James v. Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] UK House of Lords 6, 14 June 1990.
25  ECJ, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, Case C-267/06 [2008] ECR I-1757, 
1 April 2008.
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occupational pension scheme. The company refused to pay the complainant on 
the grounds that survivors’ pensions were only payable to spouses and he had 
not been married to the deceased. The ECJ accepted that the refusal to pay the 
pension amounted to unfavourable treatment and that this was less favourable 
in relation to the comparator of ‘married’ couples. The ECJ found that the 
institution of ‘life partnership’ in Germany created many of the same rights and 
responsibilities for life partners as for spouses, particularly with regard to State 
pension schemes. It was therefore prepared to find that, for the purposes of 
this case, life partners were in a similar situation to spouses. The ECJ then went 
on to state that this would amount to discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Thus, the fact that they were unable to marry was indissociable 
from their sexual orientation.
Example: in the case of Aziz v. Cyprus, the applicant complained that he was 
deprived of the right to vote because of his Turkish-Cypriot ethnicity.26 Cypriot 
law as it stood allowed Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots only to vote for 
candidates from their own ethnic communities in the parliamentary elections. 
However, since the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, the vast majority of 
the Turkish community had left the territory and their participation in parliament 
was suspended. Consequently, there was no longer any list of candidates for 
whom the complainant could vote. While the government argued that the 
inability to vote was due to the fact that there were no candidates available for 
whom the complainant could vote, the ECtHR was of the view that the close link 
between the election rules and membership of the Turkish-Cypriot community, 
together with the government’s failure to adjust the electoral rules in light of the 
situation, meant this amounted to direct discrimination on the basis of ethnicity.
The courts have given a broad interpretation to the reach of the ‘protected ground’. 
It can include ‘discrimination by association’, where the victim of the discrimination 
is not themself the person with the protected characteristic. It can also involve the 
particular ground being interpreted in an abstract manner. This makes it imperitive 
that practitioners embark on detailed analysis of the reasoning behind the less 
favourable treatment, looking for evidence that the protected ground is causative of 
such treatment, whether directly or indirectly. 
26 ECtHR, Aziz v. Cyprus (No. 69949/01), 22 June 2004.
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Example: in the Coleman case, a mother claimed that she received unfavou-
rable treatment at work, based on the fact that her son was disabled.27 Her 
son’s disability led her to be late at work on occasion and request leave to 
be scheduled according to her son’s needs. The complainant’s requests were 
refused and she was threatened with dismissal, as well as receiving abusive 
comments relating to her child’s condition. The ECJ accepted her colleagues 
in similar posts and with children as comparators, finding that they were 
granted flexibility when requested. It also accepted that this amounted to 
discrimination and harassment on the grounds of the disability of her child.
Example: in the Weller case, a Romanian woman was married to a Hungarian 
man, and the two had four children.28 She was not eligible to claim maternity 
benefit payable after giving birth because she was not a Hungarian citizen. Her 
husband tried to claim the benefit but was turned down by the government 
which stated that it was payable only to mothers. The ECtHR found that he had 
been discriminated against on the basis of fatherhood (rather than sex), since 
adoptive male parents or male guardians were entitled to claim the benefit, 
while natural fathers were not. A complaint was also lodged by the children, 
who claimed discrimination on the basis of the refusal to pay the benefit to 
their father, which the ECtHR accepted. Thus, the children were discriminated 
against on the grounds of the status of their parent as the natural father.
Example: in the case of P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, the complainant 
was in the process of undergoing male-to-female gender reassignment when 
she was dismissed by her employer. The ECJ found that dismissal constituted 
unfavourable treatment.29 As to the relevant comparator, the ECJ stated that 
‘[w]here a person is dismissed on the ground that he or she intends to undergo, 
or has undergone, gender reassignment, he or she is treated unfavourably by 
comparison with persons of the sex to which he or she was deemed to belong 
before undergoing gender reassignment’. As to the grounds, although it could 
not be shown that the complainant was treated differently because she was a 
man or a woman, it could be shown that the differential treatment was based 
around the concept of her sex. 
27 ECJ, Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law, Case C-303/06 [2008] I-5603, 17 July 2008.
28 ECtHR, Weller v. Hungary (No. 44399/05), 31 March 2009.
29 ECJ, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, Case C-13/94 [1996] ECR I-2143, 30 April 1996.
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2.3. Indirect discrimination 
Both the ECHR and EU law acknowledge that discrimination may result not only from 
treating people in similar situations differently, but also from offering the same 
treatment to people who are in different situations. The latter is labelled ‘indirect’ 
discrimination because it is not the treatment that differs but rather the effects of 
that treatment, which will be felt differently by people with different characteristics. 
Article 2(2)(b) of the Racial Equality Directive states 
that ‘indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur 
where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin 
at a particular disadvantage compared with other 
persons’.30 The ECtHR has drawn on this definition 
of indirect discrimination in some of its recent 
judgments, stating that ‘a difference in treatment may 
take the form of disproportionately prejudicial effects 
of a general policy or measure which, though couched 
in neutral terms, discriminates against a group’.31 
2.3.1. A neutral rule, criterion or practice
The first identifiable requirement is an apparently neutral rule, criterion or practice. 
In other words, there must be some form of requirement that is applied to every-
body. Below are two cases for illustration. For further examples, see Chapter 5 on 
evidential issues and the role of statistics.
Example: in the Schönheit case, the pensions of part-time employees were 
calculated using a different rate to that of full-time employees.32 This different 
rate was not based on the differences of the time spent in work. Thus, part-
time employees received a smaller pension than full-time employees, even 
taking into account the different lengths of service, effectively meaning that 
part-time workers were being paid less. This neutral rule on the calculation of 
30  Similarly: Employment Equality Directive, Article 2(2)(b); Gender Equality Directive (Recast), 
Article 2(1)(b); Gender Goods and Services Directive, Article 2(b).
31  ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC] (No. 57325/00), 13 November 2007, para. 184; 
ECtHR, Opuz v. Turkey (No. 33401/02), 9 June 2009, para. 183; ECtHR, Zarb Adami v. Malta 
(No. 17209/02), 20 June 2006, para. 80.
32  ECJ, Hilde Schönheit v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main and Silvia Becker v. Land Hessen, Joined Cases C-4/02 
and C-5/02 [2003] ECR I-12575, 23 October 2003.
The elements of indirect 
discrimination are
•  a neutral rule, criterion or 
practice 
•  that affects a group defined 
by a ‘protected ground’ in a 
significantly more negative way 
•  by comparison to others in a 
similar situation.
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
30
pensions applied equally to all part-time workers. However, because around  
88% of part-time workers were women, the effect of the rule was dis-
proportionately negative for women as compared to men.
Example: in the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, a series of tests 
were used to establish the intelligence and suitability of pupils in order to 
determine whether they should be moved out of mainstream education and into 
special schools.33 These special schools were designed for those with intellectual 
disabilities and other sources of learning difficulty. The same test was applied 
to all pupils who were considered for placement in special schools. However, in 
practice the test had been designed around the mainstream Czech population 
with the consequence that Roma students were inherently more likely to 
perform badly – which they did, with the consequence that between 50% and 
90% of Roma children were educated outside the mainstream education system. 
The ECtHR found that this was a case of indirect discrimination.
2.3.2.  Significantly more negative in its effects  
on a protected group 
The second identifiable requirement is that the apparently neutral provision, 
criterion or practice places a ‘protected group’ at a particular disadvantage. This is 
where indirect discrimination differs from direct discrimination in that it moves the 
focus away from differential treatment to look at differential effects.
When considering statistical evidence that the protected group is disproportionately 
effected in a negative way by comparison to those in a similar situation, the ECJ and 
ECtHR will seek evidence that a particularly large proportion of those negatively 
affected is made up of that ‘protected group’. This will be considered in detail in 
Chapter 5, which relates to evidential issues. For now, reference is made to the 
collection of phrases used by the ECJ appearing in the Opinion of Advocate General 
Léger in the Nolte case when speaking of sex discrimination: 
‘[I]n order to be presumed discriminatory, the measure must affect “a far greater 
number of women than men” [Rinner-Kühn34] or “a considerably lower percentage 
33 ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC] (No. 57325/00), 13 November 2007, para. 79.
34 ECJ, Rinner-Kühn v. FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung, Case C-171/88 [1989] ECR 2743, 13 July 1989.
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of men than women” [Nimz,35 Kowalska36] or “far more women than men” 
[De Weerd, née Roks, and Others 37]’.38
2.3.3. A comparator
As with direct discrimination, a court will still need to find a comparator in order to 
determine whether the effect of the particular rule, criterion or practice is signifi-
cantly more negative than those experienced by other individuals in a similar situ-
ation. The approach of the courts does not differ in this respect from that taken to 
direct discrimination. 
2.4.  Harassment and instruction to 
discriminate
2.4.1.  Harassment and instruction to discriminate 
under the EU non-
discrimination directives
A prohibition on harassment and on instruction to 
discriminate as part of EU non-discrimination law are 
relatively new developments, which were introduced 
to allow for more comprehensive protection.
Harassment features as a specific type of discrimin-
ation under the EU non-discrimination directives. It had 
previously been dealt with as a particular manifestation 
35 ECJ, Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Case C-184/89 [1991] ECR I-297, 7 February 1991.
36 ECJ, Kowalska v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Case C-33/89 [1990] ECR I-2591, 27 June 1990.
37  ECJ, De Weerd, née Roks, and Others v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Gezondheid, 
Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen and Others, Case C-343/92 [1994] ECR I-571, 
24 February 1994.
38  Opinion of Advocate General Léger of 31 May 1995, paras. 57-58 in ECJ, Nolte v. 
Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, Case C-317/93 [1995] ECR I-4625, 14 December 1995. 
For an example of a similar approach having been adopted under the ECHR, see the case of  
D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC] (No. 57325/00), 13 November 2007 
(discussed in Chapter 5.2.1.).
39  See: Racial Equality Directive, Article 2(3); Employment Equality Directive, Article 2(3); Gender Goods 
and Services Directive, Article 2(c); Gender Equality Directive (Recast), Article 2(1)(c).
According to the non-discrimination 
directives, harassment will be 
deemed to be discrimination when 
•  unwanted conduct related to a 
protected ground takes place
•  with the purpose or effect of  
violating the dignity of a person
•  and/or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating 
or offensive environment.39 
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of direct discrimination. Its separation into a specific head under the directives is based 
more on the importance of singling out this particularly harmful form of discriminatory 
treatment, rather than a shift in conceptual thinking.
The Gender Equality Directives also specifically set out sexual harassment as a 
specific type of discrimination, where the unwanted ‘verbal, non-verbal, or physical’ 
conduct is of a ‘sexual’ nature.40
According to this definition, there is no need for a comparator to prove harassment. 
This essentially reflects the fact that harassment of itself is wrong because of the 
form it takes (verbal, non-verbal or physical abuse) and the potential effect it may 
have (violating human dignity). 
Much of the guidance on harassment at EU level is derived from the Council 
Declaration of 19 December 1991 on the implementation of the Commission 
Recommendation on the protection of the dignity of women and men at work, 
including the Code of Practice to Combat Sexual Harassment.41 EU law adopts a flexible 
objective/subjective approach. Firstly, it is the victim’s perception of the treatment 
that is used to determine whether harassment has occurred. Secondly, however, even 
if the victim does not actually feel the effects of the harassment, a finding may still be 
made so long as the complainant is the target of the conduct in question. 
Questions of fact, relating to whether conduct amounts to harassment, are usually 
determined at the national level before cases are referred to the ECJ. The following 
illustrative cases, therefore, are taken from national jurisdictions.
Example: in a case before the Swedish Court of Appeal, the complainant had 
attempted to purchase a puppy. Once the seller realised that the buyer was 
homosexual, they refused to complete the sale on grounds of the puppy’s 
well-being, stating that homosexuals engage in sexual acts with animals. The 
refusal to sell the puppy was found to constitute direct discrimination in the 
40 Gender Goods and Services Directive, Article 2(d); Gender Equality Directive (Recast), Article 2(1)(d).
41  Council Declaration of 19 December 1991 on the implementation of the Commission Recommendation 
on the protection of the dignity of women and men at work, including the code of practice to combat 
sexual harassment, OJ C 27, 04.02.1992 p. 1; Commission Recommendation 92/131/EEC on the 
protection of the dignity of women and men at work, OJ L 49, 24.02.1992, p. 1.
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context of goods and services, being specifically found by the Swedish Court of 
Appeal to constitute harassment on grounds of sexual orientation.42
Example: in a case before the Hungarian Equal Treatment Authority, a complaint 
was made about teachers who told Roma students that their misbehaviour at 
school had been notified to the ‘Hungarian Guard’, a nationalist organisation 
known for committing acts of extreme violence against Roma.43 It was found 
that the teachers had impliedly endorsed the racist views of the Guard and 
created a climate of fear and intimidation, amounting to harassment.
In addition, the non-discrimination directives all state that an ‘instruction to 
discriminate’ is deemed to constitute ‘discrimination’.44 However, none of the 
directives provide a definition as to what is meant by the term. In order to be of any 
worth in combating discriminatory practices, it ought not to be confined to merely 
dealing with instructions that are mandatory in nature, but should extend to catch 
situations where there is an expressed preference or an encouragement to treat 
individuals less favourably due to one of the protected grounds. This is an area that 
may evolve through the jurisprudence of the courts. 
Although the non-discrimination directives do not oblige Member States to use 
criminal law to address acts of discrimination, a Framework Decision of the European 
Council does oblige all EU Member States to provide for criminal sanctions in relation 
to incitement to violence or hatred based on race, colour, descent, religion or belief, 
national or ethnic origin, as well as dissemination of racist or xenophobic material 
and condonation, denial or trivialisation of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity directed against such groups.45 Member States are also obliged to consider 
racist or xenophobic intent as an aggravating circumstance.
42  Ombudsman Against Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation v. A.S., Case No. T-3562-06, 
Svea Court of Appeal, 11 February 2008. English summary available at European Network of Legal 
Experts on the Non-Discrimination Field, 8 (July 2009) ‘European Anti-Discrimination Law Review’, p. 69.
43  Decision No. 654/2009, 20 December 2009, Equal Treatment Authority (Hungary). English summary 
available via: European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field, ‘New Report’:  
www.non-discrimination.net/content/media/HU-14-HU_harassment_of_Roma_pupils_by_teachers.pdf.
44  Article 2(4), Employment Equality Directive; Article 4(1), Gender Goods and Services Directive; 
Article 2(2)(b), Gender Equality Directive (Recast); Article 2(4), Racial Equality Directive.
45  Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 55.
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It is quite probable, therefore, that acts of harassment and acts of incitement to 
discriminate, in addition to constituting discrimination, may well be caught under 
national criminal law, particularly where they relate to race or ethnicity.
Example: in a case before the Bulgarian courts, a member of parliament made 
several statements verbally attacking the Roma, Jewish and Turkish communi-
ties as well as ‘foreigners’ in general. They stated that these communities were 
preventing Bulgarians from running their own State, were committing crimes 
with impunity and depriving Bulgarians of adequate healthcare, and urged 
people to prevent the State becoming a ‘colony’ of these various groups.46 
The Sofia Regional Court found that this amounted to harassment as well as 
instruction to discriminate.
2.4.2.  Harassment and instruction to discriminate  
under the ECHR
While the ECHR does not specifically prohibit harassment or instruction to 
discriminate, it does contain particular rights that relate to the same area. Thus, 
harassment may fall under the right to respect for private and family life protected 
under Article 8 of the ECHR, or the right to be free from inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment under Article 3, while instruction to discriminate may be 
caught by other Articles, such as freedom of religion or assembly under Article 9 
or 11, depending on the context. Where these acts display a discriminatory motive, 
the ECtHR will examine the alleged breaches of relevant Articles in conjunction 
with Article 14, which prohibits discrimination. Below is a selection of examples 
that show cases on similar facts to those discussed above, considered in the 
context of the ECHR. 
Example: in Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, the mayor of Warsaw made 
public announcements of a homophobic nature stating that he would 
refuse permission to hold a march to raise awareness about discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.47 When the decision came before the relevant 
administrative body, permission was refused on the basis of other reasons, 
such as the need to prevent clashes between demonstrators. The ECtHR 
46  Sofia Regional Court, Decision No. 164 on Civil Case No. 2860/2006, 21 June 2006. English summary 
available at FRA InfoPortal, Case 11-1.
47 ECtHR, Bączkowski and Others v. Poland (No. 1543/06), 3 May 2007.
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found that the mayor’s statements could have influenced the decision of the 
relevant authorities, and that the decision was based on the ground of sexual 
orientation and so constituted a violation of the right to free assembly in 
conjunction with the right to be free from discrimination. 
Example: in Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, the national courts, when sentencing 
an individual of Roma origin, expressly refused the prosecution’s recommendation 
for a suspended sentence, stating that a culture of impunity existed among the 
Roma minority and implying that an example should be made of the particular 
individual.48 The ECtHR found that this violated the applicant’s right to a fair trial 
in conjunction with the right to be free from discrimination. 
2.5. Special or specific measures
As noted above, in cases of indirect discrimination, the reason that discrimination is 
found to occur is due to the fact that the same rule is applied to everyone without 
consideration for relevant differences. In order to remedy and prevent this kind of 
situation, governments, employers and service providers must ensure that they take 
steps to adjust their rules and practices to take such differences into consideration 
– that is, they must do something to adjust current policies and measures. In the 
UN context, these are labelled ‘special measures’, while the EU law context refers 
to ‘specific measures’ or ‘positive action’. By taking special measures, governments 
are able to ensure ‘substantive equality’, that is, equal enjoyment of opportunities 
to access benefits available in society, rather than mere ‘formal equality’. Where 
governments, employers and service providers fail to consider the appropriateness 
of taking special measures, they increase the risk that their rules and practices may 
amount to indirect discrimination.
The ECtHR has stated that ‘the right not to be discriminated against in the 
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the [ECHR] is also violated when States … 
fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different’.49 
Similarly, the EU non-discrimination directives expressly foresee the possibility 
of positive action stating: ‘[w]ith a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the 
principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining 
48 ECtHR, Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria (No. 37193/07), 25 March 2010.
49  ECtHR, Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC] (No. 34369/97), 6 April 2000, para. 44. Similarly, ECtHR, 
Pretty v. UK (No. 2346/02), 29 April 2002, para. 88.
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
36
or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to 
[a protected ground]’.50  
Article 5 of the Employment Equality Directive contains specific articulations of 
the general rule of specific measures in relation to persons with disabilities, which 
requires employers to make ‘reasonable accommodation’ to allow those with 
physical or mental disabilities to be given equal employment opportunities. This is 
defined as ‘appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a 
person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, 
or to undergo training, unless such measures would impose a disproportionate 
burden on the employer’. This might include measures such as installing a lift or a 
ramp or a disabled toilet in the workplace in order to allow wheelchair access. 
Example: in the case of Thlimmenos v. Greece, national law barred those with a 
criminal conviction from joining the profession of chartered accountants, since a 
criminal conviction implied a lack of honesty and reliability needed to perform 
this role. The applicant in this case had been criminally convicted for refusing 
to wear military uniform during his national service. This was because he was 
a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, which is a religious group committed 
to pacifism. The ECtHR found that there was no reason to bar persons from 
the profession where their criminal convictions were unrelated to issues of 
reliability or honesty. The government had discriminated against the applicant 
by failing to create an exception to the rule for such situations, violating the 
right to manifest his religious belief (under Article 9 of the ECHR) in conjunction 
with the prohibition on discrimination.
Example: in a case before the Equality Body of Cyprus, the complainant, who 
was visually impaired, took part in an exam to qualify for the civil service.51 The 
complainant had requested extra time to complete the exam and was allowed 
an additional 30 minutes, but this was deducted from the break to which 
everyone was entitled. The Equality Body found that no standardised procedure 
existed for examining when reasonable accommodation should be made for 
candidates with special circumstances, and that on the facts not enough had 
50  Racial Equality Directive, Article 5; Employment Equality Directive, Article 7; Gender Goods and Services 
Directive, Article 6; and also with a slightly different formulation: Gender Equality Directive (Recast), 
Article 3.
51  Equality Body (Cyprus), Ref. A.K.I. 37/2008, 8 October 2008. English summary available at European 
Network of Legal Experts on the Non-Discrimination Field, 8 (July 2009) ‘European Anti-Discrimination 
Law Review’, p. 43.
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been done to create conditions where the complainant could compete fairly 
with other candidates. The Equality Body recommended that the State establish 
a team of experts as part of a standardised procedure to consider such cases 
needing reasonable accommodation on an individual basis.
Example: in the French courts, a wheelchair-bound individual brought a claim 
against the Ministry of Education for failure to be appointed to a particular 
post.52 The complainant’s application was ranked third in the list of candidates. 
When the first two candidates turned down the offer of the post, the offer 
was then made to the fourth candidate, rather than the claimant. Instead, the 
claimant was offered a post in a different department that had been adapted 
for wheelchair access. The State justified this decision on the basis that it was 
not in the public interest to invest funds to make alterations to the premises 
in order to fulfil the duty of reasonable accommodation. The court found that 
the Ministry of Education had failed in its duty of reasonable accommodation 
of persons with disabilities, which could not be diminished by management 
considerations.
The term ‘special measures’ is sometimes taken to include a situation where differ-
ential treatment takes place that favours (rather than disadvantages) individuals on 
the basis of their protected grounds; for instance, where a woman is chosen over a 
man for a particular post because she is a woman and the employer has a policy of 
redressing the under-representation of women among their staff. The terminology 
used to describe this varies greatly to include ‘positive’ or ‘reverse’ discrimination, 
‘preferential treatment’, ‘temporary special measures’ or ‘affirmative action’.53 This 
reflects its accepted function as a short-term and exceptional means of challenging 
prejudices against individuals who would normally suffer discrimination, as well as 
creating role models to inspire others sharing that characteristic.
52  Rouen Administrative Court, Boutheiller v. Ministère de l’éducation, Judgment No. 0500526-3, 24 June 
2008. English summary available at European Network of Legal Experts on the Non-Discrimination Field,  
8 (July 2009) ‘European Anti-Discrimination Law Review’, p. 46.
53  For example, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘General Recommendation 
No. 32: The Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination’ UN Doc. CERD/C/GC/32, 24 September 2009; UN Committee 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment 13: The Right to Education’ UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/10, 8 December 1999; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, ‘General Recommendation No. 25: Article 4(1) of the Convention (temporary special 
measures)’ UN Doc. A/59/38(SUPP), 18 March 2004; UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 
No. 18: Non-Discrimination’ UN Doc. A/45/40(Vol.I.)(SUPP), 10 November 1989; UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination against Non-
Citizens’ UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7/Add.1, 4 May 2005.
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The permissibility of taking positive measures in favour of disadvantaged groups 
is further reinforced by guidance issued by several of the monitoring bodies 
responsible for interpreting UN human rights treaties. These bodies have stressed 
that such measures should be temporary in nature, not extending in time or scope 
beyond what is necessary to address the inequality in question.54 According to the 
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in order to be permissible 
such measures should have as their sole purpose the elimination of existing 
inequalities and the prevention of future imbalances.55 The UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women elaborated that such ‘temporary 
special measures’ could include ‘preferential treatment; targeted recruitment, hiring 
and promotion; numerical goals connected with time frames; and quota systems’.56 
According to the case-law of the ECJ, discussed below, the proportionality of such 
measures will be examined strictly.
The courts have tended to treat discrimination in this context not as a distinct form 
of discrimination in itself but as an exception to the prohibition on discrimination. 
In other words, the courts accept that differential treatment has occurred, but that 
it may be justified in the interests of correcting a pre-existing disadvantage, such as 
under-representation in the workplace of particular groups. 
This justification for differential treatment has been advanced by States from time 
to time. It can be understood from two different angles. From the perspective of 
the beneficiary, more favourable treatment is accorded on the basis of a protected 
characteristic, by comparison to someone in a similar situation. From the perspective 
of the victim, less favourable treatment is accorded on the basis that they do not 
hold a protected characteristic. Typical examples include reserving posts for women 
in male-dominated workplaces or for ethnic minorities in public services, such as 
policing, in order to better reflect the composition of society. It is sometimes labelled 
‘reverse’ discrimination because the discriminatory treatment is given in order to 
favour an individual who one would expect to receive less favourable treatment 
based on past social trends. It is sometimes labelled ‘positive’ action because it is 
action specifically taken to redress past disadvantage by promoting the participation 
54 Ibid.
55  UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘General Recommendation No. 32: The 
Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination’ UN Doc. CERD/C/GC/32, 24 September 2009, paras. 21-26.
56  UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘General Recommendation No. 25: 
Article 4, para. 1 of the Convention (temporary special measures)’ UN Doc. A/59/38 (supp),  
18 March 2004, para. 22.
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of traditionally disadvantaged groups; in this sense, it is based on a benevolent aim, 
rather than being based on prejudice against particular groups. 
The concept features rarely in the case-law of the ECtHR, although it has received 
greater consideration in the context of EU law, where the ECJ has dealt with cases 
in the sphere of employment. Specific measures appear as a defence in their own 
right under the non-discrimination directives and in the case-law of the ECJ, as well 
as within the specific defence of ‘genuine occupational requirement’, as discussed 
below in Chapter 2.6.4.1. 
The principal ECJ cases concerning special measures have arisen in the context 
of gender equality, namely the Kalanke case,57 the Marschall case58 and the 
Abrahamsson case.59 Together these cases defined the limits on how far special 
measures can be taken in order to compensate for the previous disadvantages 
suffered by, in these particular cases, female workers over the years. 
Example: in the Kalanke case, the ECJ took a strict approach to according 
preferential treatment to correct the under-representation of women in 
particular posts. This case concerned legislation adopted at the regional level, 
which accorded automatic priority to female candidates applying for posts or 
promotions. Where male and female candidates were equally qualified, and 
where female workers were deemed to be under-represented in that sector, 
female candidates where to be given preference. Under-representation was 
deemed to exist where female workers did not make up at least half of the staff 
in the post in question. In this case an unsuccessful male candidate, Mr Kalanke, 
complained that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his sex 
before the national courts. The national courts referred the case to the ECJ, 
asking whether this rule was compatible with Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment 
Directive of 1976 (the predecessor to Article 3 of the Gender Equality Directive 
on ‘positive action’), which states that: ‘This Directive shall be without prejudice 
to measures to promote equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by 
removing existing inequalities which affect women’s opportunities’.60
57 ECJ, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Case C-450/93 [1995] ECR I-3051, 17 October 1995.
58 ECJ, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case C-409/95 [1997] ECR I-6363, 11 November 1997.
59  ECJ, Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v. Elisabet Fogelqvist, Case C-407/98 [2000] ECR I-5539, 
6 July 2000.
60 Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC, OJ L 39, 14.02.1976, p. 40.
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The ECJ stated that Article 2(4) was designed to allow measures that, ‘although 
discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual 
instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social life’.61 It was 
accepted that the rule pursued the legitimate aim of eliminating inequalities 
present in the workplace. Accordingly, in principle, measures that give women a 
specific advantage in the workplace, including promotion, would be acceptable, 
so long as they were introduced with a view to bringing an improvement in 
their ability to compete in the labour market, free of such discrimination.
However, it was also stated that any exception to the right to equal treatment 
should be strictly construed. It was found that where the rule in question 
guaranteed ‘women absolute and unconditional priority for appointment 
or promotion’, this would in fact be disproportionate to achieving the aim of 
eliminating inequality relative to the right of equal treatment. Accordingly, the 
preferential treatment could not be justified in this case.
Nevertheless, later cases show that specific measures may be acceptable where the 
rule does not require automatic and unconditional priority to be accorded. 
Example: the Marschall case concerned legislation similar in substance to 
the Kalanke case. However, the rule in question stated that equally qualified 
women should be given priority ‘unless reasons specific to an individual male 
candidate tilt the balance in his favour’. Mr Marschall, who was rejected for a 
post in favour of a female candidate, contested the legality of this rule before 
the national courts, which referred the case to the ECJ, once again asking if this 
rule was compatible with the Equal Treatment Directive. The ECJ found that a 
rule of this nature was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim of eliminating 
inequality as long as ‘in each individual case, it provides for male candidates 
who are equally as qualified as the female candidates a guarantee that their 
candidatures will be the subject of an objective assessment which will take 
account of all criteria specific to the individual candidates and will override the 
priority accorded to female candidates where one or more of those criteria tilts 
the balance in favour of the male candidate’. Thus, discretion built into the rule, 
prevented the priority from being absolute and was therefore proportionate to 
achieving the aim of addressing inequality in the workplace.
61  This wording has been largely adopted in the preambles to the non-discrimination directives: para. 21 
of the Gender Equality Directive (Recast); para. 26 of the Employment Equality Directive; para. 17 of the 
Racial Equality Directive.
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Example: the Abrahamsson case concerned the validity of Swedish legislation, 
which fell between the unconditional priority of the rule in the Kalanke 
case and the discretion created in the Marschall case. The rule stated that a 
candidate of an under-represented sex who possessed sufficient qualifications 
to perform the post should be accorded priority, unless ‘the difference between 
the candidates’ qualifications is so great that such applications would give rise 
to a breach of the requirement of objectivity in the making of appointments’. 
The ECJ found that in effect the legislation automatically granted priority to 
candidates from the under-represented sex. The fact that the provision only 
prevented this where there was a significant difference in qualifications was 
not sufficient to prevent the rule from being disproportionate in its effects.
These cases highlight the fact that the ECJ has generally been cautious in its 
approach of allowing specific measures to override the principle of fairness. Only 
in limited circumstances where the specific measures are not unconditional and 
absolute will the ECJ allow national rules to fall within the derogation of Article 2(4). 
When faced with an issue concerning specific measures under the EU non-
discrimination directives, practitioners must devote special attention to the ‘action’ 
that has been put in place to favour a particular group of persons. It is clearly the 
position, as evinced by the ECJ case-law above, that specific measures are a last resort. 
Practitioners and court officials if dealing with a case involving specific measures must 
ensure that all candidates considered by the employer in question, including those 
that are not targeted by the special-measures provision, are assessed objectively 
and fairly for the position in question. Special measures can only be utilised where 
such an objective assessment has determined that a number of candidates, among 
whom individuals from a targeted group, are all equally capable of fulfilling the role 
available. It is only in such circumstances that a member of a targeted group, which 
is selected due to previous historic discrimination in the workplace, can be selected 
ahead of an individual that falls outside the targeted group. 
The ECtHR has not yet had the opportunity to devote in-depth consideration to cases 
of special measures; however, it has been considered in a limited number of cases. 
Example: in the case of Wintersberger v. Austria,62 the ECtHR issued a decision 
relating to the admissibility of a claim. The applicant, who was disabled, had 
62 ECtHR, Wintersberger v. Austria (friendly settlement) (No. 57448/00), 5 February 2004.
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been dismissed from his or her employment by the State. According to national 
law, persons with disabilities received special protection from dismissal in that 
prior approval for dismissal had to be received from a special committee. In the 
case where the employer was unaware of the disability, this approval could be 
issued retroactively. No such approval was needed for persons without disability. 
The applicant argued that the fact that approval could be issued retroactively 
for persons with disabilities, but not for non-disabled persons, amounted to 
discrimination. The ECtHR found that this provision in fact existed for the benefit 
of persons with disabilities and was therefore justified as an example of reverse 
discrimination. The claim was, accordingly, declared inadmissible.
Key points
• Discrimination describes a situation where an individual is disadvantaged in some 
way because of a ‘protected characteristic’.
• Discrimination has different guises: direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, 
harassment and instruction to discriminate. 
• Direct discrimination is characterised by differential treatment: it must be shown 
that the alleged victim has been treated less favourably based on the possession of 
a characteristic falling under a ‘protected ground’.
• Less favourable treatment is determined through a comparison between the 
alleged victim and another person in a similar situation who does not possess the 
protected characteristic. 
• It may be that the ‘protected ground’ is not the express reason behind the differ-
ential treatment. It is enough for the express reason to be indissociable from the 
‘protected ground’.  
• The ECJ and national courts have accepted the notion of discrimination by 
association, where an individual is treated less favourably because of their 
association with another individual who possesses a ‘protected characteristic’.
• Harassment, while treated separately under EU law, is a particular manifestation of 
direct discrimination. 
• Indirect discrimination is characterised by differential impact or effects: it must 
be shown that a group is disadvantaged by a decision when compared to a 
comparator group. 
• Proving indirect discrimination requires an individual to provide evidence that, as a 
group, those sharing their protected characteristic are subject to differential effects 
or impact, by comparison to those without this characteristic. 
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2.6.  Defences of less favourable treatment 
under European non-discrimination 
laws
2.6.1. Introduction
In particular circumstances, the courts will accept that differential treatment has 
been carried out but that it is acceptable. The form of approach to defences under 
EU law differs from that of the ECtHR; in substance, however, they are very similar. 
Within European non-discrimination law, a defence can be phrased in general or 
more limited specific terms. The approach of the ECtHR is to operate a generally 
phrased defence, in the context of both direct and indirect discrimination. In 
contrast, EU law provides only for specific limited defences to direct discrimination, 
and a general defence only in the context of indirect discrimination. In other words, 
under the non-discrimination directives, direct discrimination will only be capable 
of being justified where it is in pursuit of particular aims expressly set out in those 
directives. 
The specific defences under the non-discrimination directives can be placed in the 
wider context of the general defence recognised by the ECtHR and are consistent 
with the way that the general defence is applied in the case-law. In essence, the 
specific defences under the non-discrimination directives are particular articulations 
of the general defence that operate in and are adapted to the field of employment.
2.6.2. Breakdown of the general defence
As noted, the general defence is available with regard to both direct and indirect 
discrimination under the ECHR, and available with regard only to indirect discrimi-
nation under EU law. According to the ECtHR,
• In order to ensure that everyone has equal enjoyment of rights, governments, 
employers and service providers may need to take special or specific measures to 
adapt their rules and practices to those with different characteristics. 
• The terms ‘special measures’ and ‘specific measures’ can be taken to include 
redressing past disadvantage suffered by those with a protected characteristic. 
Where this is proportionate, it may constitute a justification of discrimination.
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‘… a difference in the treatment of persons in relevantly similar situations … 
is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification; in other 
words, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised’.63
Similar wording is used by the EU non-discrimination directives in relation to indirect 
discrimination. The Racial Equality Directive states: 
‘[I]ndirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where 
an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice 
would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a 
particular disadvantage compared with other persons, 
unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.’64
According to the wording used by both the ECtHR and the 
non-discrimination directives, this is not, strictly speaking, 
a defence to discrimination as such but rather a justifica-
tion of differential treatment, which will prevent a finding 
of discrimination being made. However, in substance, if not 
in form, the courts treat issues of justifications as defences 
to discrimination. 
Example: the ECJ offered an in-depth explanation of the idea of objective 
justification in the case of Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber Von Hartz.65 Here, 
part-time employees, who were excluded from the occupational pension 
scheme of Bilka (a department store), complained that this constituted indirect 
discrimination against women, since they made up the vast majority of part-time 
workers. The ECJ found that this would amount to indirect discrimination, unless 
the difference in enjoyment could be justified. In order to be justified, it would 
need to be shown that: ‘the … measures chosen by Bilka correspond to a real 
need on the part of the undertaking, are appropriate with a view to achieving the 
objectives pursued, and are necessary to that end’.
63 ECtHR, Burden v. UK [GC] (No. 13378/05), 29 April 2008, para. 60.
64  Article 2(2)(b), Racial Equality Directive; Article 2(2)(b), Employment Equality Directive; Article 2(b), 
Gender Goods and Services Directive; Article 2(1)(b), Gender Equality Directive (Recast).
65 ECJ, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber Von Hartz, Case 170/84 [1986] ECR 1607, 13 May 1986.
In order to justify differential 
treatment, it must be shown:
•  that the rule or practice 
in question pursues a 
legitimate aim;
•  that the means chosen 
to achieve that aim 
(that is, the measure 
which has led to the 
differential treatment) 
is proportionate to and 
necessary to achieve that 
aim.
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Bilka argued that the aim behind the difference 
in treatment was to discourage part-time work 
and incentivise full-time work, since part-time 
workers tended to be reluctant to work eve-
nings or on Saturdays, making it more difficult 
to maintain adequate staffing. The ECJ found 
that this could constitute a legitimate aim. How-
ever, it did not answer the question of whether 
excluding part-time workers from the pension 
scheme was proportionate to achieving this aim. 
The requirement that the measures taken be 
‘necessary’ implies that it must be shown that 
no reasonable alternative means exists which 
would cause less of an interference with the 
principle of equal treatment. It was left to the 
national court to apply the law to the facts of 
the case. 
2.6.3. Application of the general defence
In the context of employment, the ECJ has been reluctant to accept differential 
treatment based on reasons of management that are related to the economic 
concerns of employers, while it is more willing to accept differential treatment 
based on broader social and employment policy goals with fiscal implications. 
In cases concerning the latter considerations, the ECJ will accord States a broad 
‘margin of discretion’. In the context of the ECHR, the ECtHR is less likely to accept 
differential treatment where this relates to matters considered to be at the core 
of personal dignity – such as discrimination based on race or ethnic origin, home, 
or private and family life – and more likely to accept differential treatment where 
this relates to broader social policy considerations, particularly where these have 
fiscal implications. The ECtHR uses the terminology of the ‘margin of appreciation’, 
which refers to the State’s sphere of discretion in determining whether differential 
treatment is justified. Where this margin is deemed ‘narrow’, the ECtHR adopts a 
higher degree of scrutiny. 
2.6.4. Specific defences under EU law
As discussed above, under the non-discrimination directives a specific set of 
 defences exist allowing differential treatment to be justified in a limited set of 
In order to determine whether 
the differential treatment is 
proportionate, the court must be 
satisfied that:
•  there is no other means of 
achieving that aim that imposes 
less of an interference with 
the right to equal treatment. In 
other words, the disadvantage 
suffered must be the minimum 
possible level of harm needed to 
achieve the aim sought;
•  the aim to be achieved is 
important enough to justify this 
level of interference. 
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 circumstances. The ‘genuine occupational requirement defence’ is present in each 
of the directives (except the Gender Goods and Services Directive, since it does not 
relate to employment); this requirement allows employers to differentiate against 
individuals on the basis of a protected ground where this ground has an inherent link 
with the capacity to perform or the qualifications required of a particular job.66 The 
other two defences are found only in the Employment Equality Directive: firstly, the 
permissibility of discrimination on the basis of religion or belief by employers who are 
faith-based organisations;67 secondly, the permissibility of age discrimination in  certain 
circumstances.68 The strict approach of the ECJ to interpreting defences to  differential 
treatment suggests any exceptions will be interpreted narrowly, since it places empha-
sis on the importance of any rights created for individuals under EU law.69
2.6.4.1. Genuine occupational requirement
According to the non-discrimination directives, in so far as they deal with the 
sphere of employment:
‘Member States may provide that a difference in treatment based on 
a characteristic related to [the protected ground] shall not constitute 
discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational 
activities concerned or the context in which they are carried out, such 
a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement 
is proportionate.’70
This defence allows employers to differentiate against individuals on the basis of a 
protected characteristic, where this characteristic is directly related to the suitability 
or competence to perform the duties required of a particular post.
There are well established occupations that fall under the genuine occupational re-
qui r ement derogation: in Commission v. Germany, the ECJ, relying on a  Commission 
survey on the ambit of the derogation in relation to sex discrimination, indicated 
66  Article 14(2), Gender Equality Directive (Recast); Article 4, Racial Equality Directive; Article 4(1) 
Employment Equality Directive.
67 Article 4(2), Employment Equality Directive.
68 Article 6, Employment Equality Directive.
69  See, for example, ECJ, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84 [1986] 
ECR 1651, 15 May 1986, para. 36.
70  Article 14(2), Gender Equality Directive (Recast); Article 4, Racial Equality Directive; Article 4(1) 
Employment Equality Directive.
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particular professions where the defence was likely to be applicable.71 Particular 
attention was given to artistic professions which may require particular attributes 
that belong to individuals as inherent characteristics, such as requiring a female 
singer to fit with a taste in performance style, a young actor to play a particular 
role, an able-bodied individual to dance, or men or women for particular types of 
fashion modelling. However, this was not an attempt at providing an exhaustive 
list. Other examples might include employing an individual of Chinese ethnicity in a 
Chinese restaurant in order to maintain authenticity or the employment of women 
in women-only fitness clubs.
Example: in Commission v. France, the ECJ found that in certain circumstances 
it will not be unlawful to reserve employment positions primarily for male 
candidates in male-populated prisons and for female candidates in female-
populated prisons.72 However, this exception could only be used in relation 
to posts that entailed those activities where being of a particular sex was 
relevant. In this case, the French authorities wished to retain a percentage 
of posts for male candidates as there may arise a need to use force in order 
to deter potential troublemakers, along with other duties that could only be 
undertaken by men. Although the ECJ accepted the arguments in principle, the 
French authorities failed to satisfy the requirement of transparency in relation 
to specific activities that would need to be fulfilled by male candidates only; 
generalisations of sex suitability will not suffice. 
Example: in the Johnston case, a female police officer working in Northern 
Ireland complained that her contract had not been renewed. The Chief Constable 
justified this on the grounds that female officers were not trained in the 
handling of firearms and this was on the basis that ‘in a situation characterised 
by serious internal disturbances the carrying of firearms by policewomen 
might create additional risks of their being assassinated and might therefore 
be contrary to the requirements of public safety’. The ECJ found that, while the 
threat to safety should be taken into account, the threat applied equally to men 
and women, and women were not at greater risk. Unless the justification related 
to biological factors specific to women, such as the protection of her child during 
pregnancy, differential treatment could not be justified on the grounds that 
public opinion demand that women be protected. 
71 ECJ, Commission v. Germany, Case 248/83 [1985] ECR 1459, 21 May 1985.
72 ECJ, Commission v. France, Case 318/86 [1988] ECR 3559, 30 June 1988.
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Example: in the Mahlburg case, the complainant, who was pregnant, was 
turned down for a permanent post as a nurse where a substantial amount of 
work was to be conducted in operating theatres.73 This was justified on the 
basis that harm could be caused to the child because of exposure to harmful 
substances in theatre. The ECJ found that because the post was a permanent 
one, it was disproportionate to bar the complainant from the post, because 
her inability to work in theatre would only be temporary. While restrictions on 
the working conditions of pregnant women were acceptable, these had to be 
strictly circumscribed to duties that would cause her harm and could not entail 
a generalised bar to work. 
Paragraph 18 of the Preamble to the Employment Equality Directive contains a 
more specific articulation of the genuine occupational requirement defence in 
relation to certain public services relating to safety and security. This is not of itself 
a separate defence, but it should rather be regarded as making express one of the 
consequences of the genuine occupational requirement defence in a particular 
context:
‘This Directive does not require, in particular, the armed forces and the police, 
prison or emergency services to recruit or maintain in employment persons 
who do not have the required capacity to carry out the range of functions 
that they may be called upon to perform with regard to the legitimate 
objective of preserving the operational capacity of those services.’74
Typically, this might apply to a situation of refusing certain posts that are deemed to 
be highly physically demanding to those beyond a certain age, or with a disability. 
In this respect, Article 3(4) of the Directive permits Member States to exclude 
expressly the provision of its terms to the armed forces. While this provision does 
not appear in the Gender Equality Directive (Recast), it is possible to appreciate 
how it might operate by examining two cases relating to sex discrimination and 
the armed forces. These cases were considered under Article 2(2) of the Equal 
Treatment Directive, which contained the defence of ‘genuine occupational 
requirement’ now found in Article 14(2) of the Gender Equality Directive (Recast). 
Example: in the Sirdar case, the complainant had served as a chef as part of 
a commando unit. She was made redundant following cutbacks in military 
73 ECJ, Mahlburg v. Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Case C-207/98 [2000] ECR I-549, 3 February 2000.
74 Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16.
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spending which introduced the principle of ‘interoperability’ for commando 
units.75 ‘Interoperability’ required that each individual be capable of performing 
a combat role, due to manpower shortages. The ECJ accepted that all-male 
commando units were justified in order to guarantee combat effectiveness, 
and that the principle of interoperability thereby excluded women. This was 
because the commandos were a small, specialised force that was usually in the 
first wave of any attack. The ECJ found the rule to be necessary in pursuit of the 
aim of ensuring combat effectiveness. 
Example: in the Kreil case, the complainant applied to work as an electrical 
engineer in the armed forces.76 However, she was refused a post since women 
were barred from any military posts involving the use of arms and could only 
participate in the medical and musical services of the forces. The ECJ found that 
this exclusion was too wide since it applied to almost all military posts simply 
because in those posts women might at some point have to use weapons. Any 
justification should be more closely related to the functions typically performed 
in particular positions. The credibility of the government’s justification was also 
questioned because, even in those posts that were open to women, they were 
still obliged to undergo basic weapon training for the purposes of self-defence 
or defence of others. The measure was therefore not proportionate to achieving 
its aim. Furthermore, distinctions should not be made between women and 
men on the basis that women require greater protection, unless these relate to 
factors specific to the circumstances of women, such as the need for protection 
during pregnancy.
The ability to justify sex discrimination by reference to the effectiveness or efficien-
cy of particular security or emergency services may well prove more difficult over 
time as gender roles and social attitudes develop, and Member States are under an 
obligation to reconsider restrictive measures in light of this periodically.77 
2.6.4.2. Religious institutions
The Employment Equality Directive specifically permits organisations that are 
based around a ‘religion’ or ‘belief’ to impose certain conditions on employees. 
Article 4(2) of the Directive states that it does not interfere with ‘the right of 
75  ECJ, Sirdar v. The Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence, Case C-273/97 [1999] ECR I-7403, 26 
October 1999.
76 ECJ, Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-285/98 [2000] ECR I-69, 11 January 2000.
77 Article 31(3), Gender Equality Directive (Recast).
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churches and other public or private organisations, the ethos of which is based on 
religion or belief … to require individuals working for them to act in good faith 
and with loyalty to the organisation’s ethos’. Furthermore, employers connected 
to religious organisations may fall within the scope of the ‘genuine occupational 
requirement’ defence allowing for differential treatment based on religious tenets 
of the organisation in question. 
Article 4(1) and 4(2) thus allow organisations such as churches to refuse, for 
instance, to employ women as priests, pastors or ministers, where this conflicts 
with the ethos of that religion. While the ECJ has not yet had the opportunity to 
rule on the interpretation of this provision, it has been applied at the national level. 
Below are two cases relating to the invocation of this defence to justify differential 
treatment on the basis of sexual orientation.
Example: in a case before the Finnish courts, the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of Finland refused the appointment as chaplain (assistant vicar) of an individual 
who was in a same-sex relationship.78 The Vaasa Administrative Court annulled 
the decision on the basis that being heterosexual could not be considered to be 
a genuine occupational requirement for this post. Attention was paid to the fact 
that no mention of sexual orientation was made in the Church’s internal rules 
relating to the appointment of vicars and chaplains.
Example: in the Amicus case, the UK courts were asked to rule on the 
compatibility of national regulations transposing the genuine occupational 
requirement defence in the context of religious employers with the 
Employment Equality Directive.79 It was emphasised that any exception to the 
principle of equal treatment should be narrowly interpreted. The wording of the 
national regulations permitted differential treatment where the employment ‘is 
for the purposes of an organised religion’, and it was underlined that this would 
be far more restrictive than ‘for purposes of a religious organisation’. The court 
thus agreed with the submissions of the government that this exception would 
apply in relation to a very limited number of posts related to the promotion or 
representation of the religion, such as religious ministers. It would not allow 
religious organisations, such as faith schools or religious nursing homes, to 
78  Vaasa Administrative Tribunal, Finland, Vaasan Hallinto-oikeus - 04/0253/3. English summary available 
at FRA InfoPortal, Case 187-1.
79  Amicus MSF Section, R (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] 
EWHC 860 (Admin), UK High Court, 26 April 2004. English summary available at FRA InfoPortal, Case 187-1.
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argue that the post of a teacher (which is for the purposes of education) or a 
nurse (which is for the purposes of healthcare) was part of the ‘purpose of an 
organised religion’.
2.6.4.3. Exceptions on the basis of age
Article 6 of the Employment Equality Directive provides two separate justifications 
of differences of treatment on grounds of age. 
Article 6(1) allows age discrimination that pursues ‘legitimate employment policy, 
labour market and vocational training objectives’, provided that this meets the 
proportionality test. A limited number of examples for when differential treatment 
may be justified is provided: Article 6(1)(b) allows for the ‘fixing of minimum 
conditions of age, professional experience or seniority in service for access to 
employment’. However, this list is not intended to be exhaustive and so could be 
expanded on a case-by-case basis.
Article 6(2) permits age discrimination with regard to access to and benefits under 
occupational social security schemes, without the need to satisfy a test of propor-
tionality. 
Example: in the Palacios de la Villa case, the ECJ had its first opportunity to 
consider the ambit of Article 6, being asked to consider its application in the 
context of mandatory retirement ages.80 In finding that a mandatory retirement 
age did fall under Article 6, the ECJ then considered whether it could be 
objectively justified. The ECJ considered the following issues to be of importance:
•  firstly, the original measure was expressed to create labour market  oppor-
tunities against an economic background characterised by high unemploy-
ment; 
•  secondly, there was evidence that the transitional measure was adopted 
at the instigation of trade unions and employer organisations, to promote 
better distribution of work between the generations; 
•  thirdly, Law 14/2005 was again enacted with the cooperation of trade 
 unions and employer organisations, this time with an expressed require-
ment that that measure be ‘linked to objectives which are consistent with 
employment policy and are set out in the collective agreement’;  
80 ECJ, Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, Case C-411/05 [2007] ECR I-8531, 16 October 2007.
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
52
•  fourthly, the compulsory retirement clause in the collective agreement was 
expressed to be ‘in the interests of promoting employment’. 
Having considered these factors, the ECJ concluded that when ‘placed in its 
context, the … transitional provision was aimed at regulating the national 
labour market, in particular, for the purposes of checking unemployment’. On 
this basis, the ECJ decided that the collective agreement fulfilled a legitimate 
aim. Having accepted that a legitimate aim was being pursued, the ECJ then 
needed to consider whether the measure was ‘appropriate and necessary’ in 
achieving that aim. The ECJ reiterated that Member States have a broad margin 
of discretion in the area of social and employment policy, and this has the 
implication that ‘specific provisions may vary in accordance with the situation 
in Member States’. What appeared key was the requirement that the workers 
concerned have access to a retirement pension, ‘the level of which cannot be 
unreasonable’. Equally influential was that the provisions in question were 
determined by collective agreement between trade unions and employer 
organisations, building into the process a level of flexibility that enabled the 
decision to retire to take into account the labour market concerned and the 
specific job requirements. On this basis, the ECJ held that the transitional 
measure, affecting Mr Palacios, and the collective agreement were objectively 
justified and thus compatible with EU law. The approach highlighted by the 
ECJ is that Article 6 will be considered in the same manner that objective 
justification is under the other grounds of non-discrimination protection, as 
discussed above. 
Example: in the UK case of MacCulloch, the court was asked to consider the 
position of redundancy payment schemes that saw enhanced redundancy 
payments according to age and length of service.81 This had the obvious 
result of older employees with longer periods of service being entitled to a 
much greater redundancy payment than younger, newer members of staff. 
The UK appeals tribunal accepted that, in principle, this could be objectively 
justified as a means of rewarding older workers for their loyalty, giving them 
larger payments to take account of their vulnerability in the job market, and 
encouraging older workers to leave, thus freeing up jobs for junior employees. 
However, guidance as to how the issue of objective justification should be 
approached was also given, with an intimation that the issue of proportionality 
81  MacCulloch v. Imperial Chemical Industries plc [2008] IRLR 846, UK Employment Appeals Tribunal, 
22 July 2008.
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requires extensive consideration before conclusions on objective justification 
can be made. 
Example: in the Hütter case, the ECJ was asked to consider a reference relating 
to an Austrian law providing that work experience prior to attaining the age 
of 18 years could not be taken into account for the purpose of determining 
pay. Mr Hütter and a colleague were both apprentices at the Graz University of 
Technology, who on completing their apprenticeships were offered a 3-month 
contract. On the basis of the legislation in question, Mr Hütter, who was just 
over 18 years of age, had his pay determined with reference to his acquired 
6.5 months’ work experience, whereas his colleague who was 22 months 
older than him had her pay determined in line with her acquired 28.5 months’ 
experience. This led to a difference in monthly pay, despite each having 
gathered similar levels of experience. 
Mr Hütter brought a claim contending that the rule was more favourable 
to persons who attained their experience after they had reached the age of 
18 years. The ECJ accepted that the legislation’s primary aims could be deemed 
legitimate: (1) so as not to place persons who have pursued a general secondary 
education at a disadvantage, compared with persons with a vocational 
qualification; and (2) to avoid making apprenticeships more costly and thereby 
promote the integration of young persons who had pursued that type of training 
into the labour market. Although appreciating that in determining whether the 
legitimate aims were appropriate and necessary the Member State had a broad 
margin of discretion, the ECJ found that an objective justification had not been 
properly made out as it had a disproportionate impact on younger workers, 
especially in those cases where the length of experience was the same, yet the 
age of the applicant affected the value of remuneration, as in this case.
It should be noted that this approach is also consistent with that of the ECtHR which 
examined the issue of different pensionable ages in the context of the ECHR, dis-
cussed in the Stec and Others case, in Chapter 4.2. In this sense, the exceptions 
relating to age are consistent with the courts’ approaches to employment and social 
policy justifications. 
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While European non-discrimination law prohibits direct and indirect discrimination, 
it does so only in certain contexts. In the EU, non-discrimination law was introduced 
in order to facilitate the functioning of the internal market, and was therefore 
traditionally confined to the sphere of employment. With the introduction of the 
Racial Equality Directive in 2000 this sphere was expanded to include access to 
goods and services, and access to the State welfare system, out of consideration 
that in order to guarantee equality in the workplace it was also necessary to ensure 
equality in other areas, which can have an impact on employment. The Gender 
Goods and Services Directive was then introduced in order to expand the scope of 
equality on the grounds of sex to goods and services. However, the Employment 
Equality Directive of 2000, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation, disability, age and religion or belief, applies only in the context of 
employment. As discussed in Chapter 1.1.2., the expansion of protection of these 
grounds to the context of goods and services and access to the welfare system is 
currently under consideration by the legislature. 
In contrast, Article 14 of the ECHR guarantees equality in relation to the enjoyment 
of the substantive rights guaranteed by the ECHR. In addition, Protocol 12 to the 
ECHR, which entered into force in 2005, expands the scope of the prohibition on 
discrimination to cover any right which is guaranteed at the national level, even 
where this does not fall within the scope of an ECHR right. However, the Protocol 
has been ratified by only 17 of the 47 CoE members, among which six are EU 
Member States. This means that among the EU Member States there exist different 
levels of obligations in European non-discrimination law. 
The scope of European 
non-discrimination law
3
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This chapter will set out the scope of application of European non-discrimination 
law. It will begin with a general exposition of the scope of Article 14 and Protocol 12 
to the ECHR and the method adopted by the ECtHR to determining its sphere of 
application. It will then examine particular substantive areas covered by the non-
discrimination directives, indicating where this corresponds to a sphere also covered 
by Article 14. It will finally give an overview of those areas where the ECHR applies 
beyond the specific contexts of EU law, such as in the area of law enforcement and 
the ‘personal sphere’. 
3.2.  Who receives protection under  
European non-discrimination law?
A preliminary point should be made on the issue of the beneficiaries of protection 
under EU law and the ECHR. The ECHR guarantees protection to all those within the 
jurisdiction of a Member State, whether they are citizens or not, and even beyond 
the national territory to those areas under the effective control of the State (such as 
occupied territories).82 In contrast, the protection of EU law is more limited in scope. 
The prohibition on nationality discrimination in EU law applies in the context of 
free movement of persons and is only accorded to citizens of EU Member States. In 
addition, the non-discrimination directives contain various exclusions of application 
for third-country nationals (TCNs). A TCN is an individual who is a citizen of a State 
that is not a member of the EU. 
The non-discrimination directives expressly exclude their application to nationality 
discrimination, which is regulated under the Free Movement Directive.83 According 
to the latter, only citizens of EU Member States have a right of entry and residence 
in other EU Member States. After a period of five years’ lawful residence in another 
EU Member State, an EU citizen is entitled to a right of permanent residence, giving 
them equivalent rights to those in the category of ‘worker’. This, of course, does 
not mean that nationals of other Member States are not protected by the non-
discrimination directives. Thus, a German homosexual dismissed from employment 
in Greece because of his sexual orientation will be able to rely on the Employment 
Equality Directive. It simply means that when making a complaint of discrimination 
on the basis of nationality, either the victim will have to try to bring this within 
82 ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (No. 15318/89), 18 December 1996.
83  Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p 77.
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the ground of race or ethnicity, or they will have to rely on the Free Movement 
Directive.
Both the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Directive state 
that they do not create any right to equal treatment for third-country nationals 
(TCNs) in relation to conditions of entry and residence. The Employment Equality 
Directive further states that it does not create any right to equal treatment for TCNs 
in relation to access to employment and occupation. The Racial Equality Directive 
states that it does not cover ‘any treatment which arises from the legal status of 
third-country nationals’. However, this would not appear to allow Member States 
to exclude totally protection for TCNs, since the preamble states that TCNs shall be 
protected by the directive, except in relation to access to employment. The Gender 
Equality Directive (Recast) and Gender Goods and Services Directive do not exclude 
protection for TCNs.
However, TCNs will enjoy a right to equal treatment in broadly the same areas 
covered by the non-discrimination directives where they qualify as ‘long-term 
residents’ under the Third-Country Nationals Directive (which requires, among 
other conditions, a period of five years’ lawful residence).84 In addition, the Family 
Reunification Directive allows for TCNs lawfully resident in a Member State to be 
joined by family members in certain conditions.85
Of course, these rules under EU law do not prevent Member States introducing more 
favourable conditions under their own national law. In addition, the case-law of the 
ECHR, as discussed in Chapter 4.7., shows that while a State may consider nationals 
and non-nationals not to be in a comparable situation (and consider it to be permis-
sible for them to be treated differently in certain circumstances), in principle all the 
rights in the ECHR must be guaranteed equally to all persons falling within their ju-
risdiction. In this respect the ECHR places obligations on Member States with respect 
to TCNs which in some areas go beyond the requirements of EU law. 
84  Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, 
OJ L 16, 23.01.2004, p. 44.
85 Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, p. 12.
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3.3.  The scope of the European Convention:  
Article 14 and Protocol 12
3.3.1.  The nature of the prohibition on 
discrimination in the Convention
Article 14 guarantees equality ‘[i]n the enjoyment of … [the] rights and freedoms’ 
set out in the ECHR. The ECtHR will therefore not be competent to examine 
complaints of discrimination unless they fall within the ambit of one of the rights 
protected by the ECHR. 
Whenever the ECtHR considers an alleged violation of Article 14, this is always done 
in conjunction with a substantive right. An applicant will often allege a violation of 
a substantive right, and in addition a violation of a substantive right in conjunction 
with Article 14. In other words, the interference with their rights was, in addition to 
failing to meet the standards required in the substantive right, also discriminatory 
in that those in comparable situations did not face a similar disadvantage. As noted 
in Chapter 4, it is often the case that, where the ECtHR finds a violation of the 
substantive right, it will not go on to consider the complaint of discrimination where 
it considers that this will involve an examination of essentially the same complaint. 
This chapter will first briefly set out the rights guaranteed by the ECHR and then 
explain how the ECtHR has interpreted the scope of the ECHR for the purposes of 
applying Article 14. 
3.3.1.1. Rights covered by the Convention
Since Article 14 is wholly dependent on discrimination based on one of the 
substantive rights guaranteed in the ECHR, it is necessary to gain an appreciation 
of the rights covered by the ECHR. The ECHR contains a list of rights, predominantly 
characterised as ‘civil and political’; it does, however, also protect certain ‘economic 
and social’ rights. 
The substantive rights contained within the ECHR cover an exceptionally wide 
breadth, including, for example: the right to life; the right to respect for private and 
family life; and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
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Wherever an issue of discrimination relates to one of the areas covered by an ECHR 
right, the ECtHR will consider complaints alleging a violation of Article 14. 
This is an extremely significant distinction between EU law and the ECHR, in that the 
ECHR provides protection from discrimination over issues that EU non-discrimination 
law does not regulate. Although the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights obliges 
the EU not to interfere with human rights in the measures it takes (including a 
prohibition on discrimination), the Charter only applies to the Member States when 
they are applying EU law. The Charter applies to them in this limited circumstance 
simply because the EU itself does not really have the administrative machinery in 
place in the Member States to implement EU law – rather, EU law is put into effect 
by the administrations of the Member States themselves. Therefore, in those areas 
where the Member States have not delegated powers to the EU, the Charter has no 
effect. 
Since the introduction of the non-discrimination directives and the extension of 
protection to accessing goods and services and the welfare system, the difference 
in scope between the protection offered under the ECHR and the directives has 
diminished. Nonetheless, particular areas where the ECHR provides protection over 
and above EU law can be identified. These will be examined below.
3.3.1.2. The scope of convention rights
When applying Article 14, the ECtHR has adopted a wide interpretation of the scope 
of ECHR rights:
•  firstly, the ECtHR has made clear that it may examine claims under Article 14 
taken in conjunction with a substantive right, even if there has been no violation 
of the substantive right itself;86
•  secondly, it has held that the scope of the ECHR extends beyond the actual letter 
of the rights guaranteed. It will be sufficient if the facts of the case broadly 
relate to issues that are protected under the ECHR.
Example: in the case of Zarb Adami v. Malta, the applicant complained of 
discrimination on the basis of sex due to the disproportionately high number 
of men called for jury service.87 Article 4(2) of the ECHR prohibits forced labour. 
86 See, for example, ECtHR, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC] (No. 31871/96), 8 July 2003.
87 ECtHR, Zarb Adami v. Malta (No. 17209/02), 20 June 2006.
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However, Article 4(3)(d) states that ‘normal civic obligations’ are not comprised 
within the notion of ‘forced labour’. The ECtHR found that, although ‘normal 
civic obligations’ are not covered by this Article (in other words, the ECHR does 
not confer a right to be free from performing jury service), the facts of the 
case did fall within the scope of the right. It based its reasoning on the fact 
that what constitutes ‘normal civic obligations’ may become ‘abnormal’ where 
these are applied in a discriminatory manner. 
Example: in the case of E.B. v. France, national authorities refused an adoption 
application from a lesbian living with her partner.88 The applicant alleged a 
breach of Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14. The ECtHR noted that it 
was not being requested to rule on whether Article 8 of itself had been violated, 
which it regarded as significant because Article 8 did not of itself confer a right 
to found a family or to adopt. The ECtHR, however, underlined that it was 
possible for a complaint of discrimination to fall within the scope of a particular 
right, even if the issue in question did not relate to a specific entitlement 
granted by the ECHR. It found that because France had in its national legislation 
created a right to adopt, the facts of the case undoubtedly fell within the ambit 
of Article 8. On the facts of the case, it also found that the applicant’s sexual 
orientation played a determinative role in the refusal of the authorities to allow 
her to adopt, which amounted to discriminatory treatment by comparison to 
other single individuals who were entitled to adopt under national law.
Example: in the case of Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, the applicants 
complained that their right to respect for private life was subject to interference 
by the State placing a bar on their access to employment in the public service 
and certain aspects of private employment.89 There is no right to work 
guaranteed within the ECHR. Nevertheless, the ECtHR found that this fell within 
the ambit of Article 8, since it ‘affected their ability to develop relationships 
with the outside world to a very significant degree and has created serious 
difficulties for them in terms of earning their living, with obvious repercussions 
on the enjoyment of their private lives’.90
Example: in the case of Carson and Others v. UK, the applicants complained 
that the government had discriminated against them on the basis of residence 
88 ECtHR, E.B. v. France [GC] (No. 43546/02), 22 January 2008.
89 ECtHR, Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania (Nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00), 27 July 2004.
90 Ibid., para. 48.
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by refusing to allow their pension payments to be revised upwards on the same 
basis as pensioners residing within the UK or within one of the countries with 
which the UK has concluded a bilateral agreement in that respect.91 The ECtHR 
found that although the ECHR creates no right to social security or pension 
payments, where the State itself decided to do so, this would give rise to a 
proprietary interest, which would be protected under Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
The ECtHR has similarly found in many other cases where any form of State benefit 
becomes payable that this will either fall under the scope of Article 1 of Protocol 192 
(because it is deemed to be property)93 or Article 8 (because it affects the family or 
private life),94 for the purposes of applying Article 14. This is particularly important 
in relation to nationality discrimination, discussed above in Chapter 3.2., since EU 
law is far more restrictive in this respect.
3.3.1.3. Protocol 12
Protocol 12 prohibits discrimination in relation to ‘enjoyment of any right set forth 
by law’ and is thus greater in scope than Article 14, which relates only to the rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR. The Commentary provided on the meaning of these terms 
in the Explanatory Report of the Council of Europe states that this provision relates 
to discrimination:
i.  in the enjoyment of any right specifically granted to an individual under national 
law;
ii.  in the enjoyment of a right which may be inferred from a clear obligation of a 
public authority under national law, that is, where a public authority is under an 
obligation under national law to behave in a particular manner;
91 ECtHR, Carson and Others v. UK [GC] (No. 42184/05), 16 March 2010.
92  Full consideration of Article 1 of Protocol 1 can be found on the CoE Human Rights Education for 
Legal Professionals website: Grgić, Mataga, Longar and Vilfan, ‘The right to property under the 
ECHR’, Human Rights Handbook, No. 10, 2007, available at: www.coehelp.org/mod/resource/view.
php?inpopup=true&id=2123.
93  For example, ECtHR, Stec and Others v. UK [GC] (Nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01), 12 April 2006 (pension 
payments and invalidity benefits); ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC] (No. 55707/00), 18 February 2009 
(pension payments); ECtHR, Koua Poirrez v. France (No. 40892/98), 30 September 2003 (disability 
benefit); ECtHR, Gaygusuz v. Austria (No. 17371/90), 16 September 1996 (unemployment benefit).
94  For example, ECtHR, Weller v. Hungary (No. 44399/05), 31 March 2009 (a social security payment for 
the purposes of supporting families with children).
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 iii.  by a public authority in the exercise of discretionary power (for example, grant-
ing certain subsidies);
iv.  by any other act or omission by a public authority (for example, the behaviour of 
law-enforcement officers when controlling a riot).’95
The Commentary also states that while the Protocol principally protects individuals 
against discrimination from the State, it will also relate to those relations between 
private persons, which the State is normally expected to regulate, ‘for example, 
arbitrary denial of access to work, access to restaurants, or to services which private 
persons may make available to the public such as medical care or utilities such as 
water and electricity’.96 Broadly speaking, Protocol 12 will prohibit discrimination 
outside purely personal contexts, where individuals exercise functions placing them 
in a position as to decide on how publicly available goods and services are offered. 
In the only case examined by the ECtHR under Article 1 of Protocol 12, Sejdić and 
Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, discussed in Chapter 4.6., the ECtHR stated that this 
instrument ‘introduces a general prohibition of discrimination’. It also stated that 
the analysis of discrimination cases would be identical to that established by the 
ECtHR in the context of Article 14.   
3.4.  The scope of the EU non-discrimination 
directives
Under the non-discrimination directives, the scope of the prohibition on 
discrimination extends to three areas: employment, the welfare system, and goods 
and services. Currently, the Racial Equality Directive applies to all three areas. While 
legislation which will extend the Employment Equality Directive to all three areas is 
under discussion, this Directive currently only applies to employment. The Gender 
Equality Directive (Recast) and the Gender Goods and Services Directive apply to 
employment and access to goods and services but not to access to the welfare 
system. 
95  Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ETS No. 177), Explanatory Report, para. 22. Available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/
Reports/Html/177.htm.
96 Ibid., para. 28.
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3.4.1. Employment
Protection against discrimination in the field of employment is extended across all 
the protected grounds provided for under the non-discrimination directives.
3.4.1.1. Access to employment
The concept of ‘access to employment’ has been interpreted widely by the ECJ. 
Example: in the case of Meyers v. Adjudication Officer, the ECJ held that access 
to employment covers ‘not only the conditions obtaining before an employment 
relationships comes into being’, but also all those influencing factors that need 
to be considered before the individual makes a decision of whether or not to 
accept a job offer.97 In the Meyers case, the granting of a particular State benefit 
(payable depending on level of income) was capable of falling in this area. 
This was because the candidate would be influenced by whether they would 
be entitled to this benefit when considering their decision to take up a post. 
Consequently, such a consideration had an impact on access to employment. 
Example: in the case of Schnorbus v. Land Hessen, the complainant applied for 
a training post as part of her qualification to join the judiciary.98 Under national 
law it was necessary to pass a national exam, followed by a period of training 
and a second exam. The complainant had passed the first exam but was 
refused a training post on the grounds that there were no vacancies. Her entry 
was consequently delayed until the next round of posts became available. The 
complainant argued that she had been discriminated against because priority 
was accorded to male candidates who had completed their military service. 
The ECJ found that national legislation regulating the date of admission to 
the training post fell within the scope of ‘access to employment’ since such a 
period of training was itself considered as ‘employment’ both in its own right 
and as part of the process of obtaining a post within the judiciary. 
3.4.1.2.  Conditions of employment, including dismissals and pay
Again, the ECJ in interpreting what falls within this field has applied a fairly wide 
understanding. This has ultimately led to any condition derived from the working 
relationship to be considered as falling within this category. 
97 ECJ, Meyers v. Adjudication Officer, Case C-116/94 [1995] ECR I-2131, 13 July 1995.
98 ECJ, Schnorbus v. Land Hessen, Case C-79/99 [2000] ECR I-10997, 7 December 2000.
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Example: in the case of Meyers, the applicant, a single parent, complained 
of indirect sex discrimination due to the method used for calculating the 
eligibility of single parents for family credit.99 It fell to the ECJ to clarify 
whether the provision of family credit (a State benefit) was solely a social 
security issue, or whether it constituted a condition of employment. The ECJ 
took into consideration that the family credit in question was payable when 
the following three conditions were satisfied: the income of the claimant did 
not exceed a specified amount; the claimant or their partner was working; 
and the claimant or their partner had responsibility for a child. The ECJ held 
that the Equal Treatment Directive (now replaced by the Gender Equality 
Directive (Recast)) would not be considered inapplicable solely because 
the benefit in question formed part of a social security system. Instead, a 
wider approach was adopted looking at whether the benefit was given in 
connection to a working relationship. In this case, to benefit from the family-
credit system, the applicant had to establish that either they, or their partner, 
were engaged in remunerative work. This requirement to establish a working 
relationship brought the family-credit system within the category of working 
conditions.
Applying such a wide definition to the concept of employment and working 
conditions led the ECJ to find that the provision of workplace nurseries100 and the 
reduction of working time also fell within its ambit.101
The ECJ has also adopted a fairly inclusive approach to the issues of dismissals and 
pay. In relation to the area of dismissals, this covers almost all situations where 
the working relationship is brought to an end. This has been held to include, for 
example, where the working relationship has been brought to an end as part of 
a voluntary-redundancy scheme,102 or where the relationship has been terminated 
through compulsory retirement.103 
The concept of pay has been defined in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU as being the ‘ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other 
consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives directly 
99 ECJ, Meyers v. Adjudication Officer, Case C-116/94 [1995] ECR I-2131, 13 July 1995.
100 ECJ, Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Case C-476/99 [2002] ECR I-2891, 19 March 2002.
101  ECJ, Jamstalldhetsombudsmannen v. Orebro Lans Landsting, Case C-236/98 [2000] ECR I-2189, 
30 March 2000.
102 ECJ, Burton v. British Railways Board, Case 19/81 [1982] ECR 555, 16 February 1982.
103 ECJ, Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, Case C-411/05 [2007] ECR I-8531, 16 October 2007.
The scope of European non-discrimination law
67
or indirectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer’. This covers a 
wide variety of benefits that a worker receives due to having entered a working 
relationship. The ambit of this definition has been considered in a range of cases 
before the ECJ, and this has been held to cover all benefits associated with a 
job, including concessionary rail travel,104 expatriation allowances,105 Christmas 
bonuses,106 and occupational pensions.107 What one is essentially looking for in 
determining whether the issue falls within the term ‘pay’ is some form of benefit, 
which is derived from the existence of a working relationship. 
3.4.1.3. Access to vocational guidance and training
The definition of ‘vocational guidance and training’ has received attention from the 
ECJ in the context of the free movement of persons.108 The ECJ has adopted a broad 
definition. 
Example: in the Gravier case, a student who was a French national wished to 
study strip cartoon art at the Académie Royale des Beaux-Arts in Liège.109 She 
was charged a registration fee whereas students from the host State were not. 
The ECJ stated that: 
‘… any form of education which prepares for a qualification for a particular 
profession, trade or employment or which provides the necessary training 
and skills for such a profession, trade or employment is vocational training, 
whatever the age and the level of training of the pupils or students, and even if 
the training programme includes an element of general education.’
Example: this definition was applied in the Blaizot case where the complain-
ant applied to study on a veterinary medicine course.110 The ECJ found 
104 ECJ, Garland v. British Rail Engineering Limited, Case 12/81 [1982] ECR 455, 9 February 1982.
105 ECJ, Sabbatini v. European Parliament, Case 20/71 [1972] ECR 345, 7 June 1972.
106 ECJ, Lewen v. Denda, Case C-333/97 [1999] ECR I-7243, 21 October 1999.
107  ECJ, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, Case C-262/88 [1990] ECR I-1889, 
17 May 1990.
108  According to Article 7(3) of Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement of workers within the 
Community (OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, p. 2), a worker shall ‘have access to training in vocational schools 
and retraining centres’ without being subject to less favourable conditions when compared to national 
workers.
109 ECJ, Gravier v. Ville de Liège and Others, Case 293/83 [1985] ECR 593, 13 February 1985.
110 ECJ, Blaizot v. Université de Liège and Others, Case 24/86 [1988] ECR 379, 2 February 1988.
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that in  general a university degree will also fall within the meaning of 
‘vocational training’ even where the final qualification awarded at the end 
of the programme does not directly provide for the qualification required 
of a particular profession, trade or employment. It was sufficient that the 
programme in question provides knowledge, training or skills required within 
a particular profession, trade or employment. Thus, where particular trades 
do not require a formal qualification, or where the university degree does 
not of itself constitute the formal entry requirement to a profession, this will 
not prevent the programme being regarded as ‘vocational training’. The only 
exceptions to this are ‘certain courses of study, which of their particular nature, 
are intended for persons wishing to improve their general knowledge rather 
than prepare themselves for an occupation’.
3.4.1.4. Worker and employer organisations
This not only deals with membership and access to a worker or employer 
organisation, but also covers the involvement of persons within these organisations. 
According to guidance issued by the European Commission, this acts to ensure that 
discrimination cannot occur in the context of membership or benefits derived from 
these bodies.111 
3.4.1.5.  The European Convention and  
the context of employment
Although the ECHR does not itself contain a right to employment, Article 8 has un-
der certain circumstances been interpreted as covering the sphere of employment. 
In the above-mentioned case of Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, a government 
ban on former KGB agents accessing employment in the public sector and parts of 
the private sector was held to fall within the ambit of Article 8 in conjunction with 
Article 14 since it ‘affected their ability to develop relationships with the outside 
world to a very significant degree and has created serious difficulties for them in 
terms of earning their living, with obvious repercussions on the enjoyment of their 
private lives’.112 Similarly in the case of Bigaeva v. Greece, it was held that Article 8 
can also cover employment, including the right to access a profession.113
111  Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, COM(1999) 566 final, 25.11.1999.
112 ECtHR, Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania (Nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00), 27 July 2004.
113 ECtHR, Bigaeva v. Greece (No. 26713/05), 28 May 2009.
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The ECtHR will also prohibit discrimination on the basis of membership of a trade 
union. Furthermore, the right to form trade unions is guaranteed as a stand-alone 
right in the ECHR.114 
Example: in the case of Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, the applicants had 
experienced harassment and less favourable treatment from their employer on 
the basis of their membership of a trade union.115 Their civil claims before the 
national courts were dismissed, since discrimination could only be established 
in criminal proceedings. However, the public prosecutor refused to bring 
criminal proceedings because the standard of proof required the State to show 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that discrimination had been intended by one of 
the company’s managers. The ECtHR found that the absence in national law 
of effective judicial protection of freedom of association for trade unions 
amounted to a violation of Article 11 in conjunction with Article 14.
3.4.2. Access to welfare and forms of social security 
Of the non-discrimination directives, only the Racial Equality Directive provides 
broad protection against discrimination in accessing the welfare system and other 
forms of social security. Encompassed within this is access to benefits in kind that 
are held ‘in common’ by the State such as public healthcare, education and the 
social security system. However, the Gender Social Security Directive does establish 
a right of equal treatment on the basis of sex in relation to the narrower field of 
‘social security’.
3.4.2.1.  Social protection, including social security  
and healthcare
The precise ambit of this area is uncertain since it is not explained within the 
Racial Equality Directive and has yet to be interpreted through the ECJ case-law. 
As noted above, the Gender Social Security Directive provides for equal treatment 
on the basis of sex in relation to ‘statutory social security schemes’.116 Article 1(3) 
defines these as schemes which provide protection against sickness, invalidity, old 
age, accidents at work and occupational diseases, and unemployment, in addition 
114 For example, ECtHR, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (No. 34503/97), 12 November 2008.
115 ECtHR, Danilenkov and Others v. Russia (No. 67336/01), 30 July 2009.
116  As opposed to ‘occupational’ schemes, which are classified as ‘pay’ by the Gender Equality Directive 
(Recast).
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to ‘social assistance, in so far as it is intended to supplement or replace’ the former 
schemes. 
It is unclear what is meant by ‘social protection’, although the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Commission’s proposal for the Racial Equality Directive, as well 
as the wording of the Directive itself, does imply that this will be wider than ‘social 
security’.117 Given the intended breadth of the provision, it should be understood 
that any form of benefit offered by the State whether economic or in kind would be 
caught within the category of social protection, to the extent that it is not caught 
by social security. In this sense, it is highly probably that the individual areas of 
application of the Racial Equality Directive overlap with each other.
The scope of the protection from discrimination in the field of healthcare also remains 
unclear. It would seem that this will relate to access to publicly provided healthcare 
at the point of delivery, such as treatment accorded by administrative and medical 
staff. Presumably, it will also apply to insurance where health services are provided 
privately, but patients are reimbursed through a compulsory insurance scheme. Here, 
it would seem that a refusal to insure an individual or the charging of increased 
premiums based on race or ethnicity would fall under the scope of this provision. In 
the alternative, this would fall under the provision of goods and services. 
3.4.2.2. Social advantages
The scope of ‘social advantages’ is well developed through the ECJ case-law in the 
context of the law on the free movement of persons and has been afforded an ex-
tremely broad definition. 
Example: in the Cristini case, the complainant was an Italian national living 
with her children in France, whose late husband had been a ‘worker’ under EU 
law.118 The French railways offered concessionary travel passes for large fami-
lies, but refused such a pass to Ms Cristini on the basis of her nationality. It was 
argued that ‘social advantages’ for the purposes of EU law were only those ad-
vantages that flowed from a contract of employment. The ECJ disagreed, find-
ing that the term should include all advantages regardless of any contract of 
employment, including passes for reduced rail fares. 
117  Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, COM(1999) 566 final, 25.11.1999.
118 ECJ, Fiorini (née Cristini) v. SNCF, Case 32/75 [1975] ECR 1085, 30 September 1975.
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The ECJ defined ‘social advantages’ in the Even case as advantages
‘which, whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are generally 
granted to national workers primarily because of their objective status as 
workers or by virtue of the mere fact of their residence on the national 
territory and the extension of which to workers who are nationals of other 
Member States therefore seems suitable to facilitate their mobility within 
the Community’.119
The term applies to virtually all rights so long as they satisfy the Even definition: 
there is no distinction between a right that is granted absolutely or those rights 
granted on a discretionary basis. Further, the definition does not preclude those rights 
granted after the termination of the employment relationship being deemed a social 
advantage such as a right to a pension.120 Essentially, in the context of free movement, 
a social advantage relates to any advantage that is capable of assisting the migrant 
worker to integrate into the society of the host State. The courts have been quite 
liberal in finding an issue to be a social advantage. Examples have included: 
•  the payment of an interest-free ‘childbirth loan’. Despite the rationale behind 
the loan being to stimulate childbirth, the ECJ considered this to be a social 
advantage as it was viewed as a vehicle to alleviate financial burdens on low-
income families;121
•  the awarding of a grant under a cultural agreement to support national workers 
who are to study abroad;122
•  the right to hear a criminal prosecution against an individual in the language of 
their home State.123 
3.4.2.3. Education
Protection from discrimination in access to education was originally developed in the 
context of the free movement of persons under Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, 
119 ECJ, Criminal Proceedings against Even, Case 207/78 [1979] ECR 2019, 31 May 1979, para. 22.
120 ECJ, Commission v. France, Case C-35/97 [1998] ECR I-5325, 24 September 1998.
121 ECJ, Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg, Case 65/81 [1982] ECR 33, 14 January 1982.
122  ECJ, Matteucci v. Communauté française of Belgium, Case 235/87 [1988] ECR 5589, 
27 September 1988.
123 ECJ, Criminal Proceedings against Mutsch, Case 137/84 [1985] ECR 2681, 11 May 1985.
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particularly directed at the children of workers. The area of education will 
presumably overlap with that of vocational training. It is unclear whether it will also 
include those higher education programmes excluded from the area of vocational 
training that are intended only for the purposes of improving general knowledge.
Example: in the case of Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München, the 
complainant was the daughter of an Italian national who was working in 
Germany.124 The German authorities paid a monthly maintenance grant to 
schoolchildren who were of school age, with the aim to facilitate ‘educational 
attendance’. The ECJ held that any general measures intended to facilitate the 
educational attendance fell within the scope of education. 
3.4.2.4.  The European Convention and the context of welfare 
and education
While there is no right to social security under the ECHR, it is clear from the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR that forms of social security such as benefit payments 
and pensions will fall under the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol 1 or Article 8.125
Although there is no right to healthcare under the ECHR, the ECtHR has held that 
issues relating to healthcare, such as access to medical records,126 will fall under 
Article 8 or Article 3 where a lack of access to health is serious enough as to amount 
to inhuman or degrading treatment.127 It might therefore be argued that complaints 
relating to discrimination in relation to accessing healthcare would fall within the 
ambit of Article 14. 
It is unclear whether access to social advantages in the form of benefits in kind 
such as travel passes would fall within the ambit of the ECHR; however, the ECtHR’s 
generous interpretation of Article 8 would suggest that this may be the case, 
particularly where these benefits are intended to benefit the family unit. 
124 ECJ, Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München, Case 9/74 [1974] ECR 773.
125  In particular, see the following cases: ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC] (No. 55707/00), 18 February 
2009; ECtHR, Gaygusuz v. Austria (No. 17371/90), 16 September 1996; and ECtHR, Koua Poirrez v. 
France (No. 40892/98), 30 September 2003, all discussed in Chapter 4.7.
126 ECtHR, K.H. and Others v. Slovakia (No. 32881/04), 28 April 2009.
127 ECtHR, Sławomir Musiał v. Poland (No. 28300/06), 20 January 2009.
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Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR contains a free-standing right to education, and 
accordingly the ECtHR would regard complaints of discrimination in the context of 
education as falling within the ambit of Article 14. Discrimination on the grounds of 
education under the ECHR is discussed in the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech 
Republic128 in Chapter 2.3.1. and in the case of Oršuš and Others v. Croatia129 in 
Chapter 5.3.
3.4.3.  Access to supply of goods and services, 
including housing 
Protection from discrimination in the field of access to the supply of goods and 
services, including housing, applies to the ground of race through the Racial 
Equality Directive, and on the grounds of sex through the Gender Goods and 
Services Directive. Article 3(1) of the Gender Goods and Services Directive gives 
more precision to this provision, stating that it relates to all goods and services 
‘which are available to the public irrespective of the person concerned as regards 
both the public and private sectors, including public bodies, and which are offered 
outside the area of private and family life and the transactions carried out in this 
context’. It expressly excludes, in paragraph 13 of the Preamble, application to 
‘the content of media or advertising’ and ‘public or private education’, though this 
latter exclusion does not narrow the scope of the Racial Equality Directive, which 
expressly covers education. The Gender Goods and Services Directive also refers to 
Article 57 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU:
‘Services shall be considered to be “services” within the meaning of this 
Treaty where they are normally provided for remuneration … 
“Services” shall in particular include: 
(a) activities of an industrial character; 
(b) activities of a commercial character; 
(c) activities of craftsmen; 
(d) activities of the professions.’ 
128 ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC] (No. 57325/00), 13 November 2007.
129 ECtHR, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC] (No. 15766/03), 16 March 2010.
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It would thus seem that this area covers any context wherever a good or a service is 
normally provided in return for remuneration, so long as this does not take place in 
an entirely personal context, and with the exclusion of public or private education. 
Case-law from national bodies suggests that this will cover scenarios such as 
gaining access to or the level of service received in bars,130 restaurants and 
nightclubs,131 shops,132 purchasing insurance,133 as well as the acts of ‘private’ 
sellers, such as dog breeders.134 Although healthcare is covered specifically under 
the Racial Equality Directive, it may also fall under the scope of services, particularly 
where this is private healthcare or where individuals are obliged to purchase 
compulsory sickness insurance in order to cover health costs. In this sense, the ECJ 
has interpreted services in the context of the free movement of services to cover 
healthcare that is provided in return for remuneration by a profit-making body.135 
The Racial Equality Directive does not define housing. However, it is suggested that 
this should be interpreted in the light of international human rights law, in particular 
the right to respect for one’s home under Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Article 8 of the ECHR (given that all EU Member States are party and 
that the EU will join the ECHR at a future date) and the right to adequate housing 
contained in Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (to which all Member States are party). The ECtHR has construed the right to a 
home widely to include mobile homes such as caravans or trailers, even in situations 
130  Equal Treatment Authority (Hungary), Case No. 72, April 2008. English summary available at FRA 
Infoportal, Case 322-1; European Network of Legal Experts on the Non-Discrimination Field, 8 (July 2009) 
‘European Anti-Discrimination Law Review’, p. 49.
131  Sweden, Supreme Court, Escape Bar and Restaurant v. Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination 
T-2224-07, 1 October 2008. English summary available at FRA InfoPortal, Case 365-1; European Network 
of Legal Experts on the Non-Discrimination Field, 8 (July 2009) ‘European Anti-Discrimination Law 
Review’, at p. 68.
132  Bezirksgericht Döbling (Austria), GZ 17 C 1597/05f-17, 23 January 2006. English summary available at 
FRA InfoPortal, Case 1-1. Original text: http://infoportal.fra.europa.eu/InfoPortal/caselawDownloadFile.
do?id=1.
133  Nîmes Court of Appeal, Lenormand v. Balenci, No. 08/00907 of 6 November 2008 and French Court of 
Cassation Criminal Chamber, No. M 08-88.017 and No. 2074 of 7 April 2009. English summary available 
at European Network of Legal Experts on the Non-Discrimination Field, 9 (December 2009) ‘European 
Anti-Discrimination Law Review’, p. 59.
134  Svea Court of Appeal, Ombudsman Against Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation v. A.S., Case 
No. T-3562-06, 11 February 2008. English summary available at European Network of Legal Experts on 
the Non-Discrimination Field, 8 (July 2009) ‘European Anti-Discrimination Law Review’, p. 69.
135  ECJ, Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, Case C-158/96, [1998] ECR I-1931, 28 April 1998; ECJ, 
Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, Case C-157/99 [2001] ECR I-5473, 12 July 2001; 
and ECJ, Müller Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij, Case C-385/99 [2003] ECR I-4509, 
13 May 2003.
The scope of European non-discrimination law
75
where they are located illegally.136 According to the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, adequate housing must satisfy a range of requirements. In 
particular it should: be of sufficient quality to ensure protection from the elements; 
reflect the cultural requirements of inhabitants (and so include vehicles, caravans, 
encampments and other non-permanent structures); be connected to public utilities 
and sanitation services; and be connected to public services and allow access 
to work opportunities through an adequate infrastructure. It should also include 
adequate protection against forced or summary eviction, and be affordable.137 This 
understanding of housing also appears in the approach taken by the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in its summary report on The State of Roma 
and Traveller Housing in the European Union: Steps Towards Equality.138
Adopting this approach, access to housing would include not just ensuring that 
there is equality of treatment on the part of public or private landlords and estate 
agents in deciding whether to let or sell properties to particular individuals. It 
would also include the right to equal treatment in the way that housing is allocated 
(such as allocation of low-quality or remote housing to particular ethnic groups), 
maintained (such as failing to upkeep properties inhabited by particular groups) and 
rented (such as a lack of security of tenure, or higher rental prices or deposits for 
those belonging to particular groups). 
Example: in Belgium, a landlord was convicted under criminal law and fined 
under civil law for refusing to rent accommodation to persons of Congolese 
origin. Despite producing satisfactory references from past landlords and 
evidence of adequate income, the landlord refused to conclude the tenancy 
agreement on the basis that he had encountered problems in the past with 
non-nationals in respect of payment.139
136 ECtHR, Buckley v. UK (No. 20348/92), 25 September 1996.
137  UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General comment No. 4: The right to adequate 
housing (Art.11 (1))’ UN. Doc. E/1992/23, 13 December 1991.
138  FRA, The State of Roma and Traveller Housing in the European Union: Steps Towards Equality, Summary 
Report (Vienna, FRA, March 2010).
139  Correctionele Rechtbank van Antwerpen, Decision of 6 December 2004 (Belgium). English summary 
available at FRA InfoPortal, Case 15-1, original text on: http://infoportal.fra.europa.eu/InfoPortal/
caselawDownloadFile.do?id=15.
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3.4.3.1.  The European Convention and the context of goods 
and services, including housing
The ECtHR has interpreted Article 8 to include cases relating to activities capable of 
having consequences for private life, including relations of an economic and social 
character. The ECtHR has also taken a broad approach to the interpretation of the right 
to respect for the home under Article 8. As noted, this will include less ‘conventional’ 
fixed accommodation such as caravans and mobile homes. Where state-provided 
housing is of particularly bad condition, causing hardship to the residents over a 
sustained period, the ECtHR has also held that this may constitute inhuman treatment. 
Example: in the case of Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), the appli-
cants had been chased from their homes, which were then demolished in 
particularly traumatic circumstances.140 The process of rebuilding their houses 
was particularly slow, and the accommodation that was granted in the interim 
was of particularly low quality. The ECtHR stated: 
‘… the applicants’ living conditions in the last ten years, in particular the 
severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment and its detrimental effect 
on the applicants’ health and well-being, combined with the length of the 
period during which the applicants have had to live in such conditions and 
the general attitude of the authorities, must have caused them considerable 
mental suffering, thus diminishing their human dignity and arousing in them 
such feelings as to cause humiliation and debasement.’ 
This finding, among other factors, led the ECtHR to conclude that there had 
been degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, though the 
language used in the above extract suggests that the conditions experienced in 
the accommodation alone would have been sufficient for this finding.141 
Example: in the case of Đokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the applicant al-
leged an interference with his right to property.142 Before the disintegration of 
the former Yugoslavia, the applicant was a lecturer at a military school and a 
140 ECtHR, Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2) (Nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01), 12 July 2005.
141  Case-law of the ECtHR indicates that, in certain circumstances, discriminatory treatment can amount to 
degrading treatment. For example, see ECtHR, Smith and Grady v. UK (Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96), 
27 September 1999.
142 ECtHR, Đokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (No. 6518/04), 27 May 2010.
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member of that country’s armed forces. He purchased a flat in Sarajevo, but once 
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out and his military school moved to 
today’s Serbia the applicant followed, joining the armed forces of today’s Serbia. 
Following the conflict, the authorities refused him restitution of his property 
because he had served in foreign armed forces. At the national level, this was 
found to be justified since it was based on the consideration that the applicant 
was a ‘disloyal’ citizen for having served in foreign armed forces which had 
participated in military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although not 
expressly considering the case under Article 14 of the ECHR, the ECtHR considered 
that this decision was taken solely on the basis of the applicant’s ethnicity (since 
service in certain armed forces was indicative of one’s ethnic origin), particularly 
since it could not be shown that the applicant had in fact committed any acts of 
‘disloyalty’ other than formally being a member of those armed forces. In the 
absence of restitution, the lack of compensation or alternative accommodation 
amounted to a disproportionate interference with his right to property.
3.4.4. Access to justice 
While access to justice is not specifically mentioned by the non-discrimination 
directives among the examples of goods and services, it is conceivable that they 
fall within this ambit to the extent that the courts system represents a service 
provided to the public by the State for remuneration. At the very least, the non-
discrimination directives require the Member States to establish judicial and/or 
administrative procedures allowing individuals to enforce their rights under the 
directives.143 In addition it is a well-established principle of EU law that individuals 
should benefit from a ‘right to effective judicial protection’ of rights derived from 
EU law.144 Thus, even if it cannot be said that ‘goods and services’ includes ‘access 
to justice’, it can certainly be said that access to justice exists as a free-standing 
right (without the requirement to prove discrimination) in relation to enforcing the 
directives themselves. 
143  Article 9(1), Employment Equality Directive; Article 17(1), Gender Equality Directive (Recast); 
Article 8(1), Gender Goods and Services Directive; Article 7(1), Racial Equality Directive.
144  See, for example, ECJ, Vassilakis and Others v. Dimos Kerkyras, Case C-364/07 [2008] ECR I-90, 
12 June 2010; ECJ, Sahlstedt and Others v. Commission, Case C-362/06 [2009] ECR I-2903, 
23 April 2009; ECJ, Angelidaki and Others v. Organismos Nomarkhiaki Aftodiikisi Rethimnis, 
Case C-378/07 [2009] ECR I-3071, 23 April 2009.
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3.4.4.1.  The European Convention and the context  
of access to justice
A right of access to justice is guaranteed as a free-standing right within the ECHR 
in the context of the right to a fair trial under Article 6. The ECtHR has dealt with 
several cases relating to discrimination in access to justice.
Example: in Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, the national court’s refusal to 
suspend the sentence of the applicant, accompanied by remarks that it was 
necessary to address the culture of impunity prevailing among ethnic minorities, 
was taken to constitute a violation of Article 6 in conjunction with Article 14.145 
Example: in the case of Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), discussed 
above, it was found that excessive delays in resolving criminal and civil 
proceedings (taking seven years to deliver a first judgment) amounted to a 
violation of Article 6.146 The delays were found to be due to a high number of 
procedural errors and, taken in conjunction with the pervading discriminatory 
attitude of the authorities towards the Roma applicants, it was found to 
amount to a violation of Article 6 in conjunction with Article 14 also. 
Example: in the case of Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, national law, which made 
it impossible for the applicant to obtain public assistance with funding a 
paternity claim on the basis that she was not a Belgian national, was found 
to amount to a violation of Article 6 in conjunction with Article 14.147 This is 
not to suggest that non-nationals have an absolute right to public funding. In 
the circumstances, the ECtHR was influenced by several factors including that 
the applicant was barred because she did not have a current valid residence 
permit, even though at the time she was in the process of having her permit 
renewed. Furthermore, the ECtHR was also motivated by the fact that a one-
year time bar existed in relation to paternity cases, which meant that it was not 
reasonable to expect the applicant to wait until she had renewed her permit to 
apply for assistance.
145 ECtHR, Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria (No. 37193/07), 25 March 2010.
146 ECtHR, Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2) (Nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01), 12 July 2005.
147 ECtHR, Anakomba Yula v. Belgium (No. 45413/07), 10 March 2009, discussed in Chapter 4.7.
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3.5.  Application of the Convention beyond 
EU law
In addition to those cases discussed above, where protection under the ECHR 
coincides with that under the non-discrimination directives, there are significant 
areas where the ECHR will afford additional protection. 
3.5.1.  The ‘personal’ sphere: private and family life, 
adoption, the home and marriage148  
One particularly significant area is that of family and private life, where the Member 
States have not given the EU extensive powers to legislate. Cases brought before the 
ECtHR in this respect have involved consideration of differential treatment in relation 
to rules on inheritance, access of divorced parents to children, and issues of paternity.
As discussed in the following Chapter and in Chapter 4, the cases of Mazurek v. France,149 
Sommerfeld v. Germany150 and Rasmussen v. Denmark151 involved consideration of 
differential treatment in relation to rules on inheritance, access of divorced parents to 
children, and issues of paternity. Article 8 will also extend to matters of adoption. The 
case of E.B. v. France, discussed above, also illustrates that adoption may fall within the 
scope of the ECHR, even though there is no actual right to adopt in the ECHR. In addition, 
the ECtHR sets out the general reach of Article 8, with reference to past case-law:
‘… the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the 
Convention is a broad concept which encompasses, inter alia, the right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings … the right 
to “personal development” … or the right to self-determination as such. 
It encompasses elements such as names … gender identification, sexual 
orientation and sexual life, which fall within the personal sphere protected 
by Article 8 … and the right to respect for both the decisions to have and not 
to have a child.’152 
148  An explanation as to the scope of Article 8 of the ECHR can be found on the CoE Human Rights 
Education for Legal Professionals website: Kilkelly, The Right to Respect for Private and Family 
Life, Human Rights Handbooks, No. 1, 2001, available at: www.coehelp.org/mod/resource/view.
php?inpopup=true&id=1636.
149 ECtHR, Mazurek v. France (No. 34406/97), 1 February 2000.
150 ECtHR, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC] (No. 31871/96), 8 July 2003.
151 ECtHR, Rasmussen v. Denmark (No. 8777/79), 28 November 1984.
152 ECtHR, E.B. v. France [GC] (No. 43546/02), 22 January 2008, para. 43.
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Thus, the ambit of Article 8 is extremely wide. The ECHR also has implications for 
other areas, such as marriage, which is specifically protected under Article 12. 
Example: in the case of Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, the applicant concluded a 
marriage with her spouse in accordance with Roma customs; however, it did 
not comply with requirements under national law and so was not formally 
constituted.153 Nevertheless, the applicant had been treated by the authorities 
as if she was married in terms of the identity documents they had been issued, 
benefits paid and the record of their ‘family book’. On the death of her spouse, 
the applicant sought to claim a survivor’s pension from the State, but it was 
refused because she had not been validly married under national law. The 
ECtHR found that because the State had treated the applicant as if her marriage 
was valid, she was in a comparable situation to other ‘good faith’ spouses 
(those who were not validly married for technical reasons, but believed 
themselves to be so), who would have been entitled to a survivor’s pension. 
Although the ECtHR found that there was no discrimination in the refusal to 
recognise the marriage as valid (taking Article 12 with Article 14), there was 
discrimination in refusing to treat the applicant similarly to other good-faith 
spouses and accord the pension (taking Article 1 of Protocol 1 with Article 14). 
Thus, while protection of the core of human dignity customarily calls for a narrower 
margin of appreciation by the ECtHR, this had to be balanced against the concerns 
of protecting others in a position of vulnerability whose rights might be abused.
Example: the case of Sommerfeld v. Germany related to German law regulating 
access of a father to his child.154 Under national law where the parents of a child 
were not married the mother was permitted to deny the father access to his 
child. In this situation the father would then have to apply to a court to override 
the refusal. The government argued that the law was not discriminatory since 
typically estranged fathers showed little interest in their children. The ECtHR 
found that the State’s margin of appreciation would be particularly narrow in 
cases relating to the right of access of parents to their children. In addition, it 
153 ECtHR, Muñoz Díaz v. Spain (No. 49151/07), 8 December 2009.
154  ECtHR, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC] (No. 31871/96), 8 July 2003, para. 93. On very similar facts: ECtHR, 
Sahin v. Germany [GC] (No. 30943/96), 8 July 2003. See also ECtHR, Mazurek v. France (No. 34406/97), 
1 February 2000, also relating to differential treatment of children born out of wedlock, discussed in 
Chapter 4 (Protected grounds).
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stated that ‘very weighty reasons need to be put forward before a difference in 
treatment on the ground of birth out of or within wedlock can be regarded as 
compatible with the [ECHR …] The same is true for a difference in the treatment 
of the father of a child born of a relationship where the parties were living 
together out of wedlock as compared with the father of a child born of a 
marriage-based relationship.’ It found that the government’s explanation could 
not justify such differential treatment. 
In the above case, the ECtHR considered that the interests of the father went hand 
in hand with those of the child – that is, it was in the child’s interests to have 
contact with the father. However, where the child’s interests potentially conflict 
with those of the father, it will allow the State a wider margin of appreciation in 
determining how best to protect the child. 
Example: in the case of Rasmussen v. Denmark, a father complained of a 
statute of limitations barring him from contesting paternity.155 The ECtHR 
found that this did amount to differential treatment on the basis of sex, but 
was justified. This pursued the legitimate aim of providing the child with 
security and certainty over their status, by preventing fathers from abusing the 
possibility of contesting paternity later in life. Since there was little uniformity 
of approach to this issue among the Member States of the ECHR, the ECtHR 
accorded the State a wide margin of appreciation, finding the differential 
treatment was justified.156
3.5.2.  Political participation: freedom of expression, 
assembly and association, and free elections
One of the main goals of the Council of Europe is the promotion of democracy. 
This is reflected in many of the rights in the ECHR which facilitate the promotion 
of political participation. While EU law confers a limited range of rights in this 
respect (in particular the right for EU nationals to vote in municipal elections and 
European Parliament elections), the ECHR contains broader guarantees creating not 
only a right to vote and stand in elections, but also flanking rights of freedom of 
expression and the right to freedom of assembly and association.
155 ECtHR, Rasmussen v. Denmark (No. 8777/79), 28 November 1984.
156 ECtHR, Rasmussen v. Denmark (No. 8777/79), 28 November 1984, paras. 40-42.
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Example: in the case of Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, discussed above, the 
refusal of permission to hold a march to raise awareness about sexual orienta-
tion discrimination, coupled with publicly made homophobic remarks of the 
mayor, amounted to a violation of the right to freedom of assembly (Article 11) 
together with Article 14.157 
The right to freedom of association has also been taken to include protection 
for the formation of political parties, which the ECtHR has accorded a high level 
of protection against interference.158 Similarly, as noted in Chapter 4.11., any 
interference with the right to free speech in the context of political debate is 
scrutinised very closely.159
3.5.3. Law enforcement
Further to guaranteeing the substantive right to life (Article 2) and freedom from 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3), these Articles 
also create a duty on the State to investigate circumstances where a loss of life or 
such treatment has occurred. In the Nachova and Others and Turan Cakir cases, the 
ECtHR has stated that this includes a specific duty to carry out an investigation into 
possible racist motives behind violations of Articles 2 and 3, and that failure to do 
so would amount to a violation of these Articles in conjunction with Article 14.160 
Example: in the case of Turan Cakir v. Belgium, the applicant complained 
of police brutality during his arrest causing severe and sustained injuries, 
accompanied by threats and racist insults.161 The ECtHR found that the violence 
inflicted violated the applicant’s right to freedom from inhuman and degrading 
treatment (under Article 3 of the ECHR). They also found that the failure of 
the State properly to investigate complaints of ill-treatment by the applicant 
violated the State’s procedural obligations under this same Article. In addition, 
they found that the failure to investigate also amounted to a violation of 
Article 3 in conjunction with the right to freedom from discrimination since 
157 ECtHR, Bączkowski and Others v. Poland (No. 1543/06), 3 May 2007.
158 For example, ECtHR, Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey (No. 21237/93), 25 May 1998.
159 ECtHR, Castells v. Spain (No. 11798/85), 23 April 1992.
160  ECtHR, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC] (Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98), 6 July 2005; ECtHR, Turan 
Cakir v. Belgium (No. 44256/06), 10 March 2009; similarly, ECtHR, Šečić v. Croatia (No. 40116/02), 
31 May 2007.
161 ECtHR, Turan Cakir v. Belgium (No. 44256/06), 10 March 2009.
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the State was under a duty not only to investigate allegations of ill-treatment, 
but also allegations that this ill-treatment was itself discriminatory, being 
motivated by racism. 
Example: the case of Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria concerned two Roma 
men who were shot dead while fleeing from military police who sought to 
arrest them for being absent without leave.162 At the time of the incident, the 
officer who killed the victims shouted ‘You damn gypsies’ at a neighbour. The 
ECtHR found that the State had violated the right to life of the victims (under 
Article 2 of the ECHR), not only substantively, but also procedurally for failing to 
investigate adequately the deaths. It was found that the failure to investigate 
also amounted to a violation of Article 2 in conjunction with the right to 
freedom from discrimination since the State was under a duty to investigate 
specifically possible discriminatory motives. 
While both of these cases involved acts by State personnel, the duty of the State to 
intervene in order to protect victims of crime and the duty to investigate them later 
also applies in relation to the acts of private parties.  
Example: in the case of Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and Others v. Georgia,163 a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses were 
attacked by an ultra Orthodox group. Although notified, the police did 
not intervene to prevent the violence. The subsequent investigation was 
discontinued once the police asserted that it was not possible to ascertain 
the identity of the perpetrators. The ECtHR found that the failure of the police 
to intervene to protect the victims from racially motivated violence and the 
subsequent lack of an adequate investigation amounted to a violation of 
Article 3 (the right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment) and Article 9 (the right to freedom of religion) in conjunction with 
Article 14 since it was based on religious grounds.  
It would appear that EU law might impose similar duties in the context of the 
Council Framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism 
162 ECtHR, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC] (Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98), 6 July 2005.
163  ECtHR, Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia 
(No. 71156/01), 3 May 2007.
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and xenophobia by means of criminal law (discussed in Chapter 4.6.).164 However, 
the Framework Decision does not impose a specific duty to investigate whether 
racist motives exist in relation to offences against the person.
3.5.4. Criminal law matters
In addition to those matters relating to law enforcement in 3.5.3., the ECHR relates 
to criminal law matters across a variety of rights, including the right to a fair trial, 
the right not to be detained arbitrarily, the prohibition on retroactive punishment 
and double jeopardy, the right to life and the right to freedom from inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
Example: in the case of Opuz v. Turkey, the ECtHR made a finding of indirect 
discrimination on the basis of sex, in conjunction with the right to life and 
freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment since the police and judiciary 
had failed to enforce adequately the law relating to domestic violence.165 
Example: in the cases of D.G. v. Ireland and Bouamar v. Belgium (discussed in 
Chapter 4.5.), the applicants had been placed in detention by national author-
ities.166 Here, the ECtHR considered that, although there had been violations 
of the right to liberty, there had been no discrimination since the differential 
treatment had been justified in the interests of protecting minors. 
164  Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 55. It ought to 
be noted that the ECtHR has accepted that an incitement to discrimination, hatred and violence towards 
a group of people because of their origin or their membership or non-membership of a specific ethnic 
group, nation, race or religion is a specific limitation on freedom of expression as protected by the ECHR. 
See, for example: ECtHR, Le Pen v. France (No. 18788/09), 20 April 2010; ECtHR, Féret v. Belgium 
(No. 15615/07), 16 July 2009; ECtHR, Willem v. France, (No. 10883/05), 16 July 2009; and ECtHR, 
Balsytė-Lideikienė v. Lithuania (No. 72596/01), 4 November 2008.
165 ECtHR, Opuz v. Turkey (No. 33401/02), 9 June 2009.
166  ECtHR, D.G. v. Ireland (No. 39474/98), 16 May 2002; ECtHR, Bouamar v. Belgium (No. 9106/80), 
29 February 1988.
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Key points
• Third-country nationals also enjoy a right to equal treatment across broadly similar 
areas covered by the EU non-discrimination directives where they qualify as ‘long-
term residents’ under the Third-Country National Directive.
• Where third-country nationals do not qualify as ‘long-term residents’, they enjoy 
limited protection under the non-discrimination directives:
• on grounds of sexual orientation, age, disability or religion or belief in their 
right of access to vocational training and conditions of work. However, they do 
not enjoy an equal right of access to employment;
• under the Gender Goods and Services Directive and the Gender Equality 
Direct ive (Recast), third-country nationals enjoy protection from sex discri m-
ination in accessing employment and goods and services.
• Protection from discrimination under the EU non-discrimination directives has a 
varied scope:
• race and ethnicity enjoy the widest protection, being protected in relation to 
accessing employment, the welfare system and goods and services;
• sex discrimination is prohibited in the context of access to employment, social 
security (which is more limited than the broader welfare system) and goods 
and services; 
• sexual orientation, disability, religion or belief and age are currently only 
protected in the context of access to employment. 
• The ECHR contains an open-ended list of protected grounds. Anyone can invoke the 
ECHR before domestic authorities, courts and, ultimately, the ECtHR.
• When faced with a claim that includes allegations of discrimination the ECtHR may 
examine the claim under the substantive right relied on solely or in conjunction 
with Article 14.
• A claim solely under Article 14 cannot be brought, it must be combined with a 
claim under one of the substantive rights of the ECHR. It will suffice for the 
complaint to relate broadly to the subject area covered by the right in question.
• Protocol 12 to the ECHR creates a free-standing right to non-discrimination. It will 
relate to any rights created by or inferable from national law or practice, and the 
meaning given to ‘discrimination’ is identical to that under Article 14. 
• The approach of the ECJ has been to construe areas of application extremely widely 
in order to give full effect to the rights of individuals under EU law. 
• The scope of the ECHR, both in terms of the substantive rights it contains and 
the manner that these are interpreted for the purposes of applying Article 14, is 
particularly wide by comparison to the EU non-discrimination directives. 
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• Particularly important areas that are beyond the reach of the non-discrimination 
directives, and largely beyond the competence of the EU (and therefore the reach 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) include matters relating to private and family 
law, rights associated with political participation and criminal law matters. 
• It is particularly important, therefore, for victims of discrimination to consider 
carefully whether their claims fall within the scope of the non-discrimination 
directives or the ECHR in formulating their approach to litigation.
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The European non-discrimination directives prohibit differential treatment that 
is based on certain ‘protected grounds’, containing a fixed and limited list of 
protected grounds, covering sex (Gender Goods and Services Directive, Gender 
Equality Directive (Recast)), sexual orientation, disability, age or religion or 
belief (Employment Equality Directive), racial or ethnic origin (Racial Equality 
Directive). The ECHR, in contrast, contains an open-ended list, which coincides 
with the directives, but goes beyond them. Article 14 states that there shall be no 
discrimination ‘on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status’. The category of ‘other status’ has allowed the ECtHR 
to include those grounds (among others) that are expressly protected by the non-
discrimination directives, namely: disability, age and sexual orientation.
Chapter 1 noted that Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights also con-
tains a prohibition on discrimination. The Charter binds the institutions of the Euro-
pean Union, but will also apply to the Member 
States when they are interpreting and applying EU 
law. The Charter provision on discrimination contains 
a combination of both the grounds of the ECHR and 
the non-discrimination directives, although it does 
not contain the open-ended ground of ‘other status’. 
Protected grounds
4
A ‘protected ground’ is a 
characteristic of an individual that 
should not be considered relevant 
to the differential treatment or 
enjoyment of a particular benefit.
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4.2. Sex
Sex discrimination is relatively self-explanatory, in that it refers to discrimination that 
is based on the fact that an individual is either a woman or a man. This is the most 
highly developed aspect of the EU social policy and has long been considered a core 
right. The development of the protection on this ground served a dual purpose: firstly, 
it served an economic purpose in that it helped to eliminate competitive distortions 
in a market that had grown evermore integrated, and; secondly, on a political level, 
it provided the Community with a facet aimed toward social progress and the 
improvement of living and working conditions. Consequently, the protection against 
discrimination on the ground of sex has been, and has remained, a fundamental 
function of the European Union. The acceptance of the social and economic 
importance of ensuring equality of treatment was further crystallised by the central 
position it was given in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Similarly, under the ECHR 
protection against discrimination on the ground of sex is well developed.
While cases of sex discrimination typically involve women receiving less favourable 
treatment than men, this is not exclusively the case. 
Example: in the case of Defrenne v. SABENA, the applicant complained that 
she was paid less than her male counterparts, despite undertaking identical 
employment duties.167 The ECJ held that this was clearly a case of sex discrim-
ination. In reaching this decision, the ECJ highlighted both the economic 
and social dimension of the Union, and that non-discrimination assists in 
progressing the EU towards these objectives. 
In the Bilka case, discussed above, the ECJ was faced with differential treatment 
based on management considerations of an employer, which justified excluding 
part-time workers from an occupational pension scheme by reference to 
incentivising full-time work to ensure adequate staffing. In this case, the ECJ did not 
expressly state whether it considered such a measure to be proportionate to the 
differential enjoyment suffered. However, it was more explicit in the following case. 
Example: in the Hill and Stapleton case, the government introduced a job-
sharing scheme in the civil service, whereby a post could be shared by two 
167 ECJ, Defrenne v. SABENA, Case 43/75 [1976] ECR 455, 8 April 1976.
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individuals on a temporary basis, working 50% of the hours of the full-time 
post and receiving 50% of the regular salary.168 Workers were entitled to 
then return to their post full time where these posts were available. The 
rules allowed individuals in full-time employment to advance one increment 
on the pay scale per year. However, for individuals who were job-sharing 
the increment was halved, with two years of job-sharing equivalent to one 
increment. The two complainants in the present case returned to their posts 
as full-time workers and complained about the means by which the increment 
was applied to them. The ECJ found this to constitute indirect discrimination on 
the grounds of sex since it was predominantly women who took part in job-
sharing. The government argued that the differential treatment was justified 
since it was based on the principle of applying the increment in relation to 
the actual length of service. The ECJ found that this merely amounted to an 
assertion that was not supported by objective criteria (in that there was no 
evidence that other individuals’ length of service was calculated in terms 
of actual hours worked). The ECJ then stated ‘an employer cannot justify 
discrimination arising from a job-sharing scheme solely on the ground that 
avoidance of such discrimination would involve increased costs’. 
Thus, it would seem that the ECJ will not readily accept justifications of discri min-
atory treatment based on the ground of sex that are based simply on the financial 
or management considerations of employers. 
Example: in the case of Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, the applicant complained that 
national law obliged a woman to bear her husband’s name upon marriage.169 
Although the law permitted a woman to retain her maiden name in addition 
to her husband’s name, the ECtHR found that this constituted discrimination 
on the basis of sex, because national law did not oblige a husband to alter his 
surname.
Example: in the case of Zarb Adami v. Malta, the applicant complained that being 
called to jury service amounted to discrimination since the practice according to 
which jury lists were compiled made men inherently more likely to be called.170 
168  ECJ, Hill and Stapleton v. The Revenue Commissioners and Department of Finance, Case C-243/95 
[1998] ECR I-3739, 17 June 1998.
169 ECtHR, Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey (No. 29865/96), 16 November 2004.
170 ECtHR, Zarb Adami v. Malta (No. 17209/02), 20 June 2006.
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Statistics showed that over 95% of jurors over a five-year period were men, and 
the ECtHR found that since men and women were in a comparable situation as 
regards their civic duties, this amounted to discrimination. 
The concept of ‘sex’ has also been interpreted to 
include situations where discriminatory treatment is 
related to the ‘sex’ of the applicant in a more abstract 
sense, allowing for some limited protection of gender 
identity. 
Thus, the more broadly accepted definition of gender 
identity encompasses not only those who undertake 
gender reassignment surgery (‘transsexuals’), but also 
choose other means to express their gender, such as 
transvestism or cross-dressing, or simply adopting a 
manner of speech or cosmetics normally associated 
with members of the opposite sex.
Following the P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council case, the ground of ‘sex’ under 
the non-discrimination directives will also encompass discrimination against 
an individual because he/she ‘intends to undergo, or has undergone, gender 
reassignment’. It therefore appears that the ground of sex as construed under EU 
law currently protects gender identity only in a narrow sense. 
Example: The case of K.B. v. NHS Pensions Agency concerned the refusal of 
KB’s transsexual partner a widower’s pension.172 This refusal was because 
the transsexual couple could not satisfy the requirement of being married; 
transsexuals were not capable of marrying under English law at the time. 
In considering the issue of discrimination, the ECJ held that there was no 
discrimination on the ground of sex because, in determining who was entitled 
to the survivor’s pension, there was no less favourable treatment based on 
being male or female. The ECJ then changed the direction of the consideration, 
171  This widely accepted definition is taken from the ‘Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’, March 2007, 
available at: www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm. The Principles were adopted by an 
independent body of experts in International Human Rights Law.
172 ECJ, K.B. v. NHS Pensions Agency, Case C-117/01 [2004] ECR I-541, 7 January 2004.
Gender identity refers to ‘each 
person’s deeply felt internal and 
individual experience of gender, 
which may or may not correspond 
with the sex assigned at birth, 
including the personal sense of the 
body (which may involve, if freely 
chosen, modification of bodily 
appearance or function by medical, 
surgical or other means) and other 
expressions of gender, including 
dress, speech and mannerisms’.171
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and concentrated on the issue of marriage. It was highlighted that transsexuals 
were never able to marry, and thus never able to benefit from the survivor’s 
pension, whereas heterosexuals could. Consideration was then given to the 
ECtHR case of Christine Goodwin.173 Based on these considerations, the ECJ 
concluded that the British legislation in question was incompatible with the 
principle of equal treatment as it prevented transsexuals from benefiting from 
part of their partners pay. 
Example: similar considerations arose in the Richards case.174 Richards, who was 
born a man, underwent gender reassignment surgery. The case surrounded 
the State pension entitlement in the UK, as at the time women received their 
State pension at the age of 60 years, while men received their State pension 
at the age of 65 years. When Richards applied for a State pension at the age 
of 60 years, she was refused, with an explanation stating that legally she was 
recognised as a man and therefore she could not apply for a State pension until 
she reached the age of 65 years. The ECJ held that this was unequal treatment 
on the grounds of her gender reassignment, and as a consequence this was 
regarded as discrimination contrary to Article 4(1) of the Directive on the 
progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women in matters of social security.175 
The ECtHR has yet to deliver a decision on whether gender identity is covered as 
a protected ground under Article 14, and it has yet to indicate whether this would 
only encompass ‘transsexuals’ or whether it would interpret gender identity more 
widely. This is not to say that it has not dealt with the issue of gender identity at all. 
Thus, the ECtHR has determined that gender identity, like sexual orientation, forms 
part of the sphere of an individual’s private life, and should therefore be free from 
government interference. 
173 ECtHR, Christine Goodwin v. UK [GC] (No. 28957/95), 11 July 2002.
174  ECJ, Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Case C-423/04 [2006] ECR I-3585, 
27 April 2006.
175  Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24.
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Example: the cases of Christine Goodwin v. UK and I. v. UK concerned very 
similar facts.176 The applicants, who had both undergone male-to-female 
gender reassignment surgery, complained that the government refused 
to allow amendment of their birth certificates in order to reflect their sex. 
Although other documents and the applicants’ names could be amended, 
birth certificates were still used for certain purposes where gender became 
legally relevant, such as the area of employment or retirement, meaning that 
the applicants would face embarrassment and humiliation where obliged to 
reveal their legally recognised male gender. The ECtHR (reversing past case-
law) decided that this amounted to a violation of the right to respect for private 
life and the right to marry under Article 12, but it did not go on to consider 
whether there had been a violation of Article 14.
Example: in the Van Kück case, the applicant, who had undergone gender 
reassignment surgery and hormone treatment, was refused reimbursement of 
her costs for this from her private medical insurance company.177 The German 
Court of Appeal, which heard the applicant’s claim against the insurance company, 
determined that the medical procedures were not ‘necessary’ as required under the 
agreement, and therefore that the applicant was not entitled to reimbursement. 
The ECtHR found that, considering the nature of gender identity and the gravity of a 
decision to undergo irreversible medical procedures, the national court’s approach 
had not only failed to ensure the applicant received a fair trial, violating Article 6 
of the ECHR, but also violated her right to respect for private life guaranteed by 
Article 8 of the ECHR. However, the ECtHR did not go on to examine compliance 
with Article 14 since essentially the same facts were at issue. 
Generally speaking it appears that the law surrounding the ground of ‘gender 
identity’ requires considerable clarification both at the European and national 
level. Recent studies of national legislation regulating this area show no consistent 
approach across Europe, with States largely divided between those that address 
‘gender identity’ as part of ‘sexual orientation’, and those that address it as part of 
‘sex discrimination’.178
176  ECtHR, Christine Goodwin v. UK [GC] (No. 28957/95), 11 July 2002; ECtHR, I. v. UK [GC] (No. 25680/94), 
11 July 2002. Similarly, ECtHR, L. v. Lithuania (No. 27527/03), 11 September 2007.
177 ECtHR, Van Kück v. Germany (No. 35968/97), 12 June 2003.
178  FRA, Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in the EU Member States: 
Part I – Legal Analysis (Vienna, FRA, 2009), pp. 129-144; Commissioner for Human Rights, Human 
Rights and Gender Identity (Issue Paper by Thomas Hammarberg, CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Strasbourg, 29 July 2009), CommDH/IssuePaper(2009)2.
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A series of cases relating to differences in treatment on the basis of sex in relation 
to retirement age show that the ECtHR will afford the State a wide margin of 
appreciation in matters of fiscal and social policy179.
Example: in the case of Stec and Others v. UK the applicants complained that as 
a result of different retirement ages for men and women they had each been 
disadvantaged by the alteration of benefits payable to them, which had been 
determined according to pensionable age.180 The ECtHR found that in principle 
sex discrimination could only be justified where ‘very weighty reasons’ existed. 
However, ‘a wide margin is usually allowed to the State under the [ECHR] when 
it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy … Because of 
their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities 
are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what 
is in the public interest on social or economic grounds, and the Court will 
generally respect the legislature’s policy choice unless it is … manifestly without 
reasonable foundation’. The ECtHR found that at their origin the different 
pensionable ages were actually a form of ‘special measures’ in that they were 
designed to offset the financial difficulties that women might suffer by reason 
of their traditional role in the home, which left them without independent 
monetary income. It was found that the government had begun gradually to 
make adjustments to equalise the pensionable ages of men and women and 
that they had not acted beyond their margin of appreciation either in choosing 
to do this over a number of years, or failing to implement changes sooner.181 
A similar approach has been adopted by the ECJ in relation to cases of differential 
treatment justified on the basis of broader employment-policy considerations.
Example: in the Schnorbus case, the practice of the Hessian Ministry of Justice to 
give preference to male candidates who had completed compulsory military or 
civilian service for practical legal training was held to be indirectly discriminatory 
179  These cases also provide a useful discussion in relation to justification of the differential treatment and 
thus offer further elucidation of this concept to enhance the discussion on justification earlier in the 
Handbook.
180 ECtHR, Stec and Others v. UK [GC] (Nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01), 12 April 2006.
181  Similarly see: ECtHR, Barrow v. UK (No. 42735/02), 22 August 2006, paras. 20-24, 37; ECtHR, Pearson 
v. UK (No. 8374/03), 22 August 2006, paras. 12-13, 25; ECtHR, Walker v. UK (No. 37212/02), 22 August 
2006, paras. 19-20, 37.
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on the ground of sex.182 However, the ECJ found that the practice was objectively 
justified as it was merely intended to counteract the delaying effects that 
undertaking the compulsory service had on male applicants’ careers. 
Example: the Megner and Scheffel case concerned German legislation that 
excluded minor (less than fifteen hours per week) and short-term employment 
from the compulsory sickness and old-age insurance schemes as well as from 
the obligation to contribute to the unemployment insurance scheme.183 The 
rule was found to be potentially indirectly discriminatory towards women 
who were inherently more likely to work on a part-time or short-term basis. 
The ECJ accepted the government’s contention that if it were to include minor 
and short-term employees into the scheme the costs involved would lead 
to an entire overhaul of the system, since it would no longer be able to be 
funded on a contributory basis. It also accepted that there was a demand for 
employees on a short-term and minor basis, which the government could only 
facilitate by exempting them from the social security scheme. If this approach 
was not taken it was likely that such jobs would be undertaken in any case 
but on an illegal basis. The ECJ accepted that the government was pursuing a 
legitimate social-policy aim, and that the State should be left a ‘broad margin 
of discretion’ in choosing what measures were appropriate to implement ‘social 
and employment policy’. Accordingly, the differential treatment was justified.
This can be contrasted with the following case where the ECJ did not find that sex 
discrimination was justifiable in the context of social policy, despite the significant 
fiscal implications invoked by the government.
Example: the De Weerd, née Roks, and Others case concerned national legis-
lation relating to incapacity benefit.184 In 1975 national legislation had 
introduced incapacity benefit for men and unmarried women, irrespective of 
their income before becoming incapacitated. In 1979 this was amended and the 
benefit also made available to married women. However, a requirement that 
182 ECJ, Schnorbus v. Land Hessen, Case C-79/99 [2000] ECR I-10997, 7 December 2000.
183  ECJ, Megner and Scheffel v. Innungskrankenkasse Vorderpfalz, Case C-444/93 [1995] ECR I-4741, 
14 December 1995. Similarly, ECJ, Nolte v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, Case C-317/93 [1995] 
ECR I-4625, 14 December 1995.
184  ECJ, De Weerd, née Roks, and Others v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Gezondheid, 




the recipient have received a particular level of income during the preceding 
year was also introduced. The legislation was challenged on the ground (among 
others) that the income requirement discriminated indirectly against women 
(who were less likely to earn the required income than men). The State argued 
that the differential enjoyment was justified out of budgetary considerations, in 
order to contain national expenditure. The ECJ found that while EU law does not 
prevent the State from regulating which categories of person benefit from social 
security benefits it could not do so in a discriminatory manner. 
These two cases can be reconciled on their facts, and De Weerd, née Roks, and 
Others should probably be regarded as the ‘rule’ with Megner and Scheffel as the 
exception. EU law does not oblige Member States to adopt particular social security 
regimes, but where they do so a court will not allow the exclusion of certain groups 
simply out of fiscal considerations, since this could severely weaken the principle 
of equal treatment and be open to abuse. However, differential treatment may be 
tolerable if it is the only means of preventing the collapse of the entire system of 
sickness and unemployment insurance schemes – particularly where such a meas-
ure would only have forced people into unregulated labour. 
4.3. Sexual orientation
Typically cases relating to sexual orientation dis-
crimination involve an individual receiving un-
favourable treatment because they are homosexual 
or bisexual, but the ground also prohibits discrimin-
ation on the basis of being heterosexual.
Example: in a case before the Swedish Ombudsman against Discrimination on 
Grounds of Sexual Orientation (‘HomO’), a heterosexual woman complained of 
sexual orientation discrimination when she was turned down for a job with the 
Swedish national federation for lesbian, gay and transgender rights as a safer 
sex information officer.186 The organisation told her that they wished to
185  This widely accepted definition is taken from the ‘Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’, March 2007, 
available at: www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm.
186  HomO, Decision of 21 June 2006, Dossier No. 262/06. 
Sexual orientation can be 
understood to refer to ‘each person’s 
capacity for profound emotional, 
affectional and sexual attraction 
to, and intimate relations with, 
individuals of a different gender or 
the same gender or more than one 
gender’.185
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employ a self-identified homosexual or bisexual man in order to allow for an 
approach of outreach through peers. It was found either that she could not 
claim to be in a comparable situation to a homosexual or bisexual man for the 
purposes of this job (and therefore could not prove less favourable treatment), 
or that in any event the discrimination was justifiable on the basis of a genuine 
occupational requirement. 
Although Article 14 of the ECHR does not explicitly list ‘sexual orientation’ as a 
protected ground, the ECtHR has expressly stated that it is included among the 
‘other’ grounds protected by Article 14 in a series of cases.187
Example: in the case of S.L. v. Austria, the applicant complained that national 
law, as it stood, criminalised consensual sexual relations between men where 
one of the parties was under eighteen.188 In contrast women were permitted to 
engage in sexual acts (both of a lesbian or heterosexual nature) from the age 
of fourteen. The ECtHR found this to constitute discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. 
Example: in the case of E.B. v. France, the applicant was refused an application 
to adopt a child on the basis that there was no male role model in her 
household.189 National law did permit single parents to adopt children, and 
the ECtHR found that the authorities’ decision was primarily based on the fact 
that she was in a relationship and living with another women. Accordingly the 
ECtHR found that discrimination had occurred on the basis of sexual orientation. 
It should be noted that the ECtHR also protects against government interference 
relating to sexual orientation per se under Article 8 of the ECHR on the right to 
private life. Thus, even if discriminatory treatment based on this ground has 
occurred, it may be possible simply to claim a violation of Article 8 without needing 
to argue the existence of discriminatory treatment. 
187 See, for example, ECtHR, Fretté v. France (No. 36515/97), 26 February 2002, para. 32.
188 ECtHR, S.L. v. Austria (No. 45330/99), 9 January 2003.
189 ECtHR, E.B. v. France [GC] (No. 43546/02), 22 January 2008.
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Example: the case of Dudgeon v. UK concerned national legislation, which 
criminalised consensual homosexual sexual relations between adults.190 
The applicant complained that as a homosexual he therefore ran the risk of 
prosecution. The ECtHR found that of itself this constituted a violation of his 
right to respect for his private life, since the latter included one’s ‘sexual life’. It 
also found that, while the protection of public morality constituted a legitimate 
aim, it could be pursued without such a level of interference in private life.
The ECtHR has been particularly keen to ensure protection of individuals where 
interferences by the State relate to matters that are considered to touch core 
elements of personal dignity, such as one’s sexual life or family life. The following 
case illustrates that interferences with private life where this relates to sexuality are 
difficult to justify.
Example: the case of Karner v. Austria concerned the interpretation of national 
legislation (section 14 of the Rent Act), which created a right for a relative or 
‘life companion’ to automatically succeed to a tenancy agreement where the 
main tenant died.191 The applicant had been cohabiting with his partner, the 
main tenant, who died. The national courts interpreted the legislation so as 
to exclude homosexual couples, even though it could include heterosexual 
couples that were not married. The government accepted that differential 
treatment had occurred on the basis of sexual orientation, but argued that 
this was justified in order to protect those in traditional families from losing 
their accommodation. The ECtHR found that although protecting the traditional 
family could constitute a legitimate aim the ‘the margin of appreciation … 
is narrow … where there is a difference in treatment based on sex or sexual 
orientation’. The ECtHR went on to state that ‘the principle of proportionality 
does not merely require that the measure chosen is in principle suited for 
realising the aim sought. It must also be shown that it was necessary in order 
to achieve that aim to exclude certain categories of people – in this instance 
persons living in a homosexual relationship – from the scope of application of 
section 14 of the Rent Act’. The ECtHR thus made a finding of discrimination, 
since the State could have employed measures to protect the traditional family 
without placing homosexual couples at such a disadvantage.
190 ECtHR, Dudgeon v. UK (No. 7525/76), 22 October 1981. 
191 ECtHR, Karner v. Austria (No. 40016/98), 24 July 2003, paras. 34-43.
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4.4. Disability
Neither the ECHR, nor the Employment Equality Directive provides a definition of 
disability. Because of the nature of the ECJ’s role, determinations of what constitutes 
a disability are frequently made by the national courts and presented as part of the 
factual background to disputes referred to the ECJ. However, the ECJ has had some 
opportunity to give limited guidance as to what constitutes a disability in its case-
law.
Example: in the Chacón Navas192 case, the ECJ were afforded the opportunity 
to consider the general scope of the disability discrimination provisions, and 
indicated that the term “disability” should have a harmonised EU definition. 
The ECJ indicated that a disability, for the purposes of the Employment Equality 
Directive, should be taken to refer to ‘a limitation which results in particular 
from physical, mental or psychological impairments and which hinders the 
participation of the person concerned in professional life’ and it must be 
‘probable that it will last a long time’. In applying this definition to the Chacón 
Navas case, the applicant was found not to be disabled when she brought an 
action before the Spanish courts claiming disability discrimination after she had 
been dismissed for being off sick from work for a period of eight months. The 
ECJ made it clear that there is a distinction that must be drawn between illness 
and a disability, with the former not being afforded protection. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the EU is a party to the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disa-
bilities (UN CRPD), 2006, with the result that the ECJ will 
most probably be guided by both the Convention itself and 
the interpretations given by the Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, charged with its monitoring and 
interpretation.193
Once party to the UN CRPD, the EU and its institutions (and 
the EU Member States when interpreting and applying 
EU law) will be obliged to follow this wide and inclusive 
approach to interpreting the meaning of ‘disability’. 
192 ECJ, Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, Case C-13/05 [2006] ECR I-6467, 11 July 2006.
193 UN Doc. A/RES/61/611, 13 December 2006.
Article 1 of the UN CRPD: 
‘Persons with disabilities  
include those who have 
long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory 
impairments which in 
interaction with various  
barriers may hinder their  
full and effective participation in 




Although not expressly featuring in the list of protected grounds of the ECHR, 
 dis ability has been included by the ECtHR in its interpretation of ‘other’ grounds 
under Article 14.
Example: in the case of Glor v. Switzerland, the ECtHR found that the applicant, 
who was a diabetic, could be considered as a person with a disability – 
irrespective of the fact that national law classified this as a ‘minor’ disability.194 
The applicant was obliged to pay a tax to compensate for failing to complete his 
military service, which was payable by all those who were eligible for military 
service. To be exempted from this tax one either had to have a disability 
reaching a level of ‘40%’ (considered equivalent to the loss of use of one 
limb), or be a conscientious objector. Conscientious objectors were obliged to 
perform a ‘civil service’. The applicant’s disability was such that he was found 
unfit to serve in the army, but the disability did not reach the severity threshold 
required in national law to exempt him from the tax. He had offered to 
perform the ‘civil service’ but this was refused. The ECtHR found that the State 
had treated the applicant comparably with those who had failed to complete 
their military service without valid justification. This constituted discriminatory 
treatment since the applicant found himself in a different position (as being 
rejected for military service but willing and able to perform civil service), and as 
such the State should have created an exception to the current rules. 
As with other protected grounds under the ECHR, it is not uncommon for cases to be 
dealt with under other substantive rights, rather than a cumulative approach of a 
substantive right and Article 14, prohibiting discrimination.
Example: in the case of Price v. UK the applicant was sentenced to prison for a 
period of seven days. She suffered from physical disabilities due to ingestion 
of thalidomide by her mother during pregnancy, with the result that she had 
absent or significantly shortened limbs as well as malfunctioning kidneys.195 
Consequently she relied on a wheelchair for mobility, required assistance to 
go to the toilet and with cleaning, and needed special sleeping arrangements. 
During her first night in detention she was placed in a cell that was not 
adapted for persons with physical disabilities and consequently was unable 
to sleep adequately, experienced substantial pain and suffered hypothermia. 
194 ECtHR, Glor v. Switzerland (No. 13444/04), 30 April 2009.
195 ECtHR, Price v. UK (No. 33394/96), 10 July 2001.
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On transferral to prison she was placed in the hospital wing where some 
adaptation could be made, but she still experienced similar problems. She was 
also not permitted to charge her electric wheelchair, which lost power. The 
ECtHR found that the applicant had been subjected to degrading treatment, in 
violation of Article 3. Discrimination based on one of the substantive rights of 
the ECHR under Article 14 was not raised in this case.
Example: in the case of Pretty v. UK the applicant, who suffered from a 
degenerative disease, wished to obtain an assurance from the government 
that she could undergo assisted suicide without prosecution at some future 
date when her condition had progressed such that she was unable to carry out 
the act herself.196 Under national law, assisting suicide constituted a criminal 
offence of itself, as well as amounting to murder or manslaughter. Among 
other things, the applicant argued that her right to make decisions about her 
own body protected in the context of the right to private life (under Article 8) 
had been violated in a discriminatory manner since the State had applied a 
uniform prohibition on assisted suicide, which had a disproportionately 
negative effect on those who have become incapacitated and are therefore 
unable to end their lives themselves. The ECtHR found that the refusal to 
distinguish between those ‘who are and those who are not physically capable 
of committing suicide’ was justified because introducing exceptions to the law 
would in practice allow for abuse and undermine the protection of the right to 
life. 
4.5. Age
The protected ground of age relates simply to differential treatment or enjoyment 
that is based on the victim’s age. Although age discrimination per se does not 
fall within the ambit of a particular right in the ECHR (unlike religion, or sexual 
orientation), issues of age discrimination may arise in the context of various 
rights. As such the ECtHR has, as in other areas, adjudicated on cases whose facts 
suggested age discrimination, without actually analysing the case in those terms – 
in particular in relation to the treatment of children in the criminal-justice system. 
The ECtHR has found that ‘age’ is included among ‘other status’.197 
196 ECtHR, Pretty v. UK (No. 2346/02), 29 April 2002.
197 ECtHR, Schwizgebel v. Switzerland (No. 25762/07), 10 June 2010.
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Example: in the case of Schwizgebel v. Switzerland a 47 year old single mother 
complained about a refused application to adopt a child.198 The national 
authorities based their decision on the age difference between the applicant 
and the child, and the fact that the adoption would impose a significant 
financial burden, given that the applicant already had one child. The ECtHR 
found that she was treated differently from younger women applying for 
adoption on the basis of her age. However, a lack of uniformity among States 
over acceptable age limits for adoption allowed the State a large margin of 
appreciation. In addition the national authorities’ consideration of the age 
difference had not been applied arbitrarily, but was based on consideration 
of the best interests of the child and the financial burden that a second child 
might pose for the applicant, which in turn could affect the child’s well-being. 
Accordingly the ECtHR found that the difference in treatment was justifiable. 
Example: in the cases of T. v. UK and V. v. UK two boys had been tried and 
found guilty of a murder committed when they were 10 years old.199 The 
applicants complained, among other things, that they had not been given a fair 
trial because their age and lack of maturity prevented them from participating 
effectively in their defence. The ECtHR found that when trying a minor the 
State should take ‘full account of his age, level of maturity and intellectual and 
emotional capacities’ and take steps ‘to promote his ability to understand and 
participate in the proceedings’. The ECtHR found that the State had failed to do 
this and had accordingly violated Article 6 of the ECHR, without examining the 
case from the perspective of Article 14. 
Example: in the cases of D.G. v. Ireland and Bouamar v. Belgium the applicants 
had been placed in detention by national authorities.200 The ECtHR found that 
in the circumstances this violated the right not to be detained arbitrarily. In 
both cases the applicants also claimed that the treatment was discriminatory 
by comparison to the treatment of adults, since national law did not permit 
adults to be deprived of their liberty in such circumstances. The ECtHR found 
that, while there was a difference in treatment as between adults and children, 
this was justified since the aim behind the deprivation of liberty was to protect 
minors, which was not a consideration to adults. 
198 Ibid.
199  ECtHR, T. v. UK [GC] (No. 24724/94), 16 December 1999; V. v. UK [GC] (No. 24888/94), 
16 December 1999.
200  ECtHR, D.G. v. Ireland (No. 39474/98), 16 May 2002; ECtHR, Bouamar v. Belgium (No. 9106/80), 
29 February 1988.
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4.6.  Race, ethnicity, colour and membership 
of a national minority
The breadth of the ground of ‘racial and ethnic origin’ appears to differ slightly 
as between the EU and the ECHR, in that the Racial Equality Directive expressly 
excludes ‘nationality’ from the concept of race or ethnicity. While the ECHR lists 
‘nationality’ or ‘national origin’ as a separate ground, the case-law discussed below 
shows that nationality can be understood as a constitutive element of ethnicity. 
This is not because discrimination on the grounds of nationality is permitted in EU 
law, but because the way that EU law has evolved means that discrimination on 
the grounds of nationality is regulated in the context of the law relating to free 
movement of persons. Apart from expressly excluding nationality, the Racial 
Equality Directive does not itself contain a definition of ‘racial or ethnic origin’. 
There are a number of other instruments which offer guidance as to how racial 
and ethnic origin should be understood. Neither ‘colour’, nor membership of a 
national minority are listed expressly in the Racial Equality Directive, but are listed 
as separate grounds under the ECHR. These terms appear to be indissociable from 
the definition of race and/or ethnicity, and so will be considered here.
The EU Council’s Framework Decision on combating racism and xenophobia under 
the criminal law defines racism and xenophobia to include violence or hatred 
directed against groups by reference to ‘race, colour, religion, descent or national or 
ethnic origin’. The CoE Commission Against Racism and Intolerance has also adopted 
a broad approach to defining ‘racial discrimination’, which includes within itself the 
grounds of ‘race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin’.201 
Similarly, Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
1966 (to which all the Member States of the European Union and Council of 
Europe are party) defines racial discrimination to include the grounds of ‘race, 
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’.202 The Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, responsible for interpreting and monitoring compliance 
with the treaty has further stated that unless justification exists to the contrary, 
determination as to whether an individual is a member of a particular racial or ethnic 
group, ‘shall … be based upon self-identification by the individual concerned.’203 
201  ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 7 on National Legislation to Combat Racism and Racial 
Discrimination, CRI(2003)8, adopted 13 December 2002, paras. 1(b) and (c).
202 660 UNTS 195.
203  CERD, ‘General Recommendation VIII concerning the interpretation and application of Article 1, 
paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Convention’.
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This prevents the State from excluding from protection any ethnic groups which it 
does not recognise.
Although EU law does not expressly list language, colour or descent as protected 
grounds, this does not mean that these characteristics could not be protected as 
part of race or ethnicity, in so far as language, colour and descent are inherently 
attached to race and ethnicity. It would also seem that to the extent that factors 
making up nationality are also relevant to race and ethnicity, this ground may, in 
appropriate circumstances, also fall under these grounds. 
Religion is expressly protected as a separate ground under the Employment Equality 
Directive. However, an alleged victim of religious discrimination may have an 
interest in associating religion with the ground of race because, as EU law currently 
stands, protection from race discrimination is broader in scope than protection 
from religious discrimination. This is so because the Racial Equality Directive 
relates to the area of employment, but also access to goods and services, while the 
Employment Equality Directive only relates to the area of employment. 
In explaining the concepts of race and ethnicity, the ECtHR has held that language, 
religion, nationality and culture may be indissociable from race. In the Timishev 
case, an applicant of Chechen origin was not permitted to pass through a 
checkpoint, as the guards were under instructions to deny entry to those of 
Chechen origin. The ECtHR gave the following explanation:
‘Ethnicity and race are related and overlapping concepts. Whereas the 
notion of race is rooted in the idea of biological classification of human 
beings into subspecies according to morphological features such as skin 
colour or facial characteristics, ethnicity has its origin in the idea of societal 
groups marked by common nationality, tribal affiliation, religious faith, 
shared language, or cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds.’204
Example: the case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first 
to be decided under Protocol 12. The applicants complained that they were 
unable to stand in elections.205 As part of a peace settlement to bring an end to 
the conflict in the 1990s, a power-sharing agreement between the three main 
204 ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia (Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00), 13 December 2005, para. 55.
205  ECtHR, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC] (Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06), 
22 December 2009.
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ethnic groups was reached. This included an arrangement that any candidate 
standing for election had to declare their affiliation to the Bosniac, Serb or Croat 
community. The applicants, who were of Jewish and Roma origin, refused to 
do so and alleged discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity. The ECtHR 
repeated its explanation of the relationship between race and ethnicity, above, 
adding that ‘[d]iscrimination on account of a person’s ethnic origin is a form of 
racial discrimination’. The ECtHR finding of racial discrimination illustrates the 
interplay between ethnicity and religion. Furthermore the ECtHR found that 
despite the delicate terms of the peace agreement this could not justify such 
discrimination. 
Example: in a case before the Austrian Equal Treatment Commission, an 
individual, who was a Sikh, complained that he had been refused entry to a 
Viennese court because he would not remove the ceremonial sword carried 
by members of this religion.206 The Commission dealt with this as a case of 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. On the facts, it found that the 
differential treatment was justified on grounds of safety. 
The ECtHR has been extremely strict in relation to discrimination based on race or 
ethnicity stating: ‘no difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a de-
cisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a 
contemporary democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for 
different cultures.’207 
A useful case study highlighting the considerations that will be taken into account 
when dealing with a claim of discrimination on the grounds of race under the 
ECHR can be found on the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Education for Legal 
Professionals website.208 
206  Equal Treatment Commission, Senate III. English summary available at FRA InfoPortal, Case 5-1. 
Original text: http://infoportal.fra.europa.eu/InfoPortal/caselawDownloadFile.do?id=5.
207  ECtHR, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC] (Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06), 
22 December 2009, para. 44. Similarly, ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia (Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00), 
13 December 2005, para. 58.




4.7. Nationality or national origin
Article 2(a) of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Nationality, 1996, defines 
it as ‘the legal bond between a person and a State’. While this treaty has not 
received widespread ratification, this definition is based on accepted rules of public 
international law,209 and has also been endorsed by the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance.210 ‘National origin’ may be taken to denote a person’s former 
nationality, which they may have lost or added to through naturalization, or to refer 
to the attachment to a ‘nation’ within a State (such as Scotland in the UK). 
Example: the Chen case concerned a question as to whether a child had a right 
to reside in one Member State when they were born in a different Member 
State, whilst their mother, on whom they depended, was from a non-Member 
State.211 The ECJ considered that when a Member State imposes requirements 
to be met in order to be granted citizenship, and where those were met, it is 
not open for a different Member State to then challenge that entitlement when 
they apply for residence. 
While the ECHR provides greater protection than EU law on the ground of nationality, 
it readily accepts that the absence of a legal bond of nationality often runs together 
with the absence of factual connections to a particular State, which in turn prevents 
the alleged victim from claiming to be in a comparable position to nationals. The 
essence of the ECtHR’s approach is that the closer the factual bond of an individual to 
a particular State, particularly in terms of paying taxation, the less likely it is that it 
will find that differential treatment on the basis of nationality is justified.
Example: in the case of Zeïbek v. Greece, the applicant was refused a pension 
entitlement intended for those with ‘large families’.212 While she had the 
requisite number of children, one of her children did not hold Greek nationality 
at the time the applicant reached pensionable age. This situation had resulted 
209  ICJ, Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955] ICJ Reports, 4, 23, 6 April 1955: ‘nationality is a 
legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests 
and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.’
210  ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 7 on National Legislation to Combat Racism and Racial 
Discrimination, CRI(2003)8, adopted 13 December 2002, p. 6.
211  ECJ, Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Case C-200/02 [2004] ECR I-9925, 
19 October 2004.
212 ECtHR, Zeïbek v. Greece (No. 46368/06), 9 July 2009.
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from the government’s earlier decision to remove nationality from the 
applicant’s entire family (which itself was tainted with irregularities) and then 
reissuing nationality only to three of her children (since the fourth was already 
married). The ECtHR found that a policy of revocation of nationality had been 
applied in particular to Greek Muslims, and that the refusal of the pension could 
not be justified on the basis of preserving the Greek nation as this reasoning 
itself amounted to discrimination on the grounds of national origin.
Example: the case of Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, a Congolese national, was 
unlawfully resident in Belgium.213 Shortly after giving birth, her residence 
permit expired and she began the process of applying for a renewal. She was 
separating from her Congolese husband and both her and the natural father 
of her child, a Belgian national, wished to establish the child’s paternity. To 
do so the applicant had to bring a claim against her spouse within a year of 
the birth. The applicant requested legal aid in order to cover the cost of the 
procedure, as she had insufficient funds. However, this was refused because 
such funding was only available to nationals of non-Council of Europe States 
where the claim related to establishing a right of residence. The applicant was 
advised to complete the renewal of her residence permit and then apply again. 
The ECtHR found that in these circumstances the applicant had been deprived 
of her right to a fair trial, and that this was based on her nationality. The State 
was not justified in differentiating between those who did or did not possess 
a residence permit in a situation where serious issues of family life were at 
stake, where there was a short time-limit to establish paternity, and where the 
individual was in the process of renewing her permit.
As discussed in Chapter 3.2., EU law prohibits nationality discrimination only in 
the particular context of free movement of persons. In particular, EU law on free 
movement grants limited rights to third-country nationals. Nevertheless, the 
ECHR does impose duties on all Member States of the Council of Europe (which 
includes all the Member States of the EU) to guarantee the rights in the ECHR to 
all individuals within their jurisdiction (including non-nationals). The ECtHR has 
maintained a balance between the State’s right to control what benefits it may offer 
those enjoying the legal bond of nationality, against the need to prevent States 
discriminating against those who have formed substantial factual bonds with the 
213 ECtHR, Anakomba Yula v. Belgium (No. 45413/07), 10 March 2009.
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State. The ECtHR has applied great scrutiny in matters relating to social security, if 
individuals can show a strong factual tie to a State. 
The entitlement of States to regulate entry and exit of their borders by non-
nationals is well established under public international law and accepted by the 
ECtHR. In this connection, the ECtHR has primarily intervened in complaints relating 
to deportation of individuals where they face inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment or torture in the destination State (under Article 3),214 or have formed 
strong family ties in the host State which will be broken if the individual is forced to 
leave (under Article 8).215
Example: in the cases of C. v. Belgium and Moustaquim v. Belgium the 
applicants, who were Moroccan nationals, had been convicted of criminal 
offences and were to be deported.216 They complained that this amounted to 
discrimination on the basis of nationality since neither Belgian nationals, nor 
non-nationals from other EU Member States, could be deported in similar 
circumstances. The ECtHR found that the applicants were not in a comparable 
situation to Belgian nationals, since nationals enjoy a right to remain in their 
home State, which is specifically enshrined in the ECHR (under Article 3 of 
Protocol 4). Furthermore, the difference in treatment between third-country 
nationals and nationals of other EU Member States was justifiable because the 
EU had created a special legal order as well as EU citizenship.
These cases should be compared to situations where the applicant has developed 
close factual links to the host State, through a long period of residence or 
contribution to the State through taxation.
Example: in the case of Andrejeva v. Latvia the applicant was formerly a citizen 
of the former Soviet Union with a right to permanent residence in Latvia.217 
National legislation classified the applicant as having worked outside Latvia 
for the period prior to independence (despite having been in the same post 
214 See, for example, ECtHR, Chahal v. UK (No. 22414/93), 15 November 1996.
215  Although these cases stand lower chances of success. See, for example, ECtHR, Abdulaziz, Cabales and 
Balkandali v. UK (Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81), 28 May 1985.
216  ECtHR, C. v. Belgium (No. 21794/93), 7 August 1996; ECtHR, Moustaquim v. Belgium (No. 12313/86), 
18 February 1991.
217 ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC] (No. 55707/00), 18 February 2009.
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within Latvian territory before and after independence) and consequently 
calculated her pension on the basis of the time spent in the same post after 
independence. Latvian nationals in the same post, in contrast, were entitled 
to a pension based on their entire period of service, including work prior to 
independence. The ECtHR found the applicant to be in a comparable situation 
to Latvian nationals since she was a ‘permanent resident non-citizen’ under 
national law and had contributed taxes on the same basis. It was stated that 
‘very weighty reasons’ would be needed to justify differential treatment based 
solely on nationality, which it said did not exist in the present case. Although it 
accepted that the State usually enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in matters 
of fiscal and social policy, the applicant’s situation was factually too close to 
that of Latvian nationals to justify discrimination on that basis.
Example: in the case of Gaygusuz v. Austria, a Turkish national who had been 
working in Austria was refused unemployment benefit because he did not hold 
Austrian citizenship.218 The ECtHR found that he was in a comparable situation 
to Austrian nationals since he was a permanent resident and had contributed 
to the social security system through taxation. It found that the absence of 
a reciprocal social security agreement between Austria and Turkey could not 
justify the differential treatment, since the applicant’s situation was factually 
too close to that of Austrian nationals. 
Example: in the case of Koua Poirrez v. France a national of the Ivory Coast 
applied for a benefit payable to those with disabilities. It was refused on the 
basis that it was available only to French nationals or nationals from States with 
which France had a reciprocal social security agreement.219 The ECtHR found 
that the applicant was in fact in a similar situation to French nationals since 
he satisfied all the other statutory criteria for receipt of the benefit, and had 
been in receipt of other social security benefits that were not dependent on 
nationality. It stated that ‘particularly weighty reasons’ would be needed to 
justify a difference in treatment between the applicant and other nationals. In 
contrast to the cases examined above, where the State was accorded a wide 
margin of appreciation in relation to fiscal and social security matters, it was 
not convinced by France’s argument of the necessity to balance State income 
and expenditure, or of the factual difference that no reciprocal agreement 
existed between France and the Ivory Coast. Interestingly, the benefit in 
218 ECtHR, Gaygusuz v. Austria (No. 17371/90), 16 September 1996.
219 ECtHR, Koua Poirrez v. France (No. 40892/98), 30 September 2003.
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question was payable irrespective of whether the recipient had made 
contributions to the national social security regime (which was the principal 
reason for not tolerating nationality discrimination in the above cases). 
4.8. Religion or belief220 
While EU law contains some limited protection against discrimination on the basis 
of religion or belief, the ECHR’s scope is significantly wider than this, since Article 9 
contains a self-contained right to freedom of conscience, religion and belief. 
Example: in the case of Alujer Fernández and Caballero García v. Spain the 
applicants complained that, unlike Catholics, they were unable to allocate 
a proportion of their income tax directly to their Church.221 The ECtHR found 
the case inadmissible on the facts since the applicant’s Church was not in a 
comparable position to the Catholic Church in that they had not made any such 
request to the government, and because the government had a reciprocal 
arrangement in place with the Holy See. 
Example: the case of Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France involved a Jewish 
organisation which certified as kosher meat that was sold among its members’ 
restaurants and butcher shops.222 Since it considered that the meat slaughtered 
by an existing Jewish organisation no longer conformed to the strict precepts 
associated with kosher meat, the applicant sought authorisation from the State 
to conduct its own ritual slaughters. This was refused on the basis that it was 
not sufficiently representative within the French Jewish community, and that 
authorised ritual slaughterers already existed. The ECtHR found that in the cir-
cumstances there was no actual disadvantage suffered by the organisation 
since it was still able to obtain meat slaughtered in the required method from 
other sources. 
220  An explanation as to the scope of Article 9 of the ECHR can be found on the CoE Human Rights 
Education for Legal Professionals website: Murdoch, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, 
Human Rights Handbooks, No. 2, 2007, available at: www.coehelp.org/mod/resource/view.
php?inpopup=true&id=2122. 
221 ECtHR, Alujer Fernández and Caballero García v. Spain (dec.) (No. 53072/99), 14 June 2001.
222 ECtHR, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC] (No. 27417/95), 27 June 2000.
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What actually constitutes a ‘religion’ or ‘belief’ qualifying for protection under the 
Employment Equality Directive or the ECHR has not received extensive consideration 
by the ECJ or ECtHR, but has been analysed thoroughly before national courts.223 
Example: in Islington London Borough Council v. Ladele (Liberty intervening), 
the UK Court of Appeal was asked to consider whether the claimant, who was 
a registrar of births, marriages and deaths, was discriminated against on the 
grounds of religion or belief when she was disciplined for refusing to conduct 
civil partnerships.224 Her refusal was based on her Christian beliefs. The Court 
of Appeal held that this was not a case of direct religious discrimination, as the 
less favourable treatment was not based on her religious beliefs, but by her 
refusal to comply with a term of her employment. The indirect discrimination 
claim was also rejected, with the Court of Appeal indicating that it was part 
of the council’s overarching commitment to the promotion of equality and 
diversity, both within the community and internally, and that such a policy 
did not intrude on the claimant’s right to have such beliefs. The Court of 
Appeal also considered that to find otherwise would lead to discrimination 
on a different ground, that of sexual orientation; the court accepted that 
the individual right of non-discrimination must be balanced against the 
community’s right to non-discrimination. 
In a series of cases relating to the substantive right to freedom of religion and 
belief under the ECHR, the ECtHR has made clear that the State cannot attempt 
to prescribe what constitutes a religion or belief, and that these notions protect 
‘atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned’, thus protecting those who 
choose ‘to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practice or not to practice 
a religion’. These cases also note that religion or belief is essentially personal and 
subjective, and need not necessarily relate to a faith arranged around institutions.225 
223  The right to freedom of religion and belief is also protected as a free-standing right in Article 18 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (which all the Member States of the European 
Union and the Council of Europe have joined). See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment  
No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of thought, conscience or religion).
224  Islington London Borough Council v. Ladele (Liberty intervening) [2009] EWCA Civ 1357, UK Court of 
Appeal, 12 February 2010.
225  ECtHR, Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia (No. 72881/01), 5 October 2006, 
paras. 57-58; ECtHR, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova (No. 45701/99), 
13 December 2001, para. 114; ECtHR, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC] (No. 30985/96), 
26 October 2000, paras. 60 and 62.
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Newer religions, such as Scientology, have also been found to qualify for 
protection.226 
The ECtHR has elaborated on the idea of ‘belief’ in the context of the right to educa-
tion under Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR, which provides that the State must 
respect the right of parents to ensure that their child’s education is ‘in conformity 
with their own religious and philosophical convictions’. The ECtHR stated:
‘In its ordinary meaning the word “convictions”, taken on its own, is not 
synonymous with the words “opinions” and “ideas”, such as are utilised in 
Article 10 … of the Convention, which guarantees freedom of expression; 
it is more akin to the term “beliefs” (in the French text: “convictions”) 
appearing in Article 9 … which … denotes views that attain a certain level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.’227 
The ECtHR has recently been faced with cases related to religious freedom in the 
context of States wishing to maintain secularism and minimise the potentially 
fragmentary effect of religion on their societies. Here it has placed particular weight 
on the State’s stated aim of preventing disorder and protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others.
Example: the case of Köse and Others v. Turkey concerned a dress code 
prohibiting the wearing of headscarves by girls in school, where it was claimed 
that this constituted discrimination on the basis of religion since wearing the 
headscarf was a Muslim religious practice.228 The ECtHR accepted that the rules 
relating to dress were not connected to issues of affiliation to a particular 
religion, but were rather designed to preserve neutrality and secularism in 
schools, which in turn would prevent disorder as well as protect the rights 
of others to non-interference in their own religious beliefs. The claim was 
therefore considered to be manifestly ill-founded and inadmissible. A similar 
approach was taken in a case which related to the dress code for teachers.229 
226 ECtHR, Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia (No. 18147/02), 5 April 2007.
227 ECtHR, Campbell and Cosans v. UK (Nos. 7511/76 and 7743/76), 25 February 1982, para 36.
228 ECtHR, Köse and Others v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 26625/02), 24 January 2006.
229 ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland (dec.) (No. 42393/98), 15 February 2001.
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4.9. Language
It should be noted that both the Council of Europe Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities, 1995,230 (ratified by 39 Member States) and 
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 1992,231 (ratified by 
24 Members States) imposes specific duties on States relating to the use of minority 
languages. However, neither instrument defines the meaning of ‘language’. 
Article 6(3) of the ECHR explicitly provides for certain guarantees in the context of 
the criminal process, such that everyone enjoys the right to have accusations against 
them communicated in a language which they understand, as well as the right to an 
interpreter where they cannot understand or speak the language used in court. 
The ground of language does not feature, of itself, as a separate protected ground 
under the non-discrimination directives, although it does in the ECHR. Nevertheless, 
it may be protected under the Racial Equality Directive in so far as it can be linked 
to race or ethnicity, and may also be considered by the ECtHR under this ground. It 
has also been protected via the ground of nationality by the ECJ in the context of 
the law relating to free movement of persons.232  
The principle case before the ECtHR involving language relates to the context of 
education.
Example: in the Belgium Linguistic case a collection of parents complained 
that national law relating to the provision of education was discriminatory on 
the basis of language.233 In view of the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking 
communities in Belgium, national law stipulated that State-provided or State-
subsidised education would be offered in either French or Dutch depending on 
whether the region was considered French or Dutch. Parents of French-speaking 
children living in the Dutch-speaking region complained that this prevented, or 
made it considerably harder, for their children to be educated in French. The 
ECtHR found that while there was a difference in treatment this was justified. 
The decision was based around consideration that regions were predominantly 
230 CETS No. 157.
231 CETS No. 148.
232  ECJ, Groener v. Minister for Education and the Dublin Vocational Educational Committee Case C-379/87 
[1989] ECR 3967, 28 November 1989.
233  ECtHR, Case ‘relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium’ 
v. Belgium (Nos. 1474/62 and others), 23 July 1968.
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unilingual. The difference in treatment was therefore justified since it would 
not be viable to make teaching available in both languages. Furthermore, 
families were not prohibited from making use of private education in French in 
Dutch-speaking regions.
For further elucidation as to how the protected ground of language operates 
in practice it is possible to draw on two cases decided by the UN Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), responsible for interpreting and monitoring compliance with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which all EU Member States 
have joined). 
Example: in the case of Diergaardt v. Namibia the applicants belonged to 
a minority group of European descent which had formerly enjoyed political 
autonomy and now fell within the State of Namibia.234 The language used by 
this community was Afrikaans. The applicants complained that during court 
proceedings they were obliged to use English rather than their mother tongue. 
They also complained of a State policy to refuse to respond in Afrikaans to any 
written or oral communications from the applicants even though they had the 
ability to do so. The HRC found that there had been no violation of the right 
to a fair trial, since the applicants could not show that they were negatively 
affected by the use of English during court proceedings. This would suggest 
that the right to an interpreter during a trial does not extend to situations 
where the language is simply not the mother tongue of the alleged victim. 
Rather it must be the case that the victim is not sufficiently able to understand 
or communicate in that language. The HRC also found that the State’s official 
policy of refusing to communicate in a language other than the official language 
(English) constituted a violation of the right to equality before the law on the 
basis of language. While the State may choose its official language, it must 
allow officials to respond in other languages where they are able to do so. 
4.10. Social origin, birth and property
It is possible to view these three grounds as interconnected as they relate to a status 
imputed to an individual by virtue of an inherited social, economic or biological 
234 HRC, Diergaardt and Others v. Namibia, Communication No. 760/1997, 6 September 2000.
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feature235. As such they may also be interrelated with race and ethnicity. Aside from 
the ground of ‘birth’, few, if any, cases have been brought before the ECtHR relating 
to these grounds.
Example: in the case of Mazurek v. France, an individual who had been born 
out of wedlock complained that national law prevented him (as an ‘adulterine’ 
child) from inheriting more than one quarter of his mother’s estate.236 The 
ECtHR found that this difference in treatment, based solely on the fact of being 
born out of wedlock, could only be justified by particularly ‘weighty reasons’. 
While preserving the traditional family was a legitimate aim it could not be 
achieved by penalising the child who has no control over the circumstances of 
their birth.
Example: in the case of Chassagnou and Others v. France, the applicants 
complained that they were not permitted to use their land in accordance with 
their wishes.237 Laws within particular regions obliged small landowners to 
transfer public hunting rights over their land, while large landowners were under 
no such obligation and could use their land as they wished. The applicants wished 
to prohibit hunting on their land and use it for the conservation of wildlife. The 
ECtHR found that this constituted discrimination on the basis of property. 
The grounds of social origin, birth and property also feature under Article 2(2) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. The Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, responsible for monitoring and inter-
preting the treaty has expanded on their meaning in its General Comment 20. 
According to the Committee, ‘social origin’, ‘birth’ and ‘property’ status are inter-
connected. Social origin ‘refers to a person’s inherited social status’. It may relate 
to the position that they have acquired through birth into a particular social class or 
community (such as those based on ethnicity, religion, or ideology), or from one’s 
social situation such as poverty and homelessness. Additionally, the ground of birth 
may refer to one’s status as born out of wedlock, or being adopted. The ground 
235  The grounds of social origin, birth and property also feature under Article 2(2) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (to which all the EU Member States are party). 
See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20, ‘Non-Discrimination 
in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, 10 June 2009, paras. 24-26, 35.
236 ECtHR, Mazurek v. France (No. 34406/97), 1 February 2000.
237 ECtHR, Chassagnou and Others. v. France (Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95), 29 April 1999.
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of property may relate to one’s status in relation to land (such as being a tenant, 
owner, or illegal occupant), or in relation other property.238
4.11. Political or other opinion
The ECHR expressly lists ‘political or other opinion’ as a protected ground, although 
they do not feature among the grounds protected by the EU non-discrimination 
directives. Presumably, where a particular conviction is held by an individual but it 
does not satisfy the requirements of being a ‘religion or belief’ it may still qualify 
for protection under this ground. This ground has rarely been ruled upon by the 
ECtHR. As with other areas of the ECHR, ‘political or other opinion’ is protected in its 
own right through the right to freedom of expression under Article 10, and from the 
case-law in this area it is possible to gain an appreciation of what may be covered 
by this ground. In practice it would seem that where an alleged victim feels that 
there has been differential treatment on this basis, it is more likely that the ECtHR 
would simply examine the claim under Article 10. 
At a general level, the ECtHR established in the case of Handyside v. UK that the 
right to freedom of expression will protect not only ‘“information” or “ideas” that 
are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, 
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population’.239 While there is extensive case-law in this area this chapter will confine 
itself to illustrating, through two cases, how political opinion is likely to receive 
stronger protection than other types of opinion.
Example: in the case of Steel and Morris v. UK, the applicants were cam-
paigners who distributed leaflets containing untrue allegations about the 
company McDonalds.240 The applicants were sued in an action for defamation 
before the national courts and ordered to pay damages. The ECtHR found 
that the action in defamation constituted an interference with freedom 
of expression, but that this served the legitimate purpose of protecting 
individuals’ reputations. However, it was also found that free speech on 
matters of public interest deserve strong protection, and given that McDonalds 
238  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20, ‘Non-Discrimination in 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, 10 June 2009, paras. 24-26, 35.
239 ECtHR, Handyside v. UK (No. 5493/72), 7 December 1976.
240 ECtHR, Steel and Morris v. UK (No. 68416/01), 15 February 2005.
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
118
was a powerful corporate entity which had not proved that it had suffered 
harm as the result of the distribution of several thousand leaflets, and that the 
damages awarded were relatively high compared to the applicants’ income, 
the interference with their freedom of expression was disproportionate.
Example: the case of Castells v. Spain concerned a member of parliament who 
was prosecuted for ‘insulting’ the government after criticising government 
inaction in addressing acts of terrorism in the Basque country.241 The ECtHR 
underlined the importance of freedom of expression in a political context, 
particularly given its important role in the proper functioning of a democratic 
society. As such, the ECtHR found that any interference would call for ‘the 
closest of scrutiny’.
4.12. ‘Other status’
As can be seen from the above, the ECtHR has developed several grounds under the 
‘other status’ category, many of which coincide with those developed under EU law, 
such as sexual orientation, age, and disability. 
In addition to disability, age, and sexual orientation, the ECtHR has also recognised 
that the following characteristics are protected grounds under ‘other status’: 
fatherhood;242 marital status;243 membership of an organisation;244 military rank;245 
parenthood of a child born out of wedlock;246 place of residence.247 
Example: the case of Petrov v. Bulgaria concerned the practice in a prison 
of allowing inmates with spouses to telephone them twice a month. The 
applicant had lived with his partner for a period of four years and had a child 
with her before his incarceration. The ECtHR found that, although marriage 
241 ECtHR, Castells v. Spain (No. 11798/85), 23 April 1992.
242 ECtHR, Weller v. Hungary (No. 44399/05), 31 March 2009.
243 ECtHR, Petrov v. Bulgaria (No. 15197/02), 22 May 2008.
244  ECtHR, Danilenkov and Others v. Russia (No. 67336/01), 30 July 2009 (trade union); ECtHR, Grande 
Oriente d’Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani v. Italy (no. 2) (No. 26740/02), 31 May 2007.
245  ECtHR, Engel and Others v. the Netherlands (Nos. 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72 and 
5370/72), 8 June 1976.
246  ECtHR, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC] (No. 31871/96), 8 July 2003; ECtHR, Sahin v. Germany [GC] 
(No. 30943/96), 8 July 2003.
247 ECtHR, Carson and Others v. UK [GC] (No. 42184/05), 16 March 2010.
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has a special status, for the purposes of rules concerning communication via 
telephone, the applicant, who had established a family with a stable partner, 
was in a comparable situation to married couples. The ECtHR stated that  
‘[w]hile the Contracting States may be allowed a certain margin of appreciation 
to treat differently married and unmarried couples in the fields of, for instance, 
taxation, social security or social policy… it is not readily apparent why 
married and unmarried partners who have an established family life are to 
be given disparate treatment as regards the possibility to maintain contact by 
telephone while one of them is in custody.’ The ECtHR accordingly found the 
discrimination unjustified.
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Discrimination does not tend to be manifested in an open and easily identifiable 
manner. Proving direct discrimination is often difficult even though, by definition, 
the differential treatment is ‘openly’ based on a characteristic of the victim. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the ground of differential treatment is often either not 
expressed or is superficially related to another factor (such as benefits conditioned 
on an individual being retired, which are connected to age as a protected ground). 
In this sense, cases where individuals openly declare their basis for differential 
treatment as one of the protected grounds are relatively rare. An exception to 
this may be found in the Feryn case, where the owner of a company in Belgium 
declared, through advertisements and orally, that no ‘immigrants’ would be 
recruited to work for him.248 The ECJ found that this was a clear case of direct 
discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity. However, the perpetrators will not 
always declare that they are treating someone less favourably than others, nor 
indicate their reason for doing so. A woman may be turned down for a job and 
told that she is simply ‘less qualified’ than the male candidate who is offered the 
job. In this situation the victim may find it difficult to prove that she was directly 
discriminated against because of her sex. 
To address the difficulty of proving that differential treatment was based on a 
protected ground, European non-discrimination law allows the burden of proof 
to be shared. Accordingly, once the claimant can show facts from which it can 
248  ECJ, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV, Case C-54/07 
[2008] ECR I-5187, 10 July 2008.
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be presumed that discrimination may have occurred, the burden of proof falls on 
the perpetrator to prove otherwise. This shift in the burden of proof is particularly 
helpful in claims of indirect discrimination where it is necessary to prove that 
particular rules or practices have a disproportionate impact on a particular group. 
In order to raise a presumption of indirect discrimination, a claimant may need to 
rely on statistical data that proves general patterns of differential treatment. Some 
national jurisdictions also accept evidence generated through ‘situation testing’.
5.2. Sharing of the burden of proof 
It is normally for the person bringing the claim to convince the deciding body 
that discrimination has occurred. However, it can be particularly difficult to show 
that the differential treatment received was on the basis of a particular protected 
characteristic. This is because the motive behind differential treatment often 
exists only in the mind of the perpetrator. Accordingly, 
claims of discrimination are most often based on 
objective inferences related to the rule or practice in 
question. Put otherwise, the court must be convinced 
that the only reasonable explanation for the diffe-
rence in treatment is the protected characteristic of 
the victim, such as sex or race. The principle applies 
equally in cases of direct or indirect discrimination. 
Because the alleged perpetrator is in possession of the information needed to 
prove a claim, non-discrimination law allows the burden of proof to be shared with 
the alleged perpetrator. The principle of the sharing of the burden of proof is well 
entrenched in the ECHR and the law of the EU.249 
This has been explained through the ECtHR case-law, which, along with other 
regional and global human rights protection mechanisms, has adopted the sharing 
of the burden of proof more generally in relation to proving claims of human rights 
violations. The practice of the ECtHR is to look at the available evidence as a whole, 
out of consideration of the fact that it is the State that often has control over much 
of the information needed to prove a claim. Accordingly, if the facts as presented by 
249  In addition to the cases referred to below, see Racial Equality Directive (Article 8), Employment Equality 
Directive (Article 10), Gender Equality Directive (Recast) (Article 19), Gender Goods and Services 
Directive (Article 9). See also case-law of the European Committee of Social Rights: SUD Travail Affaires 
Sociales v. France (Complaint No. 24/2004), 8 November 2005, and Mental Disability Advocacy Centre 
(MDAC) v. Bulgaria (Complaint No. 41/2007), 3 June 2008.
Shared burden of proof: the 
claimant needs to bring sufficient 
evidence to suggest that 
discriminatory treatment may 
have occurred. This will raise a 
presumption of discrimination, 
which the alleged perpetrator then 
has to rebut. 
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the claimant appear credible and consistent with the available evidence, the ECtHR 
will accept them as proven, unless the State is able to offer a convincing alternative 
explanation. In the ECtHR’s words it accepts as facts those assertions that are
‘supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including  such inferences 
as may flow from the facts and the parties’ submissions … [P]roof may 
follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant 
inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level 
of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this 
connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically linked to 
the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the [ECHR] 
right at stake.’250
Example: in the case of Timishev v. Russia, the claimant alleged that he was 
prevented from passing a checkpoint into a particular region because of his 
Chechen ethnic origin.251 The ECtHR found this to be corroborated by official 
documents, which noted the existence of a policy to restrict the movement of 
ethnic Chechens. The explanation of the State was found unconvincing because 
of inconsistencies in its assertion that the victim left voluntarily after being 
refused priority in the queue. Accordingly, the ECtHR accepted that the claimant 
had been discriminated against on the basis of his ethnicity.
Example: in the Brunnhofer case, the claimant alleged sex discrimination 
because she was paid less than a male colleague who was on the same pay 
grade.252 The ECJ stated that it was for the claimant to prove, firstly, that she 
was receiving less pay than her male counterpart and, secondly, that she was 
performing work of equal value. This would be sufficient to raise a presumption 
that the differential treatment could only be explained by reference to her sex. 
It would then fall to the employer to disprove this. 
250  ECtHR, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC] (Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98), 6 July 2005, para. 147. 
This is repeated in the case of ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia (Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00), 
13 December 2005, para. 39, and ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC] (No. 57325/00), 
13 November 2007, para. 178.
251 ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia (Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00), 13 December 2005, paras. 40-44.
252  ECJ, Susanna Brunnhofer v. Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG, Case C-381/99 [2001] ECR 
I-4961, 26 June 2001, paras. 51-62.
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It is important to keep two issues in mind. Firstly, it is national law that will deter-
mine what kind of evidence is admissible before national bodies, and this may be 
stricter than the rules used by the ECtHR or ECJ. Secondly, the rule on the reversal of 
the burden of proof will not normally apply in cases of criminal law where the State 
is prosecuting the perpetrator for a crime that was motivated by a racial prejudice, 
otherwise known as a ‘hate crime’. This is partly because a higher standard of proof 
is needed to establish criminal liability, and partly because it would be difficult 
to require a perpetrator to prove that they did not hold a racist motive, which is 
entirely subjective.253
The alleged perpetrator can rebut the presumption in two ways. They may either 
prove that the claimant is not actually in a similar or comparable situation to their 
‘comparator’, as discussed in Chapter 2.2.2., or that the differential treatment is not 
based on the protected ground, but other objective differences, as discussed in 
Chapter 2.6. If the perpetrator fails to rebut the presumption they will have to raise 
a defence of differential treatment, showing that it is an objectively justified and 
proportionate measure.
Example: in the Brunnhofer case, above, the ECJ offered guidance on how the 
employer might rebut the presumption of discrimination. Firstly, by showing 
that the male and female employees were not actually in a comparable 
situation because they performed work which was not of equal value. This 
might be the case if their jobs involved duties of a substantially different 
nature. Secondly, by showing that objective factors, unrelated to sex, explained 
the difference in pay. This might be the case if the male employee’s income 
was being supplemented by travel allowances owed by virtue of him having 
to commute over a long distance and stay in a hotel during the working week.
Example: in the Feryn case, above, the ECJ found that the advertisements 
and statements made by the perpetrator gave rise to a presumption of direct 
discrimination. However, the ECJ also said that the alleged perpetrator could 
rebut this presumption if he could prove that recruitment practices did not 
actually treat non-Whites differently – for instance, by showing that non-White 
staff were in fact routinely recruited.
253  For the approach of the ECtHR to the reversal of the burden of proof in the context of racist violence 
see ECtHR, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC] (Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98), 6 July 2005,
paras. 144-159. EU discrimination legislation does not require the reversal of the burden of proof  
to be applied in the context of criminal law.
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5.2.1. Factors not needing to be proven
Certain issues of fact which often accompany examples of discrimination, such 
as the existence of prejudice, or an intention to discriminate, are not actually of 
relevance to determining whether the legal test for discrimination has been 
satisfied. What must be proven in a case of discrimination is simply the existence 
of differential treatment, on the basis of a prohibited ground, which is not justified. 
This means that several ancillary facts surrounding situations of discrimination do 
not need establishing in order to prove a claim.
Firstly, there is no need to prove that the perpetrator is motivated by prejudice – 
thus, there is no need to prove the perpetrator has ‘racist’ or ‘sexist’ views in order 
to prove race or sex discrimination. In general law cannot regulate individuals’ 
attitudes since they are entirely internal. Rather it can only regulate actions through 
which such attitudes may manifest themselves.
Example: in the Feryn case, the owner of the company said that he applied 
this rule because his customers (rather than he himself) only wanted white 
Belgians to perform the work. The ECJ did not treat this as relevant to 
deciding if discrimination had occurred. You will not normally need to prove a 
discriminatory motive unless you are attempting to prove the commission of a 
‘hate crime’, since criminal law has higher thresholds of evidence. 
Secondly, it is not necessary to show that the rule or practice in question is intended 
to result in differential treatment. That is to say, even if a public authority or private 
individual can point to a well-intentioned or good-faith practice, if the effect of that 
practice is to disadvantage a particular group, this will amount to discrimination. 
Example: in the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, discussed above, 
the government argued that the system of ‘special’ schools was established 
in order to assist in the education of Roma children by overcoming language 
difficulties and redressing the lack of pre-school education.254 However, the 
ECtHR found that it was irrelevant whether the policy in question was aimed 
at Roma children. In order to prove discrimination it was necessary to show 
254 ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC] (No. 57325/00), 13 November 2007, para. 79.
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that they were disproportionately and negatively affected by comparison to 
the majority population, not that there existed any intention to discriminate.255 
Thirdly, in relation to a case on race discrimination, the ECJ found that there was no 
need to prove that there is actually an identifiable victim, and presumably this has 
equal application for other grounds of discrimination in similar circumstances. While 
under EU law there may be no requirement for an identifiable victim, this is not 
the case for accessing the ECtHR, where such claim would not meet the criteria for 
admissibility under Article 34 of the ECHR.
Example: in the Feryn case it was not possible to show that someone had 
tried to apply for a job and been turned down, and it was not possible to find 
someone who said that they had decided not to apply for the job on the basis 
of the advert. Put in other words, there was no ‘identifiable’ victim, and the 
case was brought by Belgium’s equality body. The ECJ said that it was not 
necessary to identify someone who had been discriminated against. This was 
because it was clear from the wording of the advert that ‘non-Whites’ would 
be deterred from applying because they knew in advance that they could not 
be successful. According to this, it would be possible to prove that legislation or 
policies were discriminatory, without needing to show an actual victim.
Example: in cases of ‘situation testing’ (discussed below) individuals often take 
part in the knowledge or expectation that they will be treated unfavourably. 
Their main aim is not to actually access the service in question, but to collect 
evidence. This means that these individuals are not ‘victims’ in the traditional 
sense. They are concerned with ensuring enforcement of the law rather 
than seeking compensation for harm suffered. In a case brought in Sweden, 
where a group of law students conducted situation testing at nightclubs and 
restaurants, the Supreme Court found that those involved in testing were still 
able to bring proceedings for discriminatory treatment. At the same time the 
damages they were awarded could be reduced to reflect the fact that they had 
not been denied something that they actually wanted (i.e., entry to particular 
establishments).256 
255 Ibid, paras. 175 and 184.
256  Sweden, Supreme Court, Escape Bar and Restaurant v. Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination 
T-2224-07, 1 October 2008. English summary available at FRA InfoPortal, Case 365-1; European Network 
of Legal Experts on the Non-Discrimination Field, 8 (July 2009) ‘European Anti-Discrimination Law 
Review’, p. 68.
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5.3. Role of statistics and other data 
Statistical data can play an important role in helping a claimant give rise to 
a presumption of discrimination. It is particularly useful in proving indirect 
discrimination, because in these situations the rules or practices in question are 
neutral on the surface. Where this is the case it is necessary to focus on the effects 
of the rules or practices to show that they are disproportionately unfavourable to 
specific groups of persons by comparison to others in a similar situation. Production 
of statistical data works together with the reversal of the burden of proof: where 
data shows, for example, that women or disabled persons are particularly 
disadvantaged, it will be for the State to give a convincing alternative explanation of 
the figures. The ECtHR spelt this out in the case of Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands:257
‘[T]he Court considers that where an applicant is able to show, on the basis 
of undisputed official statistics, the existence of a prima facie indication that 
a specific rule – although formulated in a neutral manner – in fact affects 
a clearly higher percentage of women than men, it is for the respondent 
Government to show that this is the result of objective factors unrelated to 
any discrimination on grounds of sex.’
When considering statistical evidence the courts do not appear to have laid down 
any strict threshold requirement that needs to be evidenced in establishing that 
indirect discrimination has taken place. The ECJ does emphasise that a substantial 
figure needs to be achieved. A summary of ECJ case-law is presented in the Opinion 
of Léger AG in the Nolte case where he stated in relation to sex discrimination:
‘[I]n order to be presumed discriminatory, the measure must affect “a far 
greater number of women than men” [Rinner-Kühn258] or “a considerably 
lower percentage of men than women” [Nimz259, Kowalska260] or “far more 
women than men” [De Weerd, née Roks, and Others 261].
Cases suggest that the proportion of women affected by the measure must 
be particularly marked. In Rinner-Kühn, the Court inferred the existence of 
257 Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.) (No. 58641/00), 6 January 2005.
258 ECJ, Rinner-Kühn v. FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung, Case C-171/88 [1989] ECR 2743, 13 July 1989.
259 ECJ, Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Case C-184/89 [1991] ECR I-297, 7 February 1991.
260 ECJ, Kowalska v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Case C-33/89 [1990] ECR I-2591, 27 June 1990.
261  ECJ, De Weerd, née Roks, and Others v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Gezondheid, 
Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen and Others, Case C-343/92 [1994] ECR I-571, 
24 February 1994.
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a discriminatory situation where the percentage of women was 89%. In 
this instance, per se the figure of 60% … would therefore probably be quite 
insufficient to infer the existence of discrimination.’262
Example: in the Schönheit case a part-time employee alleged that she was 
discriminated against on the basis of her sex.263 The difference in payable 
pensions, which was not based on differences in the time worked, meant that 
part-time employees were, effectively, paid less than full-time employees. 
Statistical evidence was brought to show that 87.9% of part-time employees 
were women. As the measure, although neutral, negatively affected women 
disproportionately to men, the ECJ accepted that it gave rise to a presumption 
of indirect discrimination on the basis of sex. Similarly, a disadvantage to part-
time workers, where 87% of these were women, was accepted as sufficient in 
the Gerster case.264
Example: the Seymour-Smith case concerned UK law relating to unfair 
dismis sal, which gave special protection to those who had been working 
for longer than two years continuously with the particular employer.265 The 
complainant alleged that this amounted to indirect discrimination based on 
sex, since women were less likely than men to satisfy this criterion. This case 
is interesting because the ECJ suggested that a lower level of disproportion 
could still prove indirect discrimination ‘if it revealed a persistent and relatively 
constant disparity over a long period between men and women’. However, on 
the particular facts of this case the ECJ indicated that the statistics that were 
presented, which indicated that 77.4% of men and 68.9% of women fulfilled 
the criterion, did not evidence that a considerably smaller percentage of 
women could comply with the rule. 
Example: the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic involved complaints 
by Roma applicants that their children were excluded from the mainstream 
education system and placed in ‘special’ schools intended for those with 
262  Opinion of Advocate General Léger of 31 May 1995, paras. 57-58 in ECJ, Nolte v. 
Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, Case C-317/93 [1995] ECR I-4625, 14 December 1995.
263  ECJ, Hilde Schönheit v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main and Silvia Becker v. Land Hessen, Joined Cases C-4/02 
and C-5/02 [2003] ECR I-12575, 23 October 2003.
264 ECJ, Gerster v. Freistaat Bayern, Case C-1/95 [1997] ECR I-5253, 2 October 1997.
265  ECJ, R v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Seymour-Smith and Perez, Case C-167/97 [1999] 
ECR I-623, 9 February 1999.
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learning difficulties, on the basis of their Roma ethnicity.266 The allocation of 
Roma children to ‘special’ schools was based on the use of tests designed to 
test intellectual capacity. Despite this apparently ‘neutral’ practice, the nature 
of the tests made it inherently more difficult for Roma children to achieve a 
satisfactory result and enter the mainstream education system. The ECtHR 
found this to be proven by reference to statistical evidence showing the 
particularly high proportion of pupils of Roma origin placed in ‘special’ schools. 
The data submitted by the applicants relating to their particular geographical 
region suggested that 50 to 56% of special-school pupils were Roma, while 
they only represented around 2% of the total population in education. Data 
taken from inter-governmental sources suggested between 50% and 90% of 
Roma attended special schools in the country as a whole. The ECtHR found that 
while the data was not exact it did reveal that the number of Roma children 
affected was ‘disproportionately high’ relative to their composition of the 
population as a whole.267
It seems that it may be possible to prove that a protected group is disproportion-
ately affected even where no statistical data is available, but the available sources 
are reliable and support this analysis.
Example: the case of Opuz v. Turkey involved an individual with a history of 
domestic violence who had brutalised his wife and her mother on several 
occasions, eventually murdering the mother.268 The ECtHR found that the 
State had failed to protect the applicant and her mother from inhuman and 
degrading treatment, as well as the latter’s life. It also found that the State 
had discriminated against the applicants because the failure to offer adequate 
protection was based on the fact that they were women. It came to this 
conclusion in part based on evidence that victims of domestic violence were 
predominantly women, and figures illustrating the relatively limited use the 
national courts had made of powers to grant orders designed to protect victims of 
violence in the home. Interestingly in this case, there were no statistics presented 
to the ECtHR showing that victims of domestic violence were predominantly 
women, and indeed it was noted that Amnesty International stated that there 
266 ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC] (No. 57325/00), 13 November 2007.
267  ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC] (No. 57325/00), 13 November 2007, paras. 18, 
196-201.
268 ECtHR, Opuz v. Turkey (No. 33401/02), 9 June 2009.
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were no reliable data to this effect. Rather, the ECtHR was prepared to accept 
the assessment of Amnesty International, a reputable national NGO and the UN’s 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women that violence 
against women was a significant problem in Turkey. 
Note that statistical data may not always be necessary to prove cases of indirect 
discrimination. Whether statistics are necessary in order to prove a claim will 
depend on the facts of the case. In particular, proof as to the practices or beliefs of 
others belonging to the same protected category may be enough.
Example: in the case of Oršuš and Others v. Croatia certain schools had 
established classes which dealt with reduced curricula as compared to normal 
classes. It was alleged that these classes contained a disproportionately high 
number of Roma students and therefore amounted to indirect discrimination 
on the basis of ethnicity. The government contended that these classes 
were constituted on the basis of competence in Croatian, and that once a 
student reached adequate language proficiency they were transferred to the 
mainstream classes. The ECtHR found that, unlike the D.H. case, the statistics 
alone did not give rise to a presumption of discrimination. In one school 44% of 
pupils were Roma and 73% attended a Roma-only class. In another school 10% 
were Roma and 36% of them attended a Roma-only class. This confirmed that 
there was no general policy to automatically place Roma in separate classes. 
However, the ECtHR went on to state that it was possible to establish a claim of 
indirect discrimination without relying on statistical data. Here, the fact that the 
measure of placing children in separate classes on the basis of their insufficient 
command of Croatian was only applied to Roma students. Accordingly, this 
gave rise to a presumption of differential treatment.269
Example: a case taken before the Slovenian Advocate of the Principle of 
Equality involved an employer who provided meals for employees that 
often included products derived from pork meat or fat. A Muslim employee 
requested the alternative monthly meal allowance in order to purchase their 
own food, which the employer only issued to employees who could prove the 
need for alternative eating arrangements for medical reasons.270 This was a 
269 ECtHR, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC] (No. 15766/03), 16 March 2010, paras. 152-153.
270  Advocate of the Principle of Equality (Slovenia), Decision No. UEM-0921-1/2008-3, 28 August 2008. 
English summary available at FRA Infoportal, Case 364-1; European Network of Legal Experts on the 
Non-Discrimination Field, 8 (July 2009) ‘European Anti-Discrimination Law Review’, at p. 64.
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case of indirect discrimination since a practice that was neutral on the surface 
had an inherently negative impact on Muslims who are not permitted to eat 
pork. In the circumstances of this case it was not necessary to bring statistical 
evidence to show that the rule negatively affects Muslims because it is readily 
ascertainable that Muslims may not eat pork by reference to evidence of their 
religious practices. 
Example: a case taken before the UK courts involved an employer that prohibited 
the wearing of jewellery (including for religious reasons) on the outside of 
the employee’s uniform.271 A Christian employee claimed that this amounted 
to discrimination on the basis of her religion because she was not permitted 
to wear a cross. During the case and the subsequent appeals the courts were 
prepared to accept that this could constitute indirect discrimination on religious 
grounds, if it could be proved that wearing the cross was a requirement of the 
Christian faith. For this purpose the Employment Tribunal sought evidence from 
expert witnesses regarding Christian practices, rather than statistical evidence 
relating to the numbers of Christians who wear religious symbols at work.
271 UK Court of Appeal, Eweida v. British Airways Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 80, 12 February 2010.
Key points
• The motive behind the less favourable treatment is irrelevant; it is the impact that 
is important.
• Under EU law there is no need to establish an identifiable victim.
• The initial burden rests with the complainant to establish evidence that suggests 
that discrimination has taken place.
• Statistical evidence may be used in order to help give rise to a presumption of 
discrimination. 
• The burden then shifts to the alleged perpetrator who must provide evidence that 
shows that the less favourable treatment was not based on one of the protected 
grounds.
• The presumption of discrimination can be rebutted by proving: either that the 
victim is not in a similar situation to their ‘comparator’; or that the difference in 
treatment is based on some objective factor, unconnected to the protected ground. 
If the perpetrator fails to rebut this presumption they may still attempt to justify 
the differential treatment.
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Note on citation 
The above case-law provides the reader with comprehensive information that will 
enable them to find the full judgment of the case concerned. This may be deemed 
useful should the reader want to delve deeper into the reasoning and analysis 
applied before the respective court in reaching the decision concerned. 
Much of the cases referred to in this publication are either cases decided before the 
ECJ or the ECtHR; so, they constitute the focus of the remainder of the discussion. 
Similar techniques can, nonetheless, be used when using national case-law 
databases. 
In order to find ECtHR case-law, the reader can access the ECtHR HUDOC portal, which 
provides free access to ECtHR case-law: www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-
Law/Hudoc/Hudoc+database/. The HUDOC portal has a user friendly search engine 
which makes finding the desired case-law a simple exercise. The simplest way of 
finding the required case is to enter the application number into the search box 
entitled ‘Application Number’. 
In order to find ECJ case-law, the reader can access the CURIA search engine, which 
provides free access to ECJ case-law: http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.
pl?lang=en. The CURIA search engine has a user friendly interface which makes 
finding the desired case-law a simple exercise. The simplest way of finding the 
required case is to enter the case number into the search box entitled ‘Case number’. 
Alternatively, the two suggested search engines (or any search engine that is 
used) will allow the user to browse the cases by date. Locating the required case-
law through browsing the date of the judgment has been made easier through the 
presentation of the date with all cases that have been incorporated in this Handbook.

